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ABSTRACT

The East-German euphoria of unification in 1989 and the subsequent transition from a
communist to a market economy that had promised West German standards and prosperity in
East Germany vanished rapidly. A hastily negotiated unification treaty and emerging West
German dominance – in numbers and economic power – resulted in vast unemployment,
bankruptcies, and the large-scale collapse of the East German economy. In addition, EastGerman culture, accomplishments, and experiences were not respected and valued in a unified
country that was focused on Western values, languages, and ways of life. With nothing to offer,
East Germans became hopeless and resentful and developed a feeling of second-class citizens in
their own country that is lasting until the present day.
This dissertation examines how West Germans constantly and consistently disrespected
and delegitimized East-German culture and accomplishments in politics, the arts, education, and
everyday life. It argues that the work of East Germans and their accomplishments were not
evaluated based on their merit but rather on their East-German origin or East-German party
affiliation. For that, this dissertation focuses on the narrative of the leading conservative party of
the unification chancellor Helmut Kohl, the CDU. Furthermore, it surveys the dominant WestGerman newspapers that largely contributed to a public scrutinizing and shaming of everything
East German. And lastly, it provides a close reading of post-unification German films that
illustrate the challenges East German faced when navigating in a new world. Recognizing the
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magnitude of this wide-ranging disrespect that is constantly and consistently manifested,
provides a counter-narrative of the “Jammerossi” (the whining East German) as East Germans
are often berated when complaining about the status quo.

x

INTRODUCTION

Thirty-one years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, contemporary German citizens are still
preoccupied with the contentious dynamics of the unification process.1 Concerns with geopolitical fractiousness are deeply rooted in German history and still affect the citizens’ presentday attitudes toward a unified nation. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent rejection of
socialism was a chance to recover and unify what was perceived to be an “incomplete” nation;
yet, despite these actions, social unity between East and West Germans has never been fully
realized and a wall still persists as a metaphorical barrier in the minds of many German citizens.
After three decades of lacking social unification efforts, questions about the unification process
provide a context rife with opportunities for a historical, cultural, and social-studies analysis,
because such an analysis can inform the reasons for lingering social disunity between East and
West Germans so that this challenging issue may be better understood and potentially remedied.2
In this dissertation, through the evidence of politics, journalism, and the arts, I argue that
until the present day, East Germans have been consistently and continually denied legitimacy
and respect after unification. Furthermore, East Germans have continued to be othered and
excluded in what should have been an integrative and inclusionary unification process. This

1

Throughout this dissertation I chose the term “unification” instead of “reunification,” as Germany with its current
borders, had previously not existed in this form.
2
This dissertation contains sections of my master thesis submitted in 2014,
Arwen Puteri, “’Die Mauer im Kopf’: Aesthetic Resistance against West-Germany Take-Over,” Master’s thesis,
University of South Florida, 2014, https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5107.
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othering on a political, social, and cultural level has led to widespread alienation and disaffection
of the East Germans in everyday life. Additionally, it led to a turning away from traditional
politics in a search for radical political philosophies that seem to restore dignity to the Eastern
Germans, such as those propagated by PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of
the Occident), the AfD (Alternative for Germany), and the Neo Nazis (or even a nostalgia as
expressed in the strong support for Die Linke). In other words, thirty years hence, the German
unification project has remained a very much imperfect and even flawed process that has not
been sufficiently and objectively discussed through the lens of East Germans.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I was nine years old. My positionality, that of German
and French nationality/ethnicity and Rhineland-Palatinate regional identification, made me
ignorant to the challenges that my fellow Germans were experiencing in East Germany. But this
ignorance was – partially – institutionalized. Throughout my childhood and adolescence, my
knowledge and therefore, interest, about East Germany was very limited because in school I did
not learn anything about East Germany. It was as if the country did not and after 1989 had not
existed. My understanding was that West Germans had saved East Germans and that the
“communist/socialist” problem was solved. I was also taught that nothing worthy and
salvageable came out of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The only occasion I was
confronted with anything East German was when we suddenly had one East German girl called
Mandy in my class, but nobody interacted with her. In those days, the name “Mandy” was
uncommon in West Germany. Mandy, Cindy, or Sandy were all names given in East Germany
and displayed my classmate’s Mandy’s otherness. We ended up calling her “Mandel,” the
German word for “almond.” I also remember, of course, the lack of “exotic” items in the GDR;
when referring to East Germany, the lack of bananas, kiwis, or Hollywood films was always

2

discussed and a reason to chuckle. This is where my knowledge about the other part of Germany
ended. When I moved to Berlin, I started evaluating unification and the East-German condition
under a more critical lens. I worked in a restaurant with East and West Germans and noticed that
each group mostly associated with their “own.” When I organized a small get together with
colleagues, my closest (East-German) friend asked whether I had also invited West Germans.
This question seemed odd to me at that time but upon researching how East Germans were – and
still are – treated and othered by West Germans after unification, in politics, the arts and
entertainment, and in the press, the lingering social disunity of East and West Germans and the
resulting “us/them” narrative started to makes sense.

GERMAN UNIFICATION: 1990 - 2000
Shortly after unification, East Germans were often the laughingstock of the nation, because of
their dubious portrayal in the entertainment industry. The cinematic representation was crucial,
as this was one way of “getting to know” the East German. The widely successful comedy Go,
Trabi, Go (1991), which depicts a Saxon family in their unreliable East-German car (the Trabi)
on their family vacation to Italy, attracted 1.5 million viewers. The film used clichés and
stereotypes to portray the East German as unrefined, naïve, and silly, and therefore, reinforced
the notion of the East German as the “other.”3 In a 2019 interview, director Peter Timm
recollected how renowned West German producer Günther Rohrbach of Bavaria Film in Munich
recruited him for the film that should feature the East German car Trabi (short for Trabant),
since it was first appearing on the West German Autobahn and the producer wanted to

3

Go Trabi Go, directed by Peter Timm (1991; Munich, Germany: EUROVIDEO, 2016), DVD.

3

“introduce” it to the West-German audience.4 According to Timm, Rohrbach chose him as
director because he had lived in the GDR until he was exiled for his critical evaluation of the
system in 1973, suggesting that this would make him the “East Germany” expert on set.5 Still,
the funding, the production, and the distribution were all West German. Timm furthermore
claimed that the main goal of the film was the humanization of the Trabi; the filmmakers did not
aim to ridicule East Germans.6 However, if the Trabi was utilized as a representation of the East
German (since the Trabi was exclusive to East Germany), specific scenes of the films, for
instance, when the Trabi is unable to drive over a hill without being pushed or the East German
family does not have enough money to pay for a proper hotel accommodation abroad, inevitably
make the East German appear inadequate and pitiful. Considering that the Trabi “evokes the
unproductiveness, inefficiency, and obsolescence of the GDR industry” it seems impossible to
depict the East German in a favorable light.7
Lastly, Timm discussed an incident on the Go, Trabi, Go set on October 3, 1990, the day
Germany officially united; as a result, some of the East German crew were hugging each other
and crying, in fear of the loss of employment in the GDR that their friends and family might face
and the general uncertainty of their future. It then appears out of place to produce a film
depicting funny East Germans traveling abroad when serious existential concerns were
distressing the crew.
Yet, the most astounding and concerning fact is that the film did not generate harsh
criticism or dismissal that the German press would have usually delivered.8 It was not until 2019,
4

Moving History, “Peter Timm im Gespräch,” YouTube, January 8, 2020, video, 26:46,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ainr_-VL7Wg.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Leonie Naughton, That Was the Wild East, Film Culture, Unification, and the “New” Germany (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2002), 167.
8
Ibid, 166.
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when Go, Trabi, Go was re-released in German cinemas in commemoration of the thirtieth year
of unification that led Bert Rebhandl to acknowledge in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ) that the GDR had been “the prey of jovial ironists” in German film after unification.9 He
claimed that excellent GDR films, such as Die Architekten, Imbiss Spezial, or La Villette, offered
a nuanced portrayal of the transformations that occurred in East Germany.10 These films,
however, never became big box-office successes.
After the Trabi films in the early 1990s – there were more than one – the interest about
anything East Germany faded on the big screen. Quoting film mogul Atze Brauner: Der Osten
stinkt (The East Stinks).11 Although by the late 1990s nobody wanted to see any films about the
GDR anymore, according to East-German director Leander Haußmann, he still decided to make
one that depicted the “survival of little people in the everyday life of the GDR” in an effort to
facilitate the communication between East and West Germans.12 His film Sonnenallee in 1999
became the next box-office success that portrayed the East-German “hero” in cinemas.13 The
film attracted 1.8 million viewers and quickly gained cult status in the East-German provinces.14
Haußmann contributed the success to an East-German “longing for recovering a little bit of
identity.”15 But since the audience followed East-German adolescents in a coming-of-age
comedy, on their universal quest for love and acceptance and their interest in music and fashion,

9

Bert Rebhandl, “Vom Mobilitätstrost zum fliegenden Teppich,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, modified January
20, 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/kino/kultfilm-go-trabi-go-wird-wieder-in-den-kinos-gezeigt16589894-p2.html.
10
Ibid.
11
Atze Brauner quoted in Leander Haußmann, “Es kam dicke genug,” Der Spiegel, September 8, 2003,
https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-28530391.html.
12
Leander Haußmann, “Es kam dicke genug,” Der Spiegel, September 8, 2003,
https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-28530391.html.
13
Sonnenallee, directed by Leander Haußmann (1999; Munich, Germany: Universum Film GmbH, 2018), DVD.
14
Paul Cooke, Representing East Germany since Unification: From Colonization to Nostalgia (Oxford and New
York: Berg, 2005), 111.
15
Leander Haußmann, “Es kam dicke genug,” Der Spiegel, September 8, 2003,
https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-28530391.html.
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West Germans were also able to identify and somewhat get to know their fellow Germans.
Sonnenallee also started what Germans call Ostalgie, the nostalgia for the GDR, specifically its
culture and products, that was later reinforced in Good Bye, Lenin!. Considering that
Haußmann’s goal was inciting communication between East and West Germans and a general
interest about East Germany, Sonnenallee was a success. Although the film received positive
reviews overall, critics such as Christiane Peitz accused Haußmann of a false depiction of the
GDR and exaggeration.16 Her film review displayed a crusade against the GDR state instead of
merely focusing on the storyline, and/or the artistic and technical realization of the film. She
started, “[t]he theater has never been too good for lying.”17 When discussing Haußmann’s
decision to make a film about young adults, she asserted, “[u]ltimately it is about a country,
where actually nobody was allowed to come of age. What other options did the citizen have but
that of eternal youth?”18 In wickedness difficult to vanquish, she commented on the actors:

Only the old (Katharina Thalbach, Henry Hübchen, Ignaz Kirchner) revive
something human in the asbestos-contaminated living room-enclosure: the
faintheartedness of those, who always just muddled through. Their complicated manner
to be in the way of their own lives, forebode what kept the GDR together: not the Berlin
Wall, but the smell of barn with its mixture of mediocrity and lack of oxygen.19

16

Christiane Peitz, “Alles so schön grau hier,” Zeit Online, November 4, 1999,
https://www.zeit.de/1999/45/199945.sonnenallee.etc..xml.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
As seen in Atze Brauner’s and Peitz’s comments, the bad smell or the derogatory term “mief” (“stink”) of the GDR
is recurrently used by West Germans to describe the GDR (this is further identified in the ensuing chapters of this
dissertation).
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Peitz’s quest to devalue the GDR and ultimately, the product of an East German, did not
end with this criticism. In another article, reviewing Haußmann’s film NVA, she dismissively
stated, “[t]he GDR fairy tale uncle ran out of narrative power,” discrediting the East German,
too.20
In the 1990s, demeaning East-German productions was a common practice. Films made
by the East-German film academy DEFA (Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft), such as
Herzsprung (1992) or Stein (1990/1991) that in a sensible manner covered topics about the
existential crises of East Germans after unification and, therefore, offered East Germans a voice,
were not promoted; on the contrary, influential West-German filmmaker Volker Schlöndorff
called DEFA films “furchtbar” (terrible) and since he had the authority as the CEO of Studio
Babelsberg, dismissed the DEFA legacy by eliminating its name.21 He furthermore claimed that
he watched DEFA films during his studies in Paris just to laugh about them.22 After his assertion
caused controversy, he wrote a statement “not relativizing, apologizing, or distancing himself”
from his “casual remark” but rather asking why such fuss was created that only “GDR
nostalgics” would concern themselves with.23
The DEFA ceased to exist in 1992 when the Treuhandanstalt (a federal agency founded
to privatize East-German companies owned by the state) sold its studios to a French
conglomerate. Nonetheless, that DEFA films have merit is confirmed by their recent boom in
Germany, where the films are regularly broadcasted on television, featured at festivals, and sold

20

Christiane Peitz, “Sonnenallee, Schattenarmee,” Der Tagesspiegel, September 29, 2005,
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/sonnenallee-schattenarmee/646536.html.
21
Christiane Peitz, “Schlöndorff: ‚Defa-Filme waren furchtbar’,“ Der Tagesspiegel, December 11, 2008,
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/kino/kontroverse-schloendorff-defa-filme-waren-furchtbar/1393060.html.
22
Ibid.
23
Christiane Peitz, “Schlöndorff: ‚Defa-Filme waren furchtbar’,“ Der Tagesspiegel, December 11, 2008,
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/kino/kontroverse-schloendorff-defa-filme-waren-furchtbar/1393060.html.
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on DVD. Even the Museum of Modern Art in New York City showcased DEFA films during the
“Rebels with a Cause: The Cinema of East Germany” retrospective in 2005.24
Immediately after unification, the press focused dominantly on the Stasi involvement of
major East-German politicians, artists, and intellectuals. A myriad of articles in every major
newspaper and magazine such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine, Der Spiegel, or Die Zeit, discussed
the Stasi involvement of key figures and furthermore used their mostly speculative conclusions
in order to discredit East-German accomplishments and expertise often solely based on
allegations and assumptions. Journalist Evelyn Finger wrote in her 2003 article, “Does anyone
remember the arm-thick Stasi files that one threw around in the early 90s?”25 This obsessive
concern with the Stasi was not shared with East Germans to the same extent. On December 29,
1991, the new Stasi Files Law (Stasi Unterlagen Gesetz) allowed for the public to review their
Stasi files that the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the
former German Democratic Republic (Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, BStU) provided. Interestingly, until today,
approximately three million people have requested their files; a number that is described as
“great interest” on the BStU’s website.26 However, considering that in 1989 the GDR had about
sixteen million citizens, three million does not seem great in comparison. Evaluating the
extensive Stasi coverage in the media, it seems as if West Germans were more invested in
discovering the Stasi involvement of East Germans than the East Germans themselves.
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Another pressing issue largely covered in the media was the mismanagement of EastGerman companies by the Trustee Agency (Treuhandanstalt or short Treuhand), an agency
established in 1990 by the Volkskammer aimed to privatize all of the government owned
companies. The idea of such an agency was born out of the desire that Eastern capital would not
fall in the hands of West-German or international investors and that jobs would be saved.27
However, when the Treuhand dissolved in 1994, it had liquidated 3,718 out of 13,815 companies
and from 4.1 million workers only 1.2 million remained.28 In the two years after unification, the
East-German GDP shrank more than 40%.29 Instead of restructuring and rehabilitating EastGerman companies to make them survive in a competitive capitalist market, the people in charge
caused the collapse of the East-German economy.
Economist Wolfgang Dümcke and professor of political science Franz Vilmar used the
phrase “colonization of [the East-German] economy” to describe the “deindustrialized and
structurally broken system” in their work Colonization of the GDR.30 False speculations,
misjudgment, false investments, negligence, and of course, personal greed caused the destructive
deindustrialization of East Germany that even the federal government was not always able to
detect or prevent. Instead, many journalists investigated on their own and published their
findings in newspapers. In a 1994 document, delegate Dr. Fritz Schumann asked the
Bundesregierung to confirm twenty-five allegations of criminal action between
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individuals/companies and the Treuhand that were previously released by the press.31 Dr.
Schumann separately itemized all twenty-five cases with the respective press listed in
parentheses. The Berliner Zeitung, Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Neues
Deutschland, WirtschaftsWoche, Die Welt, metall, taz, Der Morgen, Tagesspiegel, Junge Welt,
Die Woche im Bundestag, and Der Spiegel were among the newspapers that had released
information about such suspicious or criminal activity.
This exemplifies the extensive interest of people that was further incited when Treuhand
manager, Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, was shot and killed in April 1991. Although the Red Army
Faction (a West-German far-left militant organization) claimed responsibility, the murderer was
never found and many theories, for instance, suggesting the former Stasi members as perpetrator,
remain. Over the years, Rohwedder’s death continued to preoccupy Germans, for instance, when
the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt) reopened the case in
2001 when new methods for DNA analysis identified evidence, or in 2020, when Netflix
broadcasted their documentary series A Perfect Crime that discussed Rohwedder’s
assassination.32
Similarly, in the early 1990s, scholarship predominantly focused on the turbulent
economic unification of Germany, as the economic transition caused ample commotion in
Germany but also influenced international markets, for instance, through the external value of
the Deutsche Mark.33 Hans-Werner Sinn and his wife Gerlinde Sinn, both economists and
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professors, have extensively written about the economic transformation of Germany after
unification and the errors made that caused the deindustrialization of East Germany. HansWerner Sinn assessed that one of the dominant problems occurred during wage negotiations.
Disturbingly, West-German employee’s associations and East-German unions – advised by
West-German unions – negotiated East-German wages, which resulted in the adjustment of EastGerman wages to West-German standards within only five years.34 This was theoretically a
favorable outcome for the East Germans, but it was practically motivated to avoid putting WestGerman jobs in jeopardy and ultimately resulted in a less competitive East-German market, since
companies and factories needed extensive repairs and restructuring. As an economist, Sinn
offered specific measures to reform the broken system.
Many politicians, artists, or scholars, for instance, Gregor Gysi, Günter Grass, Jürgen
Habermas, spoke against the rapid pace of unification and had offered alternatives. In 1990,
shortly before the negotiation for the unification treaty began, German philosopher and
sociologist Jürgen Habermas specifically criticized federal chancellor Helmut Kohl for wanting
“West Germany to become the master of the [unification] process” and for delegitimizing the
GDR opposition that had sought to alter structures internally.35 These oppositional groups,
according to Habermas, were invested in self-determination and self-stabilization.36 Habermas
furthermore accused the Bundesregierung of “economic nationalism”
(“Wirtschaftsnationalismus”) that was guided by “politics of a fast hand” and “fait-accompli
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politics” that would hinder East Germans time to reflect on their self-determination.37 Habermas
maintains this position today.
With little temporal distance, German-American historian Konrad H. Jarausch tackled the
hastiness of unification in his work The Rush to German Unity, published in 1994. He rightfully
stated that because of the hasty events and the people’s euphoria, Germany was “overreported
and underanalysed.”38 In his work, Jarausch contextualized the peaceful revolution and
specifically discussed a third way option, a reforming of the GDR, that had gained momentum in
East Germany and even found supporters in the West.39 When this idea failed and the GDR
joined West Germany, conflict between both sides occurred due to specific solutions put in
place, for instance, the Aufbau Ost (“Construction East”) program. Amongst other initiatives, the
Aufbau Ost program introduced a solidarity tax of 7.5% that was added to the West-German
income tax.40 This additional tax created resentment on the West-German side. Jarausch’s work
explained the broader context of the rushed unification process; however, as this was written so
shortly after unification, certain patterns, such as the consistent and continual denying of EastGermans’ identity and accomplishments, were not discussed.
British historian Mary Fulbrook, who has extensively written about German history, paid
attention to the radical physical changes East Germans were facing. She claimed that, for
instance, new street names, new symbols, and new colors in the cities were unnerving and
disorientating for the older population, as this also meant that East Germans had to learn to live
with new rules.41 She also pointed out the shortcomings of unification; like most other historians,
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she discussed the Stasi witch-hunt, the rising unemployment in the East, the difficulties women
faced in unified Germany, or the purge of the intellectuals. Fulbrook had correctly foreseen that,
if social issues would not get resolved and under the premise that international migration would
increase, we would see “two Germany nations in one multicultural state.”42 When examining the
xenophobic attacks that occurred in the East, partially because of unemployed and dissatisfied
East Germans, she mistakenly concluded that “large numbers of Germans are prepared to
condemn acts of racism and violence” and that “there is a will at the center to stem the tide, to
ensure that the historical clock is not turned back.”43 The large PEGIDA gatherings and the
election of the AfD into the Bundestag have illustrated that the number of German bigots or of
German xenophobia is increasing (or the search for scapegoats for their current and past
problems). The short period of time between unification and Fulbrook’s essay, published in
1994, did not allow sufficient time to examine the evolving relationship between East and West
Germans. Three decades later, for example, xenophobic sentiments against foreigners further
increased with the large influx of Syrian refuges in Germany, building on a long developing
groundswell.
A turning point occurred in 1996, when Wolfgang Dümcke and Fritz Vilmar published a
collection of essays that while evaluating the economic shortcomings of unification also
discussed the destruction of East-German identity, shifting from the economic hardships to the
social disaster of unification.44 Dümcke and Vilmar’s often-quoted analyses are invaluable, as
they boldly coined the unification process as a “capturing-process” (“Vereinnahmungsprozeß”
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instead of “Vereinigungsprozeß”) and speak of a “colonization of the people.”45 They define the
term “colonization” as: “… a destruction of domestic economic structure, an exploitation of
existing economic resources, the social liquidation of the political elite and the intelligence of a
country, as well as the destruction of the cultivated – however problematic – identity of the
population…”46
To prove that such political, economic, and cultural colonization occurred, Dümcke and
Vilmar offered empirical evidence that illustrate the structural elements of East-German
colonization by the West. Crucial to Dümcke and Vilmar’s work is their call for a “critical
appreciation of the socialist achievements.”47 Dümcke and Vilmar were not referring to the
communist/socialist ideology but specific institutions and customs in East Germany that were
more progressive than in the West, such as secured day care, abortion rights, the polytechnical
school system, and an easier access to cultural events for everyone (including the workers),
among other accomplishments. Although this dissertation discusses the consistent and continual
denying of legitimacy and respect for East Germans that are in congruence with Dümcke and
Vilmar’s assessment, in the following chapters I discuss an imposing of West-German values
and way of life, and not, per se, a colonization. While I agree that a take-over occurred, it was
not unilateral or forced. In the end, even if East Germans did not predict the ensuing
discrimination they would face on a massive scale, or the pervasive dogmatic and swanky talk
from the West, they had still negotiated, voted on, and signed the unification treaty. However,
Dümcke and Vilmar’s evaluations remain crucial, as they gave legitimacy to East Germans’
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grievances and pointed out the flaws of unification on the social scale and offered alternatives to
the unification process.
In 1997, After Unity: Reconfiguring German Identities, a collection of essays edited by
Jarausch, discussed the German desire for a shared identity, which postulated a coming to terms
with their past(s). In the essay, “The Presence of the Past: Culture, Opinion, and Identity in
Germany,” Jarausch, Seeba and Conradt examined the difficult – and seemingly impossible –
task of Germans negotiating their past after unification, when they had to confront having (more
or less) supported two dictatorships.48 The authors discussed the public debate, especially the
accusatory discourse by the West-German media that was invested in portraying the GDR as an
oppressive totalitarian state, accomplished by a witch-hunt against the Stasi and its members.
Such condemnation, however, led to the “discrediting of everything East German.”49 The
academic discourse, according to Jarausch, offered more controversy. He differentiated three
approaches; the “accusatory camp,” consisting of former opponents of the SED regime, who
morally disapproved of the East-German regime based on totalitarian theory, such as that of
Hannah Arendt.50 Just like the press, this condemnation stance rejected everything East German
and saw the West-German, democratic way as superior and necessary. The counter narrative, or
the “apologists,” saw the GDR in a more favorable light and its ideology in its essence noble,
which resulted in downplaying the crimes of the oppressive SED regime and in a distorted view
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of capitalism.51 The third group of scholars analyzed the GDR through a more objective lens and
discussed the “complexities and ambiguities” of the GDR.52 Jarausch concluded that the
similarities between the discussion after 1945 and unifications were striking.
Jarausch alluded to the West-German dominance and the public condemnation of
everything East-German. However, a close account how this disapproval manifested in every day
live of East Germans is lacking. German historians Jürgen Kocka and Renate Mayntz described
one of these manifestations in their collection of essays that analyze the academic discipline in
Germany after the abrupt change of the political regime.53 Kocka claimed that after unification
more professors and scholars were expelled from university than after the Nazi purge in 1945.54
Within five years after unification, 500 East-German professors were replaced at the leading
Humboldt University in Berlin alone. Every scholar who had been member of the SED party had
to go. The issue was that almost everyone, actively or not, was part of the party since party
affiliation was a job requirement. In the collection of essays, Kocka et alia tackled the question
how academia in the East changed after the appropriation of the West-German model.

GERMAN UNIFICATION: 2000 – 2010
Ten years after unification, more time had passed to reflect and critically evaluate the unification
process. During these ensuing ten years, the GDR became the focus of attention again because
new films that offered a more nuanced narrative of unification and the East-German condition
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after the demise of the GDR had achieved world-wide success. In 2001, the film Berlin is in
Germany introduced Martin, the East-German hero, who is released from jail and discovers the
new Germany eleven years after unification. His struggles to navigate through his city that has
become foreign to him and to adjust to the rapid changes in his new life, are relatable to the
audience, as almost everyone has felt lost and alone at some point in life. Martin bravely masters
every hurdle thrown at him; he reconnects with his wife and his son and studies for his taxidriver license. It is mostly the people he interacts with who see and treat him as an outsider
because of his dated clothing and his ignorance of new products, such as modern toys and other
products he only knows from watching television. Berlin is in Germany illustrates ample
criticism of unification; for instance, when Martin meets his wife who now works in a travel
agency, posters of exotic places are on display, and an airplane flies over Martin’s head when
exits the shop. All these beautiful places and newfound opportunities are available, if only
Martin had the money to afford it. Der Spiegel called the film, “sensitive and tender” and Martin
“a charismatic hero of everyday life.”55
In 2003, the internationally successful film Good Bye, Lenin! also gave East Germans
agency and told the story of the GDR from an East-German perspectives. In this film, main
character Alex Kerner (Daniel Brühl) recreates the GDR after unification, in order to prevent his
sick mother from another heart attack. A supporter of socialism, she was in a coma when the
Berlin Wall fell and was now supposed to believe that life was still the same. Alex goes to great
length to revive the GDR; he redecorates their apartment in the typical GDR seventies-style by
reclaiming their old furniture that had been resting in the scrapheap and procures their dated
clothing at good-will stores. During the entire length of the film the audience witnesses him on a
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comical but often sad hunt to find old relics of the GDR, such as coffee, pickles, and champagne,
in order to comfort his mother. In an attempt to adjust to recent events, he produces false news
on VHS tapes depicting the GDR in a more favorable light, a GDR with socialist ideology but an
open border policy. Constantly rushing between the “fake” GDR and the new Germany, Alex
illustrates the East-German struggle to make it in a new world while keeping alive its identity
that was forcefully vanishing in front of their eyes. While Alex is depicted as happy and
adventurous in unified Germany, the everyday struggles to come to terms with a past that
everyone in the West seems to deny is evident. At the end of the film, Alex puts this into words:
“The country, that my mother left, was a country that she believed in and that we kept alive until
the very second of her life. A country that in reality never existed like that. A country that in my
memory I will always associate with my mother.”56
The newspaper Tagespiegel claimed, “’Good Bye, Lenin!’ … was the burial of the GDR,
thirteen years after its end. And it offered dignity, a dignity that anyone had no longer
anticipated.”57 The tragicomedy celebrated unification but allowed for subtle criticism that was
continually disguised in comedy so that the West-German audience would not feel offended. On
the contrary, the Ostalgie-theme depicted in the film, for instance, Alex’s obsessive search for a
specific East-German pickle, the Spreewald Gurken, entertained the East-German as well as the
West- German audience. Especially when Alex’s mother was tricked into eating a West-German
pickle – disguised in an East-German pickle container – and did not taste the swindle. For more,
the pickle proved that the GDR and West Germany were not that different after all.
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Although Good Bye, Lenin! hinted at the loss of culture and identity East Germans felt
after unification, the film was often interpreted as a glorification of East Germany.58 Repeatedly,
critics assessed the film based on the fact that the GDR was not sufficiently vilified.
Films that focused on the East-German oppressive regime, such as Der Tunnel (2001), or
academy award winner The Lives of Others (2006), dominated in numbers. Although these films
have merit, as they reflect the wrongdoings of a dictatorship, they at the same time helped
perpetuate a one-sided narrative that continually promoted a generalization and vilification of all
things East-German.
In the decade after unification, scholarship still focused on economic history. EastGerman historian of economics Jörg Roesler offered an economic and social history of both
Germanies from 1945 until 1990 “on a level playing field,” as described in his title.59 Roesler
examined the dissimilar developments of both economies after 1945, the issues of periodization
of German history after the Second World War, and, lastly, the coming together and the
annexation of the GDR to West Germany. On the final two pages of his text, he briefly discussed
the flawed unification process on the social level. He quoted a part of Lothar de Maizière’s State
of the Nation Address from 1990 that was delivered before the Volkskammer. In this speech, de
Maizière asserted what East Germans could bring to unification: “We bring our identity and our
dignity. Our identity is our history and culture, our failures and our accomplishments, our ideals
and our sufferings. Our dignity is our human right for self-determination…”60
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Roesler’s sarcastic reply to this assertion, however, is that East Germans were only able
to bring the left-turn arrow and the Ampelmännchen – the symbol shown on pedestrian signals.61
He continued that the “asymmetrical unification” resulted in an economical, judicial, and social
annexation of East Germany by the West, while the lack of unity in people’s minds was
lamented by politics and the media for years. Again, the emphasis in Roesler’s work was on the
two German economies and the economic take-over by the West. The East-German voice after
unification is neglected.
German historian and professor Heinrich August Winkler also claimed that in 1990
Germans had “mistaken the degree of mutual alienation that had occurred during the forty years
of separation” and that right-wing radicalism, anti-West prejudices, and antisemitic resentments
were the result.62 Although Winkler acknowledged the differences between East and West
Germans, he seemed to sweep them under the rug and failed to address the potential ramification
it could have long term. He surprisingly concluded that Germany now had a “European
question” and that it was reasonable to focus and contribute to the European identity.63
In 2005, scholar Paul Cooke offered a refreshing insight into East-German
accomplishments after unification.64 Similar to Jarausch, he discussed the academic split
between anti-communist rhetoric/totalitarian views and left/liberal consent after unification that
both provided grounds for either a vilification, or a measured idolization of the GDR. This
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discussion is an effective foundation to understand the broader context of how Germans dealt
with the past. Novel and provocative in his work were his analyses of East-German literature
after unification that prompted its readers to detect West-German assumptions and to
concurrently assess the GRD in a more nuanced manner. Cooke also provided close readings of
Sonnenallee and Good Bye, Lenin (amongst other cinematic representations). Cooke argued that,
despite its comic nature, Sonnenallee still offered an uncompromisingly direct and honest
depiction of the GDR. While Good Bye, Lenin! literally bid farewell to the GDR, it did not
refrain from criticizing the West and capitalism in general. What Cooke pointed out is that the
ensuing success of Good Bye, Lenin! inspired, and even encouraged, the commercialization of
the GDR, or the newly celebrated Ostalgie on TV. One of the most popular shows, the Ostalgie
Show, attracted up to 4.8 million viewers.65 Cooke’s strengths are the literature and film analyses
and his overall recognition of East-German art that he accurately contextualized. What was
missing, though, again, was the persisting struggles East Germans were still facing and how this
affected art, academia, and East Germans’ everyday lives.

GERMAN UNIFICATION: 2010 – PRESENT DAY
Around 2010, when I started researching the East-German condition after unification, the topic
was not widely discussed in the media anymore. Whenever I mentioned it in a discussion, my
interlocutors did not understand the urgency of writing about it. This sentiment was shared by
German filmmaker Burhan Qurbani, who mentioned during an interview with me that when he
started working on his 2014 film, Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark, which examines the postunification situation of East-German adolescents, people commented that this topic was “old
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hat.”66 Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark discussed the challenges of East-German adolescents, who,
upon unification, struggle to find purpose in life, when unemployment and the disappearance of
cultural youth institutions left them hopeless and resentful.67 Asylum seekers who had gained
access to East Germany after unification were living on the streets of residential areas because of
politicians’ avoidance of responsibility and decision-making. They became perfect scapegoats
for the unacceptable conditions in the East. Qurbani’s message is clear: the devastation and
hopelessness that turned into anger could happen to anyone. The newspaper Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung offered a peculiar review, however, stating that “…the film does not provide
educational intention. Because it wants to show everything, it only shows a bit of everything,
especially something that could touchingly unsettle the audience: the forlornness of a youth in a
situation of upheaval, the insecurity of politics in terms of immigration,…”68 This, however, was
the intention of the filmmaker. Qurbani’s film never demonized nor glorified the GDR. By
means of real footage of the events, it often factually explained the situation without assigning
blame.
Another film about the GDR, Bornholmer Strasse, was released in 2014.69 Named after
an actual street in Berlin that separated East and West, East-German director Christian
Schwochow decided to recollect actual events of the night of November 9, 1989. Although the
reception of the film was overall positive, some critics disapproved of the “tragicomedy” genre
that the director used. Rena Lehmann wrote, “Schwochow decided for incomprehensible reasons
to tell the dramatic night at the border crossing in a tragicomedy. He should have acquitted

66

Burhan Qurbani (German filmmaker) in discussion with the author, June 2017.
Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark, directed by Burhan Qurbani (2014; Hamburg: Indigo Musikproduktion, 2015),
DVD.
68
Hans-Jörg Rother, “Chronik einer bösen Nacht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, modified January 22, 2015,
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/kino/im-kino-wir-sind-jung-wir-sind-stark-13382745.html.
69
Bornholmer Strasse, directed by Christian Schwochow (2014; Munich: Universum Film, 2014), DVD.
67

22

himself to the real crime thriller that happened.”70 This statement seems odd, since a crime did
not occur that night. In her review, she criticized that the GDR border patrol was not depicted in
a more negative light and that their victims, probably felt ridiculed. This, however, is an
assumption.
Starting in 2015, the GDR became a hot topic again. TV series about the GDR, such as
Der gleiche Himmer (2017), Honigfrauen (2017), and Deutschland 83, 86, 89 (2015, 2018,
2020), flooded the screen. The thriller Ballon, released in 2018 by Bavarian comedian Michael
Herbig, depicted an East-German family secretly building a hot air balloon to flee the GDR.
What all these film and series have in common is their focus on the Stasi and espionage in the
GDR, ultimately offering a one-sided portrayal. Bornholmer Strasse and Wir sind jung. Wir sind
stark depict the confusion and messiness of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the results of a flawed
unification process. Is it a coincidence that they were made by an East German and a German
with a migration background?
Coincidentally, when Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark. was released in 2014, the far-right
political movement PEGIDA was founded and tens of thousands of – mostly East Germans –
demonstrated against the Islamization of Germany in the streets of Dresden. East Germans were
in the media again, but, once more, depicted in a negative and damaging way. The large support
of the PEGIDA allowed for the far-right AfD to gain enough momentum to become the thirdlargest party in Germany, gaining 94 seats in the Bundestag, sanctioning their representation in
the Bundestag (by passing the 5%-of-the-vote threshold required to enter the German
parliament). The extensive coverage of these events marginalized the East Germans again. In the
ze.tt. article “Why we are not unified,” published on October 3, 2017, the 28th anniversary of
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German unification, Marieke Reimann discussed why Germany is still socially divided into an
Eastern and Western “zone” today, more than a quarter century after the fall of the Berlin Wall.71
Her statements are based on personal experiences that she had living in Berlin and working in the
media that, according to her, is monopolized by West-German news coverage and staff. She
mentions that disparaging remarks, such as “East Germans are dumb anyways,” are still common
practice. Reimann explains that the “furious” are to be blamed that the “face of the East is
distorted into a grimace.”72 The furious, according to her, consists of two groups of people: the
neo-Nazis and the former East-German citizens who after unification felt left behind and
consequently politically and culturally voiceless. These people often have tendencies to lean far
right politically and tend to channel their rage in protest and violent behavior. It is this rage that
the media chooses to highlight.
Reimann is chief editor for the ze.tt, an online magazine of the Zeitverlag, a leading
German publishing conglomerate. Ze.tt aims to attract an audience of readers between the ages of
16 and 35. When Reimann took over as chief editor in October 2018, she decided to shift the
magazine’s focus to topics around East Germany and East Germans. Reimann was still a child
when the Berlin Wall fell, but she states in an interview that she was “ostsozialisiert” (socialized
in an East-German way) due to the influence of her parents, teachers, and friends who all held
socialist values and world views that were taught and practiced in the German Democratic
Republic (GDR). In an attempt to point out the bias of Western media coverage, and specifically
rebuff the dominant coverage about the Stasi and neo-Nazis of East Germany, she specifically
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chooses to cover the everyday life of East Germans from Mecklenburg-West Pomerania to
Thuringia.73
Reimann’s attempt to reconstruct readers’ perceptions of East-German identity offers a
more nuanced way beyond party affiliation and ideological orientation to understand and accept
the (historically grown) cultural differences between East and West Germans. However, it is
likewise crucial to examine the roots of this misperception. Before unification, East and West
Germans principally relied on media coverage for information about the other German. Thus,
their opinions of their neighbors were biased, as they were constructed, often fabricated and
presented through a third-party lens. Unification offered a new beginning when East and West
Germany were able to physically meet, and form opinions based on tangible experiences.
The rise of the AfD and the East Germans’ search for radical political philosophies that
seem to restore their dignity propelled a more nuanced examination of the East Germans’
dissatisfaction. In 2019 Steffen Winter wrote a lengthy eight-page Spiegel article, “That’s how
he is, the Ossi, Clichés and Reality: How the East ticks – and why they vote differently,” that
offered specific examples of West-German disrespect towards East Germans and the East
Germans’ inability to catch up in the capitalist world order.74 Most importantly, Winter discussed
why educated East Germans who had been voting for the CDU (Christian Democratic Union)
turned to the AfD and PEGIDA. The former conservative CDU, according to East Germans that
Winter interviewed, had become a more centric party that allowed too many refugees and the
money spent on refugees, should have been invested in education.75 Interestingly, Winter
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mentioned a survey of 400 PEGIDA members. According to this study, only 2% lacked
employment and one out of three held a university degree (in the general population it is one out
of six).76 The general perception of the “dumb” Ossi, as Reimann described, who votes AfD out
of fear of the unknown or fear to have jobs taken away, is evidently untrue. The East Germans
Winter interviewed provided different reasons; they believed that proper integration had failed in
Germany and that money should be sent to the refugees’ country of origin to rebuild or
ameliorate those countries.
Winter also provided reasons why East Germans felt like second-class citizens. In fact,
among 81 East-German higher education institutions, none are led by an East German.77
Similarly, only 23% of East Germans are in executive positions in the East, a shocking 1.7% in
Germany in total. No East-German company is officially traded on the stock market. These
sobering numbers were confirmed by East-German politician Gregor Gysi, who has been
fighting for East Germans equality and dignity tirelessly since unification. On October 3, 2020,
for the thirtieth anniversary of unification, he posted income and employment inequality
statistics and claimed: “30 years of German unity: in society as a whole, eye level has not been
established, which is a result of the West-German government that could not stop winning and
that was not willing to inherit somethings from the East, of which West Germans would also
have profited.”78
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In conclusion, Winter’s insightful article offered abundant explanations for the East
Germans’ discontent and the appeal to acknowledge their fears and concerns and take them
seriously. Regrettable is the cover picture the Spiegel chose for this story. It depicts a bucket hat
in black, red, gold (the colors of the German flag). The main actor in Go, Trabi, Go also wore a
bucket hat. Maybe to attract a readership, the magazine resorted to clichés, instead of depicting a
successful East German or an East-German accomplishment that would break the old and
unquestionably exhausted narrative.
After 2010, historians provided insights into life in East Germany. In Within Walls, Paul
Betts for instance examines the possibilities and limitations of East Germans’ private life.
Contrary to the popular narrative, Betts argues that East Germans were able to negotiate and
shape their private lives while living in a totalitarian regime. Ned Richardson-Little published a
work that examines how East Germany imagined itself to be a human rights champion in a
dictatorship. Edith Sheffer and Astrid M. Eckert wrote about border town and how the East and
West German divide emerged psychologically and later physically. In its core, they argue that it
is the competition between capitalism and socialism and the resulting visible differences that
caused emerging social divide.
In recent years, East Germans have worked on changing the one-sided narrative. Thomas
Oberender, director of the Berliner Festspiele, an institution offering cultural events, decided to
give his organization a focus on East-German cultural history.79 Oberender also published the
book Empowerment Ost, with the aim to retell history from an East-German perspective. He
claimed that a 2019 survey of the federal government indicating that 57% of East Germans still
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feel like second-class citizens surprised him and made him want to create more “awareness and
sympathy.”80 Alexander Cammann offered a recension in the newspaper Die Zeit, in which he
criticized two aspects; first, Oberender’s “paternalistic” claim that the West had pushed or
manipulated the East into abandoning their idea of a third option and succumbing to the WestGerman system (a claim also made by Habermas which I mentioned above). 81 According to
Cammann, the majority of East Germans wanted to join West Germany. And second, Cammann
questioned why it took Oberender so many years to engage with this topic. Cammann’s first
criticism exemplifies why East Germans have felt unheard and like second-class citizens, as
Cammann’s assertions were not founded on research. For that, he would have had to study CDU
campaign slogans and methods of manipulations to assess whether East Germans were rushed
into unification. His second criticism bears no weight, as the amount of time to reflect is a
personal choice and cannot be categorized in right or wrong.
The thirty-year anniversary of unification in October 2020 illustrated abundant returning
interest in Germany. British historian Timothy Garton Ash claimed that “Since unification,
Germany has had its best 30 years. The next will be harder,” ignoring all of the East-German
struggles.82 But others, such as journalist Melissa Eddy, wrote a more nuanced and critical article
for the New York Times, in which she examined the economic, political, and social inequalities
after unification.83 She concludes that unification, overall, has been a great achievement, but that
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inequalities, such as wage disparity and the lack of East Germans in leadership positions, still
needed to be addressed. In “Covid-19 Sparks New East-West Divide in Germany – 30 Years
After Reunification,” Ruth Bender examined in the Wall Street Journal how these inequalities,
for once, benefited the East. In this article she discussed how the spread of Covid-19 has been far
less disturbing in the East than West. Although no conclusive scientific data was available, she
pointed to several plausible theories that could explain the difference in infection rates. East
Germany is less densely populated and lacks large industrial areas or sizeable corporation
compared to the West, which can be attributed to the flaws of unification, when corporations
were privatized and unemployment significantly increased, as previously discussed. Another
valid reason stated was the lack of travel funds due to depressed wages that is statistically
proven. Furthermore, all the major airports gathering large crowds of people, are also in the
West, such as Frankfurt or Munich. Lastly, a local resident of Rostock had her own theory and
explained the disparity on the East-Germans attribute of obeying the rules that the government
imposes, “Ossis follow the rules more […] That was the case back then and is the case now.”84
As stated in this conclusion, unification has been widely discussed in the past thirty years.
Scholars specifically focused on the rushed economic transition and the lasting ramifications of
this in the East. It has been widely recognized that the hasty economic transition caused
inequalities, such as wage disparity and unemployment, and that the East is still today catching
up. Scholars, for instance Dümcke and Vilmar, discussed an economic but also a cultural
colonization, pointing to the delegitimizing of everything East Germans by West Germans.
Historians have offered analyses of the roots of the social divide; mainly the dominance of the
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West-German economy and the resulting envy and distrust in the East and the constant
comparison and evaluations of both systems. A lot has also been written about the life in the
GDR, and of course, the Stasi.
In recent years, there has been a change of narrative depicted in the Spiegel article:
“That’s how he is, the Ossi, Clichés and Reality: How the East ticks – and why they vote
differently.” The article steers away from blaming East Germans and rather explaining why they
have been dissatisfied – even after the West has so generously paid towards the “Aufbau Ost”
program. Lastly, East Germans, such as Marieke Reimann and Thomas Oberende, have actively
participated in a new narrative that would point away from the GDR Unrechtstaat (unethical
state) idea and instead argue for a much greater recognition of East-German accomplishments.
However, the consistent and continual disrespect and delegitimizing of East-German
accomplishments remain a widely accepted experience. Either the East-German voices are
ignored, as seen in Timothy Garton Ash’s recent article that pointed to thirty years of bliss, or
Alexander Cammann’s estimation that East Germans agreed to all aspects of unification and,
therefore, had no right to complain. In this dissertation, I argue that East Germans and their
accomplishments have been consistently and continually disrespected and delegitimized after
unification. What strengthens my argument is that I discuss facts illustrating this in all areas of
life, such as in politics, art, architecture, and everyday life. The wide compilation of these
examples in all fields then refute the argument that East Germans’ complains are unfounded and
unreasonable and prove the West-German dominance and ignorance.
I divided this dissertation in specific events that exemplify this West-German dominance
and ignorance. The first chapter discusses the political accession (Beitritt) of the GDR to West
Germany. I examine the aspirations and efforts of East-German politicians to negotiate a treaty
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consisting of shared values, traditions, symbols, and laws that were largely dismissed by West
Germans, thus creating a “unified” country that was in its entirety foreign to East Germans. I
specifically discuss the East-German request to have two legal changes in the German criminal
code, the decriminalization of homosexuality and abortion, included in the unification treaty, as
they reflected the different cultural and social experiences and norms in the GDR. I will then
discuss the ways the West chose to circumvent the implementation of these requests and prohibit
them from becoming law.
Furthermore, I examine the dismissive rhetoric used by key politicians, cultural figures,
and especially the media following the fall of the Berlin Wall that would stigmatize East
Germans, with ramifications lasting until the present day. To demonstrate this, I assess, for
instance, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s historic speech in Dresden shortly after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, and the speech of West-German politician Wolfgang Schäuble delivered in 1990, when the
unification treaty was finalized. Kohl and Schäuble were respected leaders in Germany and the
world and members of the dominant conservative party CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and
therefore influenced public opinion more than any other party. These leaders had the opportunity
to create a narrative that would depict the East Germans and East-German culture as a new,
valued addition to Germany. Although the Stasi and the SED party were undoubtfully unethical
and ruthless, the West did not offer a fair and nuanced distinction between active Stasi members,
citizens that were forced to participate in Stasi activities or ones that only offered positive reports
on their victims, and those who were asked to engage but refused. Instead, they created a
narrative of an all “unethical-state” with evil agents or naïve participants.
Lastly, I discuss the different reactions of East-German key politicians, who have been
accused of having been part of the Stasi. Here, I look at two examples. I first discuss Lothar de
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Maizière’s resignation. De Maizière was the last democratically elected prime minister of the
GDR and an important negotiator during the unification treaty. When Stasi allegations arose –
that were never confirmed – he chose to resign and remove himself from the public eye. I also
examine the case of East-German politician Gregor Gysi, who vehemently opposed the treaty.
He had previously demanded a collaboration of both states on the principle that each would keep
its sovereignty. He decided to remain an active member in the German Parliament (Bundestag),
even after he was accused of having worked for the Stasi. The partisan reactions of WestGerman politicians to his requests, and his policies in general, will be investigated. I will provide
evidence that these partisan reactions still echo in the Bundestag today. Gysi and De Maizière
were key politicians representing East Germany, like Kohl and Schäuble in the West. Their
tarnished reputation discredited their accomplishments, political views, polices, and could harm
their representation and decision-making in politics.
In chapter two, I examine how West Germans used similar rhetoric to discredit EastGerman artists and intellectuals. First, I discuss the German-German Literature Dispute
(Deutsch-deutscher Literaturstreit). I demonstrate how influential authorities, such as several
leading West-German intellectuals, used cultural channels to undermine East-German identity
and accomplishments. To do this, I discuss the Literature Dispute in 1990 that discredited
literature produced by East-German writers during the Cold War, such as the novel What
Remains (Was Bleibt) by Christa Wolf. The dispute was initiated by the most influential
German-speaking literature critic, Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who was considered the Pope of
Literature (Literaturpapst) by the media; thus, he wielded significant power in influencing public
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opinion.85 Reich-Ranicki and other fellow critics accused Wolf of political apathy in the GDR
and debated whether art could be produced within an oppressive system.
In the second part of chapter two, I transition to film to examine how West-German
filmmakers portrayed the conditions of East-Germans in their everyday life, especially the ways
in which they were treated and perceived by West Germans. For this, I conduct a close reading
of two German films, Good Bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany. Those films, as cultural
products, offer further insights into West-German’s attitude and stereotypes of East Germans.
Chapter three focuses on how East Germany, specifically East Berlin, physically changed
after unification and how West Germans prompted these changes, often against East Germans’
objections. I discuss how the destruction of the Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik),
which housed the East-German federal government (Volkskammer), divided the nation again. I
chose to discuss the palace because it represents the most famous example of destruction of EastGerman historical architectural heritage. The Palast der Republik was a beloved building among
many East Germans because it largely housed public spaces for cultural events and
entertainment. It therefore gained a positive connotation amongst most East Germans. The
destruction of it, in 2003, was widely protested, especially because the city of Berlin lacked
funds and no alternative plan had been decided upon. The destruction, therefore, was considered
yet another affront against East Germany’s culture and another faux pas in the process of coming
to terms with Germany’s past.
In the second part of chapter three, I analyze effective scenes in the previously discussed
films Good bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany, as they expose spatial transformations in East
Berlin. These changes resulted in either unsettled ground or in a disorientation of the East
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Germans’ sense of place and home that further added to their challenges in a new country that
had become foreign to them.
Chapter four is dedicated to another group that was left behind after unification: the
Vietnamese contract workers (Vertragsarbeiter) in the GDR. Although the GDR hosted contract
workers from other socialist countries, such as Cuba, China, or Mozambique, I chose to illustrate
the conditions of the Vietnamese contract workers for two reasons: Vietnamese were amongst
the first who arrived in the GDR in the 1950s and stayed until the demise of the GDR, and, with
more than 70,000 workers, the Vietnamese were the largest group of contract workers in the
GDR.
Second, the Vietnamese in Germany after unification suffered similar coethnic challenges
as the East Germans: whereas the “anti-communist” and mostly southern Vietnamese “Boat
People,” who had fled after the Vietnam War in 1975, found refuge in West Germany and had
become respected citizens, the mostly northern Vietnamese contract workers in East Germany
struggled to be allowed to reside and work in unified Germany. Furthermore, their reputation
amongst the Vietnamese in West Germany was tarnished, as they were seen as the communists
who had come to the GDR voluntarily and – in large part and rather unfairly– earned notoriety
for participating in small-crime business activities to support their families in Vietnam.
In chapter four, I first address when the contract workers in the East Germany and the
“Boat People” in the West Germany arrived and how each government and the German
population received them and, most importantly to my argument, I discuss the challenges the
contract workers faced after unification, similar to the issues East Germans confronted. In the

34

final section, I provide a brief analysis of the 2014 German film, We are Young. We are Strong
(Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark), previously mentioned in this introduction.86
This film provides a unique opportunity to probe elements of East Germans’ identity as
they emerged from the Communist era, and which groups were left behind after the demise of
the GDR. My goal is to describe the paradoxes of East-German identity (as experienced by East
Germans and the Vietnamese) in order to better understand the challenges of German unification
in forging a common identity and generate a collective sense of belonging among all of those
who previously lived in the GDR.87 I argue that the euphoria of unification experienced by the
majority of Germans and contract workers rapidly vanished among the residents of the New
States (Neue Bundesländer), the states that formerly formed the GDR.88 The often hasty process
of unification resulted in not only the desolation and desertion of native East Germans but also
the contract workers who had moved there.
While this study is often based on a close reading of work by artists, journalists, critics,
politicians and historians, I also explore several kinds of primary sources besides the artistic,
political, journalistic, or scholarly interpretation of this flawed process of unification. The
experiences and patterns I describe in chapter four are based on archival documents pertaining to
contract worker laws, regulations, and even propaganda between the Ministry of Labor in the
GDR and the administration of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), which were obtained
from the federal German archive located in Berlin. Among other primary sources that this
dissertation showcases are my interview with Dr. Wolfgang Richter, who was the foreign
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representative (Auslandsbeauftragter) in Rostock and happened to be inside of the
Sonnenblumenhaus (the residential housing of the contract workers) on the night of the
xenophobic attacks. In the interview, he was able to provide detailed information on the political
and social disruption leading to the escalation of the situation. I was also fortunate to interview
Burhan Qurbani, the director of We are Young. We are Strong, who offered insightful
commentary about his reasoning to tell the story of East-German adolescents and Vietnamese
contract workers and their struggles in unified Germany.
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Figure 1: The East-German Ampelmann89

Figure 2: The West-German Ampelmann
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CHAPTER ONE
THE UNIFICATION TREATY:
THE DECLARATION OF DOMINANCE OVER EAST GERMANS

The first chapter discusses the political accession (Beitritt) of the GDR to West Germany.
I examine the aspirations and efforts of East-German politicians to negotiate a treaty consisting
of shared values, traditions, symbols, and laws that were largely dismissed by West Germans,
thus creating a “unified” country that was in its entirety foreign to East Germans. I specifically
discuss the East German request to have two legal changes in the German criminal code, the
decriminalization of homosexuality and abortion, included in the unification treaty, as they
reflected the different cultural and social experiences and norms in the GDR. I will then discuss
the ways the West chose to circumvent the implementation of these requests and prohibit them
from becoming law.
Furthermore, I examine the dismissive rhetoric used by key politicians, cultural figures,
and especially the media following the fall of the Berlin Wall that would stigmatize East
Germans, with ramifications lasting until today. To demonstrate this, I assess, for instance,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s historic speech in Dresden shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
and the speech of West-German politician Wolfgang Schäuble that he delivered in 1990, when
the unification treaty was finalized. Kohl and Schäuble were respected leaders in Germany and
the world and members of the dominant conservative party CDU (Christian Democratic Union)
and therefore influenced public opinion more than any other party. These leaders had the
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opportunity to create a narrative that would depict the East Germans and East-German culture as
a new, valued addition to Germany. Although the Stasi and the SED party were undoubtfully
unethical and ruthless, the West did not offer a fair and nuanced distinction between active Stasi
member, citizens that were forced to participate in Stasi activities or ones that only offered
positive reports on their victims, and those who were asked to engage but refused. Instead, they
created a narrative of an all “unethical-state” with evil agents or naïve participants.
Lastly, I discuss the different reactions of East-German key politicians, who have been
accused of having been part of the Stasi. Here, I look at two examples. I first discuss Lothar de
Maizière’s resignation. De Maizière was the last democratically elected prime minister of the
GDR and an important negotiator during the unification treaty. When Stasi allegations arose –
that were never confirmed – he chose to resign and remove himself from the public eye. I also
examine the case of East-German politician Gregor Gysi, who vehemently opposed the treaty.
He had previously demanded the collaboration of both states under the premise that each would
keep its sovereignty and decided to remain an active member in the German Parliament
(Bundestag), even after he was accused of having worked for the Stasi. The partisan reactions of
West-German politicians to his requests, and his policies in general, still echo in the Bundestag
today. Gysi and De Maizière, like Kohl and Schäuble, were key politicians representing East
Germany. Their tarnished reputation discredited their accomplishments, political views, polices,
and could harm their representation and decision making in politics.
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RUSHING A UNIFICATION TREATY
After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, negotiations for a unification treaty began
between the two German parliaments, the East-German 10th Volkskammer and the 11th WestGerman Bundestag. The delegates from each side formally represented a parliamentary system
of government, with the same responsibilities and authority, such as engaging in legislation,
scrutiny of judiciary and executive, formation of the government, among the more important
ones. However, the delegates of the Bundestag had functioned in this well-established system
without being “guided” by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschland or SED) in East Germany that predetermined anything of political importance. They
had gained the proficiency needed to confidently navigate through the process. The SED was the
only party in the GDR.
Günther Krause, Parliamentary Secretary of State of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), and Wolfgang Schäuble, Federal Minister of the Interior of West Germany, were
selected by each side to negotiate the unification treaty. Their discussions were rushed, in an
attempt to finalize political reform quickly to ensure stability. Considering that economically the
GDR was aiming to rapidly adjust to Western standards and using the West-German Deutsche
Mark as currency, politicians felt forced to respond swiftly in order to avoid a crisis. In their
view, drafting a completely new constitution that involved lengthy discussions within both
governments would have caused destabilizing delays. Instead, the two negotiators hastily entered
an agreement accepting the West’s cultural norms and setting aside limited exceptions for EastGerman citizens’ cultural priorities, that only applied in the former territories of the GDR.
A timeline of events displays just how rushed this process took place. During the first
meeting in Bonn, on June 1, 1990, Krause and Schäuble scheduled four negotiation proceedings,
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thereby setting a timeframe that would lead to the final date of August 31, 1990, when the treaty
was projected to be signed. Two countries that had operated separately for 40 years, were
scheduled to culturally, economically, juristically, politically, and socially unify in only three
months, which was an ambitious strategy.
On June 30, 1990, minister Krause sent out a first questionnaire to several East-German
departments that was designed to facilitate the first negotiating proceeding that were scheduled
for July 6, 1990. The East-German department heads of finances, justice, foreign affairs, and
defense were asked to participate in devising ideas for the treaty. Within this set of questions,
Krause asked, for example, “Which legal norms of West Germany have to be changed or
amended by interim arrangements,” and, “In which ways should further agreements or contracts
between the states [Länder] of West Germany (as well as its institutions and its private
companies) and the departments of the GDR be pursued?”90 The representatives of each
department offered in response both specific questions they thought crucial to ask or, on the
other hand, offered specific proposals to anticipated issues.
The previously discussed recommendations from the East-German government’s
negotiators indicate that there was a general understanding, at least among the East-German
politicians, that laws would be discussed and negotiated, and a common version developed that
would apply to a unified Germany. This is furthermore evident in the protocol of the first official
negotiation proceeding of July 6, 1990. The language that the delegation of the GDR used
signifies their wish to negotiate a treaty that would reflect shared interests. In section two of the
preliminary statement rendered by Lothar de Maizière, the delegation of the GDR declares
interest in identifying the treaty as “Einigungsvertrag” rather than calling it a separate treaty for
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each of the two states. 91 The German word “Einigungsvertrag” is a composition of two words:
“Einigung” meaning agreement/unification and “Vertrag,” treaty. De Maizière sets a tone that
identifies two equal partners bringing their ideas and values to the negotiation table and will
endeavor to come to a fair resolution. Furthermore, he adds that it is important to conduct
discussions at great length and achieve a balance duly taking note of all things that have
developed and evolved differently in both territories in the previous 40 years.
Notable here again is the language he uses. Ambiguously, De Maizière writes “die
Teilung sei nur durch Teilen zu überwinden“ (“the division can only be overcome by sharing”).92
In German, the term „teilen“ can mean both divide and share, which appears to suggest that De
Maizière stresses that at this turning point in history, the two authorities must use their power to
find shared values and common grounds for unity, instead of creating or enshrining policies and
laws that divide the country and its people once again.
The notion of combining the culture and traditions that had grown separately in the past
forty years and building a new unified country is exemplified in section 4.2 of the protocol. De
Maizière suggests here a new name for the country. Instead of using the two former names of the
countries, “German Democratic Republic” or “Federal Republic of Germany,” he suggests
“German Federal Republic,” an attempt to symbolically indicate a new beginning for each side
combining something of each postwar name. He also advises to use the second stanza of the
East-German national anthem as well as the third stanza of the West-German national anthem for
a unified Germany national hymn. As we know today, these suggestions were not adopted, and
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the West-German name “Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” and the “Deutschlandlied” remained in
place for unified Germany. 93
Bender argues in his article “Willkommen in Deutschland” that by denying these requests
of symbolic nature, Schäuble failed to “build an emotional bridge for East Germans” to transition
and feel welcome in a new state.94 He claims that West-German politicians were oblivious to
East-German grievances and possible frustrations that would arise from this, as they had never
experienced a change of regime themselves and, therefore, did not take into consideration that
those actions could offend East Germans.95 Bender furthermore addresses the “underestimation
of the non-material“ wishes and needs of the East-German citizen. He explains that the West
granted great financial assistance that kept many East-German cities from falling into further
decay and allowed citizen new ways of communicating and exploring the world, such as the
addition of phone lines. However, he criticizes the lack of empathy in cultural and social matters,
for instance, by denying the inclusion of a national anthem stanza of the East-German hymn, or
the rejection of the request to create a new flag and a new name for the unified new country. He
furthermore thinks that a redesigning of those symbols might have offered a more welcoming
transition for East Germans, as they were navigating their course in a changed country that bit by
bit was adjusting to new norms, socially, economically, and spatially.96
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THE ABORTION AND HOMOSEXUALITY DEBATE
Two significant differences between the cultural norms and practices of East and West Germany
involved the East’s legalization of abortion and the decriminalization of homosexuality. The
implementation of the Abortion Law (Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft) or
Regulation of Term (Fristenregelung,) in the GDR had been simple. On March 9, 1972, the
Volkskammer met to vote on the issue. A crucial speaker, the Minister of Health Prof. Dr.
Mecklinger, delivered a lengthy plea in favor of the law. He first reminded his audience that
matrimony, family, and maternity were under the protection of the socialist state according to
article 38 of the constitution and that the Law for the Protection of Mother and Child and the
Rights of Women (Gesetz zum Schutz für Mutter und Kind und über die Rechte der Frau) were
passed in 1950. He claimed that equal rights were achievements of the socialist state that were
initially demanded by the revolutionary labor movements. Furthermore he stated that in 1931,
the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or KPD) had already
filed a motion for the implementation of an abortion law that should legally allow women to
abort. 97 In order to remain consistent with the socialist agenda, Mecklinger claimed that equal
rights also meant that women should have the right to decide about abortion. Furthermore, the
protection of matrimony, family, and maternity would also bear the responsibility of the state to
allow women to be happy in their marriage and professional lives and love their children, which
could not be guaranteed if women were forced to keep an unwanted child or seek illegal
dangerous methods to have it aborted.
The majority voted for the law to pass. In the GDR, abortion was then legal if performed
by a licensed medical doctor within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy and when the patient had
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sought counseling beforehand.98 The next day, the East-German newspaper New Germany
(Neues Deutschland) published an exemplary with the cover headline “Rights and Dignity of
Women fully guaranteed” (Recht und Würde der Frau vollauf garantiert).99 The GDR adhered to
this position.
Interestingly, the East-German laws on abortion and homosexuality were more
in line with the views and directions of other countries in the Western world. The United States
Supreme Court, for example, struck down outright abortion bans in Roe v. Wade in 1973.100
France legalized abortion in 1975.101 England legalized homosexuality (the Sexual Offences Act)
and abortion in 1967.102 The state of Illinois was the first US state to remove criminal laws
against homosexuality or sodomy in 1961, with 19 states following in the 1970s. France revoked
all sodomy laws during the French Revolution in 1791 and enacted a law in 1985 prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.103
Given the concurrence of East-German laws with laws from other European nations, the
East Germans proposed that their current law regarding abortion and homosexuality should be
adopted in all Germany.104 According to the documents presented by the East-German ministry
for justice, paragraphs 175 and 218 of the West-German law that criminalized homosexual
behavior and abortion respectively, should not be included in the pan-German criminal code.
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However, the abortion debate had been far messier in West Germany. After the Second
World War, when abortion was punished by death or prison sentences, laws changed constantly.
The attempt in 1974 to regulate the Fristenregelung, like in the GDR, was impeded a year later
by the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the highest court in
Germany.105 It was then followed by a new amendment in 1976 that punished abortion with a
fine or up to a three-year imprisonment, codified in criminal code 218.106 The last change to the
law prior to unification implemented the Indication Regulation (Indikationsregelung) that
permitted abortion in the case of rape or when the health of the mother was at risk.
Despite the fact that the laws of the GDR were more “Western” by comparison with laws
in West Germany, West-German negotiators still refused to decriminalize abortion and
homosexuality across all of Germany. It is noteworthy to mention that SED policies aggressively
forced a non-religious culture in the GDR. While 96% of East Germans were a member of either
the catholic or protestant church after the Second World War, by 1989, 70% were nondenominational.107 In West Germany, the numbers after 1945 were similar: 96% of the
population belonged to the church; however, in 1989, it was still 85%.108 This might explain why
the West-German government decided that paragraphs 175 and 218 of the West-German
criminal code should both remain in place in West Germany. During the negotiations for the
unification treaty, the delegates failed to reach a consensus about a common abortion law, which
resulted in different laws in East and West. The West-German legislator however demanded for
a common solution that should be voted on by the latest December of 1992. In a source
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published by the German parliament in 2017, the German abortion debate during unification is
summarized as such, “During the negotiations of the accession of the GDR to the Federal
Republic of Germany, it remained unsuccessful in expanding the intended ‘indication solution’
of the criminal code of the FRG to the acceding territory [East Germany]. Therefore, for a brief
period, partial federal law remained in both parts of Germany.”109 Then, article 31. IV of the
treaty is quoted, “[the legislator has to] find a regulation by December 31, 1992, that will better
protect the prenatal life and offer pregnant women the judicially right to social services and
counseling, as is currently the case in both parts of Germany.”110
Notable in this paragraph again is the language that indicates the West-German
dominance over East Germans exhibited by the West-German lawmaker and the author of the
Scientific Services of the German Parliament (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen
Bundestages).111 The author indicates that the “indication solution,” the law in West Germany,
was intended to be expanded to the East-German states. This however comes from a WestGerman perspective, as East Germans wanted their solution expanded to the West. In fact, many
East German protested against the expansion of the “indication solution,” by writing letters and
petitions that were presented at the Volkskammer on June 1990.112
Second, since both parties did not reach a consensus, the lawmakers (which would then
consist of mostly West Germans) would be obliged to find a solution within two years.113
However, it is suggested that prenatal life should be protected by the state, as was not the case in
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both parts of Germany then. It is not specifically stated that the prenatal life is not protected in
East Germany but, since the Fristenregelung allowed abortion in the East for the first three
months, it becomes clear that the drafter of this phrasing is suggesting that West-German law
should be assumed to prevail in the future. Either case illustrates the dominance of West
Germans and their confidence that their laws and traditions would override those of the East.
Despite the West-German negotiators’ failure to decriminalize abortion and
homosexuality, shortly after unification, former East-German law did become the law of unified
Germany. The West-German laws continued to criminalize homosexuality until 1994, but then
legislators removed it shortly before the law was scheduled to expire.114 In 1992, unified
Germany’s legislators permitted abortion in all of Germany by a law that closely mirrored the
former GDR code.
The unification negotiations surrounding the socially significant issues of abortion and
homosexuality arguably show a lack of empathy on the part of West Germans for the EastGerman way of life. The West-German politicians could have embraced these two more
enlightened practices of East Germany, which were more aligned with other nations and the
progress of which West Germany proudly boasted. Such compromise could have brought
together the two peoples. However, the conservative leaders of the CDU found it difficult to
support this progressive law. In a letter exchange between member of the Volkskammer Gisela
Sept-Hubrich (SPD), who had spoken for the extension of the Fristenregelung to unified
Germany, and President of the Bundestag Rita Süssmuth (CDU) from August 8, 1990, Süssmuth
explained that West-German jurisdiction could not support such law that was “not ethically
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justifiable.”115 Süssmuth argued that even the West-Germany Indikationslösung was not in line
with the German jurisdiction, as it also did not protect the unborn life in every case.116 She
therefore suggested a third option: the state and the society should agree that the most important
legal interest should be the preservation of life and all should commit to extending “material and
ideal help and a child-friendly environment” for mothers.117 Süssmuth went even further and
proposed a modified, what she termed, “Lebensschutzgesetz” (Law of the Protection of Life), of
the German criminal code that would include the new paragraph, “The unborn, the disabled, and
the dying human life are under the special protection of the state order.”118 In order to better
protect the (unborn) life, Süssmuth listed several improvements and assistance for the mothers
(to be), such as increased child benefits, social welfare, or extended parental leave.
Süssmuth’s concerns were valid and had been shared and contested in other democracies
in the Western world. However, in the East-West unification debate, it is not her argument itself
that is reason for criticism, but the lack of compromise illustrated while reaching the agreement.
Considering that only two years later, the German legislators adopted the Fristenregelung in
unified Germany indicates that this progressive law of the GDR was not irrational after all.
East Germans had similar progressive views about homosexuality, especially compared
to other Eastern blocs. In the Soviet Union, for instance, one could get a prison term of up to five
years for homosexual activities under article 121.1, a law that was not overruled until 1993.119 In
1968, homosexuality was decriminalized in the GDR and on August 11, 1987, the Supreme
Court of the GDR held that “homosexuality, just as heterosexuality, depicts variation of human
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behavior. Homosexuals therefore are not outcasts in socialist society but entitled to civil rights in
the same way as all other citizens.”120 During the unification treaty negotiations, the WestGerman legislators, on the other hand, adhered to section 175 of the criminal code prohibiting
“male sodomy” in the western part of Germany.
The West-German gay community however, had already started to publicly demonstrate
on the streets against persecution since 1979, when they participated in Christopher Street Days,
large gay parades. These parades were held in major German cities, such as Berlin, Munich, and
Cologne.121 Various German parties, except the CDU, participated in such Emancipation
Movement (Emanzipationsbewegung) events and for the first in 1980, the West-German FDP,
Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) demanded in the Bundestag to abolish
paragraph 175.122 However, it was not until the crucial AIDS crisis in the 1980s when public
opinion and the vilifying of homosexuals in West Germany started to gradually change. Rita
Süssmuth and Heiner Geißler, both health minister of the CDU, started a campaign against the
taboos in politics, which sanctioned a more open discussion about sexuality in Germany.123
Although this did not change the status of paragraph 175, it allowed the media to explore the
topic of homosexuality and make it more accessible and present in the every-day life of West
Germans. One well-known example was the first gay character and the first romantic kiss
between two men in one of the most prominent German TV shows, Lindenstraße, in 1990.
While homosexual activities were not considered criminal in East-German territory after
unification, they continued to be illegal in the West. Still, surveys indicate that East Germans felt
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pressured to follow societal norms, such as heterosexual marriages, that were valued and
encouraged by the party. As a consequence, many people in the East-German gay community
decided to get married to a partner of this opposite gender.124 This collective pressure did not
exist to the same extent in West Germany. A large exodus from West to East in order to live a
sexually free life did therefore not occur.
These examples show how a division was created that had severe consequences for the
everyday life of East Germans. Homosexuals who had been given freedom in the former GDR
could not freely express their sexual identity in large parts of their new country. Similarly,
women no longer had complete control over their body if they moved to the West. Both of these
issues were heavily debated over many years.125 In hindsight, the West-German negotiators
maintained the status quo in both the East and West after unification. The East Germans,
however, wanted one common law, but were overruled.
The unification treaty can be considered the moment of birth of a new German nation, but
it was fundamentally flawed. Both East and West should have been equal partners as Germans.
Providing these examples above, it is evident that the unification treaty did not live up to the
promise of its name. Whereas important cultural and symbolic wishes of the East Germans were
denied by West Germans, once the unification treaty was agreed, it was introduced to the public
with an additionally humiliating West-German rhetoric of superiority that I will further discuss
in this chapter. The terms Besserwessi, a composition of Besserwisser (Know-it-all) and Wessi
(West German), and Jammerossi (whining East German) were quickly embraced in the everyday
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jargon of Germans. In a 2019 survey conducted by the ZDF, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen
(German Public TV Channel), 49% of the East-German interviewees still regard West Germans
as Know-it-alls and 34% of West Germans think East Germans still whine too much.126 In
another evaluation led by the research institute Emnid in 2018, 56% of East Germans claimed
that West Germans still treat them in an arrogant manner.127

DOMINANT WEST GERMAN RHETORIC
West Germany was not a monolithic bloc. As previously stated, there were three different
attitudes towards the GDR; the “accusatory camp,” consisting of former opponents of the SED
regime, who morally disapproved of the East-German regime based on totalitarian theory, such
as that of Hannah Arendt.128 Just like the press, this condemnation stance rejected everything
East German and saw the West-German, democratic way as superior and necessary. The counter
narrative, or the “apologists,” saw the GDR in a more favorable light and its ideology in its
essence noble, which often resulted in downplaying the crimes of the oppressive SED regime
and in a distorted view of capitalism.129 The third group analyzed the GDR through a more
objective lens and discussed the “complexities and ambiguities” of the GDR.130 In this
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dissertation, I focus on the narrative of the dominant party in West Germany, the CDU, as it was
the Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s leading party.
This attitude of West-German superiority was reflected in various instances. Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, also called the “Unity-Chancellor,” held a speech in Dresden in December 1989,
shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this speech, he assured that the West respected the
wishes, self-determination, and opinions of the East and was not going to patronize them: “We
respect what you will decide for your country.”131 In December of 1989, it was still uncertain
how a “unification” would be brought into existence, but Kohl declared that the main goal of the
West would be to ameliorate the living conditions of East Germans and make them feel
comfortable in the East so that they could remain in their “Heimat” (home, homeland,
belonging,) and find their happiness.132
Kohl’s assumption that East Germans were not happy and comfortable in East Germany
is still often shared today. However, in his book Within Walls: Private Life in the German
Democratic Republic, Paul Betts describes how – within the physical walls erected by the state,
as well as the private walls in their homes – East Germans were able to negotiate and protect
their private lives. This sophisticated and layered insight into the everyday life of East Germans
demonstrates that especially during Honecker’s “relative liberalization” in the 1970, East
Germans used their homes and Dachas (garden plot in the country that usually included a small
living space where East Germans spent their weekend and/or holidays, from the Russian dacha),
as their refuge of freedom, happiness, and self-expression, therefore, debunking Kohl’s
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assumption that a happy and comfortable life in the socialist regime had never occurred. 133 Kohl
furthermore mentioned in his speech that after Second World War, he had “the chance to grow
up over there [the West].”134 Although in his speech Kohl asserted Western-German respect,
support, and solidarity, it is statements like these that made West Germans appear insensitive.
One of the most notorious examples of West-German dominance openly expressed is
Wolfgang Schäuble’s speech after the unification treaty was finalized in 1990. The speech
translates as follows:

Dear Citizens, it is a question of entry of the GDR into West Germany, not the
other way around. We [the West Germans] have a good constitution that has proven it
worth. We will do everything for you. We welcome you. We do not want to ignore your
wishes and interests callously. But a unification of two equal states is not occurring here.
We are not beginning from equal starting positions. There is the constitution and the
Federal Republic of Germany. Let us emanate from the conditions, from which you were
excluded for 40 years. Now you have the right to participate [in the constitution and the
FRG] and we will be considerate of that.135
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(such as the wish to rename the country), while West Germans did not accept the validity of
East-German laws in their side of Germany. Thus, East-German wishes and interests were at
most only partially met, while West Germans did not have to make any concessions.
The West was praised in the domestic and international media and by leading politicians
at home and abroad for its monetary sacrifices to East Germany, for instance the
“Begrüßungsgeld” (welcome money)136 and the “Solidaritätssteuer” (solidarity tax),137 while it
was also praised for their non-monetary contributions during unification. Individual Western
politicians were praised, sometimes long after. For instance, in 2016, Wolfgang Schäuble
became an honorary citizen of Berlin for his speech in favor of moving the parliament and
administration from Bonn to Berlin. However, it was De Maizière who had suggested it and
provided specific reasons for his proposal during the first unification treaty meeting on July 8,
1990.138 During this meeting, Schäuble claimed that this decision should be reserved to the
legislator and decided short term.139 When it finally came to a vote, it was just with a small
margin that a majority supported the move. According to Michael Müller, then acting mayor of
Berlin, the majority was reached specifically because of Schäuble’s efforts and his “historic”
speech in favor of the move.140
In this speech, Schäuble mentioned that many had discussed the necessity of overcoming
the division of the two Germanys through sharing. In his opinion, sharing meant the willingness
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of both sides to adjust to changes. His speech was constantly interrupted by applause and
exclamations of support. Elements of Schäuble’s speech can be detected in De Maizière’s
opening remarks during the first negotiation meeting discussed in the beginning of this chapter.
Considering the amount of symbolic changes that the East-German side suggested, Schäuble’s
call for Berlin to be the capital as a new symbol for unified Germany was an important step but
not enough. Furthermore, declaring Berlin the capital seemed inevitable due to its large size, its
metropolitan nature, and fairness, since it had been the only city divided between East and West.
Schäuble’s words amounted to scoring a goal into an empty net. In an interview with Die Zeit,
Schäuble indicated that Berlin was elected possibly due to the attack that left him paralyzed and
in a wheelchair.141 When he held his pro-Berlin speech, it was the first time that the delegates
saw him in a wheelchair on the podium and everyone most likely felt “touched.”142 He claimed
that this sight must have had a strong effect.
It is indeed puzzling why the East-German effort to make Berlin the capital was not
honored, for instance, by nominating De Maizière as honorary citizen. In the protocol of the first
unification treaty negotiation, it is even said that in fact Schäuble did not want to include the
“Hauptstadtfrage” (the question whether Berlin should become the capital again) in the treaty
but rather let the legislature decide on this issue later. It was De Maizière who insisted on
including it in the treaty. He listed several reasons why Berlin should become the capital again.
Most importantly, Berlin as capital would allow a better integration of the five New States (Neue
Bundesländer) that are all in rather close proximity of Berlin. Furthermore, Berlin as the capital
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from the start until recently had never been disputed, and nowhere else could the divide and the
reconciliation be documented better than in Berlin.143
While Berlin was declared the capital in the unification treaty, the seat of the unified
parliament and administration remained in Bonn. In a separate meeting of the Bundestag, on
June 20, 1991, the “completion” of this decision to restore Berlin as Germany’s capital, the move
of the parliament and administration from Bonn to Berlin, came up for a vote. In his speech in
favor of Berlin as seat of the government, De Maizière addressed the Bundestag stating that
during the unification negotiation, a move to make Berlin the capital had been agreed. This
implied that all capital functions, such as seat of the parliament, would therefore move to Berlin.
He claimed that during this decision, nobody had “a schizophrenic capital idea” in mind that was
devoid of its meaning, that is, having Berlin merely be a symbolic capital rather than a
meaningful one housing the government. He ended his speech with the now famous saying in
Berlin, “Wer A sagt, muss auch Berlin sagen” (“whoever says A, has to say Berlin, too”), which
is a word play on the German saying, “Wer A sagt, muss auch B sagen“(“In for a penny, in for a
pound”).144 De Maizière made a stronger and more persistent argument about the importance of
Berlin as the capital of a united Germany, and yet his voice was muted and his role erased.
Why Schäuble’s speech was selected, and deemed “historic” and influential, rather than
De Maizière’s consistent advocacy of Berlin as the new German capital, is unclear but the
decision to choose him as honoree for the honorary citizen list of Berlin is consistent with a
common trend. Since 2002 only two East Germans, Wolf Biermann and Joachim Gauck, became
honorary citizens of Berlin. Both of them are known to have fought the East-German regime.
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Although Wolf Biermann spent the first 17 years of his life in Hamburg, he relocated to East
Berlin in 1953 where he went to university and later worked as a theater director, writing his own
productions. In his plays, he continually criticized the GDR until he was deprived of his EastGerman citizenship while hosting a concert in West Germany. His exile was extensively covered
in the West-German media and he is depicted as a person, who “…brave and steadily stood for
freedom and democracy...”145
Joachim Gauck also fought the East-German regime. The induction of his person, in the
honorary citizen of Berlin’s description, was because of his extensively involvement in the
dissolution of the Stasi and the department of national security. Furthermore, when he left office,
he continued to be “involved in the commemoration of historical injustice and [the cultivation of]
a lively democratic culture.”146 The Members of the Berlin Parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus) and
the Senate Chancellery (Senate von Berlin) chose other (West-German) honorees, such as
Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, who became an honorary citizen in 2000, because his artistic work at
the Berlin Festival (Berliner Festwochen) and the German Opera helped achieve worldwide
recognition and made Berlin a music city.147 The lack of East-German honorees seems unusual
and upon emailing the Senatskanzlei Berlin and specifically asking if there is an official reason
why most of the East-German honorees were not transferred from the - still existing East-German list to the official German list, an employee sent the following reply:
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Due to the divide in Berlin, there were two different honorary citizens lists. In
1992, after unification, the Senate of Berlin (in compliance with the Members of the
Parliament) decided, which people with extraordinary cultural and scientific merit for
Berlin should be transferred from the honorary list of Berlin (East) to the honorary list of
the country and the city of Berlin [the West-German list]. In the case of the remaining
honorary citizens of the “Capital of the GDR,” such extraordinary merits could not be
determined. However, a “de-recognition” [strip someone from her/his honorable
distinction] did not occur. Although the decision-making of awarding or transferring the
honorary citizen laureateship is in principle confidential, I hope to have helped you with
this information.148

Examining the employee’s language, it is striking that the West-German list was and
remains the chosen standard. This list was not evaluated by East Germans to assess whether or
not certain honorees should be “dishonored.” Overall, only 9 out of 24 East Germans were
transferred to the official honorary citizen list that is posted on the Senate Chancellery’s website
today. Noteworthy is the example of Soviet General Nikolai Erastowitsch Bersarin, first city
commandant of Berlin and part of the honorary citizen list of East Germany due to his
humanitarian work assisting for the destitute citizens in the capital after the Second World War.
Bersarin was removed from the official list in 1992, on the basis of the incongruous claim that
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nobody could know how he would have behaved in Berlin in the postwar years, since he had
passed away shortly after the end of the war. In 2003, following public pressure, he was added
again to the list. Yet, a lack of East Germans or people that East Germans deemed honorable, is
undeniable among those recognized as Berlin’s honorary citizens.149 This provides yet another
example of how the West-centered unification process effectively ignored and erased the
experiences of East Germans.

DEFAMATION OF EAST GERMANS
Lothar de Maizière was not honored for suggesting Berlin as the capital. When examining his
complex political career after unification, a common tendency of undermining East-German key
figures after unification becomes manifest. Since this chapter discusses the unification treaty, I
want to specifically examine the marginalization of those East-German politicians - directly and
indirectly - involved in the negotiations of this treaty by their West-German colleagues and the
West-German media. The unfavorable representation and treatment of East-Germans public
figures, as they represented the other German, had lasting effects on how East Germans were and
are perceived by West Germans. I will discuss this idea further in the following chapters.
De Maizière began his career as a viola musician in East Germany and toured theaters in
the GDR as part of an orchestra. Due to an arm injury, he put his career as a musician to rest and
studied law. He proceeded to practice law in the GDR, starting in 1976 until unification. His
career as a politician did not begin until unification. Although he was a member of the EastGerman CDU since 1956, he did not assume an active role until he was appointed chair of the
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CDU. Ultimately, he became the first democratically elected prime minister of the GDR (from
April 1990 until the dissolution of the GDR on October 3, 1990).150
As previously mentioned in this chapter, De Maizière strongly desired to provide East
Germans with a smooth transition into the new country, not only in financial matters but also
culturally. Given that his cousin, Thomas De Maizière, was a politically active citizen in West
Germany, he recognized the differences in thinking and behaving between East and West
Germany and was sensitive to East-German needs that might arise from these differences.151
Furthermore, he understood the importance of symbolic gestures, which the West Germans were
far too seldom willing to give. That De Maizière was nonetheless a crucial and fitting unification
treaty negotiator, can be concluded, for instance, from his contemporaries’ assessment of his
character.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, describes De Maizière as an
“exceptionally cultured and very talented person.”152 Gorbachev stated that De Maizière’s factual
and objective assessment of the past and the present help find fair solutions to problems.
Furthermore, he argues that De Maizière is a “highly moral and honest person,” who at the same
time is also “sensitive and considerate… always acting adherent to principles.”153 This was
reflected in his election as the - first and last - democratically elected prime minister of the
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GDR. Yearning for democracy, the moral compass of the candidate was of utmost importance
for East Germans in casting their vote in these elections.154
Yet, after unification his credentials and professional experiences were not accredited in
the Federal Republic of Germany. He was not allowed to legally practice law until being
admitted to the bar in West Germany. Although he had actively participated and negotiated the
unification treaty, the Two Plus Four Agreement (Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag), and the Union of the
Economy (Wirtschaftsunion), a lawyer who could have been his son instructed him on what he
was and was not allowed to do in the new country. 155 This lawyer ended the inauguration with a
handshake and the words, “I wish you good luck in your new job.”156 However, the most severe
consequence De Maizière faced after unification was the accusation of having worked for the
Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit MfS) or Stasi. This accusation was
levelled at many public figures from the former GDR, and often resulted not only in public
humiliation but ended their professional career. Whereas there was a certain degree of EastGerman – voluntarily or not – Stasi involvement, numerous East-German politicians were
tarnished by unsubstantiated claims that continue to resurface until the present day.
The Stasi was the East-German secret police controlled solely by SED, the only EastGerman party until unification when a democratic system of multiple parties, such as the CDU
and SPD was established shortly before the demise of the GDR. After its liquidation in June
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1990, citizens in a unified Germany came to realize the full extent of the Stasi’s crimes, such as
the extreme surveillance of its citizens, psychological warfare techniques during interrogation,
and the bullying and arrest of dissidents. In unified Germany, the Stasi became the new symbol
of terror, dictatorship, and therefore, the oppression of a people.157
Stefan Wolle argues in his work about German commemorative culture that the ways in
which the Stasi and its methods were exposed in the West after unification, and the resulting
discourse of contemporary history and its representation, insulted many former East-German
citizens.158 They felt betrayed as the dominant Stasi debate – in politics, arts, media, and any
public sector – discredited their culture, identity, and everyday life in the GDR. It appeared as if
the Stasi debate was a welcome replacement or distraction from the Nazi narrative and the
question of guilt in the West that was never resolved after the Second World War.159
The obsession with the Stasi and the resulting pursuit of its former members dominated
all German newspapers. In a noticeable article from July 1992, “Stasi comes, Nazi leaves?”
(“Stasi kommt, Nazi geht?”) in the newspaper Die Zeit, Herbert Obenaus quotes historian HansPeter Schwarz claiming that the communist past will be the central topic of the younger
generation for decades.160 Rolf Müller, then director of the Institute of Contemporary History in
Munich, is quoted stating that the Nazi dictatorship will “lose significance in the collective
memory of Europeans,” as the much longer lasting suffering of communist dictatorship would
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gain pre-eminence.161 Today, 18 years later, we know that these projections did not come to
fruition and it seems peculiar that historians could assume that the atrocities committed by Nazis
would ever “lose significance” in history. The idea that recently discovered crimes by a regime
would simply reduce another evil seems either naïve or evasive and convenient.
An unnamed Die Zeit’s author then briefly surveys how each German country worked
through their Nazi past pre-unification to then proceed to compare the Nazi dictatorship with the
GDR regime in absurd fashion. He begins by pointing out that the Nazis had “more or less the
approval of the masses,” which was not the case for the GDR’s regime in the “Ostzone” (the East
zone).162 This, according to the author, was revealed through the frequent defections from the
East to the West. He furthermore claims that since the GDR regime effectively censored,
surveilled and oppressed not only those East Germans who escaped to the West, but WestGerman citizens, too.163
The purpose of comparing two dictatorships seems peculiar. Furthermore, it is evident in
this paragraph that the Nazi regime is depicted in a more favorable way than the GDR regime.
Lastly, there is considerable research indicating that East Germans supported the socialist
regime’s social welfare policies and wanted to reform the system’s weaknesses rather than
abandon the system entirely. Examining sources that evaluate East-German citizen or peace
movements, such as the Friedensbewegung that was one of the factors leading to the fall of the
Berlin Wall, indicates that these groups did not see themselves as “opposition to the current
system” but rather wanted to reform the GDR’s “real socialism.”164 Eckhard Jesse explains that
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“[w]hat the few opposition members wanted (to reform the GDR), they never accomplished;
what they achieved with other groups (the end of the GDR), they did not want in that form.”165
Groups, such as the New Forum (Neues Forum), Democracy now (Demokratie Jetzt), or
Democratic Construction (Demokratischer Aufbau), intended to reform the GDR.166 After the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the peaceful demonstrations and the reforms did not abruptly end.167 Even
in the Volkskammer was a large consensus that the GDR should remain sovereign.168 The former
opposition of the SED state intended to reform the GDR from the inside.169
However, in the Die Zeit article, the author indicates that the fall of the GDR regime was
considered a liberation, whereas the end of the Second World War was generally viewed as a
defeat among all Germans and, although the magnitude of the crimes of the GDR regime was not
as great as those of the Third Reich, the “bloody rule of Stalin” and the Soviet satellites’ regimes
committed many crimes, such as shootings at the Berlin Wall, abductions, torture, forced
adoptions, and citizens exiled. This vivid language is reserved for the GDR, as Hitler and his
regime are never referred to as having exerted a “bloody rule,” overseeing a “system of hell” or
similar jargon that he uses to describe the communists and socialists but simply as the “Third
Reich” or “Nazi regime.” Moreover, the author quotes German philosopher Jürgen Habermas
claiming that the GDR had always offered “deceptive hope for democracy,” just to counter that
the Nazi regime never had such pretenses.
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In summary, the author combines a group of facts about the Nazi regime in a way that
compares favorably to the “bloody rule” of the GDR. The author offers these facts: Hitler was
voted into his office and, therefore, received the approval of the masses, even when the atrocities
- if we consider the number of deaths - committed by the Nazis were greater than during the
GDR regime, and lastly, the Nazis never pretended to create a system of democracy. However,
the way he positions his argument, in a compare-and-contrast manner, does not offer any
meaningful contribution and apprehension but rather creates an illusion of a winner versus loser
evaluation.170
The purpose of comparing two dictatorships that started upon unification was the German
desire to come to terms with the past, which is coined Vergangenheitsbewältigung in German.
The word is a composition of Vergangenheit (the past) and Bewältigung (coming to terms),
which figuratively describes the debate of overcoming traumatic historical events and guilt in the
recent past. Although it does not stand for a specific past, until 1990, in Germany it was always
referred to the crimes of the Nazi dictatorship. In the last part of the 1980s in West Germany,
conservative and left-leaning academics and intellectuals engaged in a history dispute
(Historikerstreit) that sought to find a consensus on how to historicize Nazi Germany and the
Holocaust and whether Germans should accept the burden of guilt.171
After 1990, Vergangenheitsbewältigung of the SED regime was exercised – to a smaller
extend – by evaluating the Stasi files for example. However, many voices criticized the
comparison of the two dictatorships and perceived it again as a West-German attempt to point
fingers to the SED regime in order to distract from their own “wrongdoings” in the past. For

170

Herbert Obenaus, “Stasi kommt – Nazi geht?” Zeit Online, July 31, 1992, https://www.zeit.de/1992/32/stasikommt-nazi-geht/seite-5.
171
Jürgen Habermas et al., Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? The Disputer about the Germans’ Understanding of
History, ed. Ernst Piper, trans. James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993).

66

instance, Heinrich Senfft, attorney and journalist, who had defended clients accused of having
worked for the Stasi, such as Gregor Gysi, said: “We will probably achieve to compare the real
existing socialism with national socialism to the point where a total equalization will generally
be accepted, and the 50 million deaths of the Second World War will disappear over the crimes
of the SED regime.”172
Senfft’s remark was exaggerated but it is crucial to point out the sentiment behind his
sarcastic evaluation. A more nuanced approach to this debate offered historian Eckhard Jesse. He
made a critical distinction in the comparison of the Nazi and the SED dictatorship: the Nazi
dictatorship was supported from the inside and overthrown from the outside whereas the SED
state was overthrown from the inside and supported from the outside.173 He explained that the
Nazi dictatorship had German origins while the Soviet Union had extended and propagated its
power in the East-German territory. This changes the argument insofar that the atrocities of the
Nazis can be compared to the atrocities of Stalin’s Soviet Union, which takes away some agency
from East Germans. Historian Richard J. Evans wondered how comparing these dictatorships
could offer any further insights into the Vergangenheitsbewältigung debate. Like Jesse, he
determined it more important to investigate whether these two dictatorships could be considered
German in origin.174
This act of comparing the GDR to the Nazis created a cloud over prominent East-German
politicians, such as can be seen in the example of De Maizière. At the beginning of 1990, shortly
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before his election to prime minister of the GDR, rumors began to emerge that De Maizière
allegedly worked for the Stasi as Unofficial Collaborator (Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter or IM).175
This event was widely covered in the media, especially in Der Spiegel. Der Spiegel is a
particularly important weekly magazine, as it is one of the most distributed and influential
magazines in Germany with a record circulation of 1.2 million in 1991.176 During unification,
Der Spiegel was highly regarded in Germany, as it has been credited with having contributed to
the first viable freedom of the press after an “extreme anti-democratic nationalist” Alfred
Hugenberg owned most of the press during the Weimar Republic and extreme censorship during
the Third Reich. 177 Even after the Nazi era, the “Spiegel Scandal of 1962,” when an article
accused then secretary of defense Franz Josef Strauß of bribery, the press had been shackled.
Abusing his power and later denying his involvement, Strauß ordered the responsible (chief)
editors to be arrested, which resulted in large protests amongst students and other journalists and
publishers to demonstrate solidarity. Due to the exposure of such critical political topics that
have resulted in country-wide scandals, the editorial department housed a documentation
division that supposedly verifies all reports meticulously.178
Like many other media outlets, Der Spiegel provided extensive coverage on the alleged
Stasi involvement of De Maizière, as well as other East-German political figures, often
suggesting in their articles that these individuals were in some form involved in Stasi activity.
However, these articles failed to include appropriate evidence. Instead of factually describing the
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situation and supplying evidence, the language and tone were set to manipulate the reader into
believing vague assumptions.
In the article “Everything has to come out” (“Es muss alles raus”) from March 26, 1990,
Der Spiegel analyzed and determined the suitability of potential candidates for prime minister of
the “second German state,” who would be elected at West-German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s
“mercy.”179 It is left unclear why Kohl had to give his “mercy” in search of the still existing
autonomous East-German state. The fact that the West-German chancellor had to give his
blessing to any East-German politicians demonstrates the superior attitude of the West and the
profound distrust of East-German politicians among West-German politicians.
The unnamed author of the Spiegel article then proceeds to render the East-German
politicians unfit because of their Stasi past—all of them. As far as providing evidence of Stasi
involvement, the author either states that a candidate has “Stasi-Flecken (Stasi-stains),” without
further explanation or refers to “Überläuferberichte (reports of former member of the Stasi that
had denounced their former colleges),” also without offering further details. In De Maizière’s
case, the article refers to two anonymous letters that due to the same use of language and
typewriter, were likely written by the same person. For all five candidates mentioned, not a
single concrete piece of evidence is presented to support these Stasi allegations, as the article
merely presents anonymous hearsay.
Additionally, it is not only the lack of factual information and supporting documents that
is disconcerting in the article, it is also the language used, as well as the tone set that is reason to
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believe that the author intends to manipulate and steer the reader into thinking about East
Germans in a certain way. The article particularly attacks De Maizière. In a condescending tone,
the author first quotes De Maizière’s denial of all Stasi involvement, only to follow it up with an
almost childish like response: “No?” 180 The author then attempts to prove his Stasi involvement
by concocting a mismatched quote from the two anonymous letters, in which Czerni (De
Maizière’s alleged Stasi agent name) was seemingly given a gift for his Stasi work:

And did the 3-page informer letter not say: […] that after every important church
conference respectively […] gathering of oppositional groups, in the […] attorney de
Maizière participated, right away a […] “conspiratorial gathering between Major Hasse
and Czerni […] occurred. The report of the gathering that was produced the next day [..]
was right away brought to the ministerium by personal messenger to […] the
Normannstreet. For his extraordinary […] work guidance and levy of the […] star
informant Czerni alias attorney L. de […] Maizière received from Major Hesse several
awards and […] from the district administration leader a certificate of exception […] for
a purchase of a Lada 2107 car.181

The next paragraph follows up this unpersuasive quotation by asserting without evidence
that the “idiot” former Stasi member who may or may not have written the anonymous letter
would have no reason to lie. Thus, the author takes this one anonymous source as a beyond-areasonable-doubt conviction that De Maizière was a Stasi operative or collaborator, that De
Maizière is a liar without-a-doubt, and that his affiliation with the Stasi also makes him an idiot.
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Noteworthy is the language and metaphors used when referring to East and West
Germany. The Stasi is referred to as “detested Stasi,” or “the octopus Stasi,” people’s Stasi past
as “adverse winds,” former Stasi members are “light-in-the-head Stasi members,” whereas the
system of government in West Germany is referred to as a “tender plant,” and as previously
mentioned, Kohl’s approval, his tender “mercy.” While the crimes of the Stasi are welldocumented, this wholesale condemnation of De Maizière looks more like an anonymous
denunciation than an evidence-based report. As a critical reader, it is difficult to consider this
factual and unbiased journalism, which Germans claim Der Spiegel represents.
In subsequent paragraphs, the author restated that De Maizière denied ever receiving
monetary compensation from the Stasi and that contrary to Federal Intelligence Service
(Bundesnachrichtendienst) reports, former Stasi members had confirmed this. Again, the reader
is not provided with any detailed information on these sources. The author admits that, so far, all
accusations are only based upon two anonymous letters.
The rest of the article contains additional accusations lacking supportive evidence and
further mismatched quotations. It ends with the question whether the new democracy should
forget (and forgive) an individual’s Stasi involvement or reprocess (and therefore, condemn) it.
The article concludes with a quote by Ibrahim Böhme, another East-German politician accused
of Stasi involvement, “Since December I know that all people of this transition period soon
won’t be there anymore: neither Gysi, nor De Maizière or Böhme.”182
The East-German newspaper Neues Deutschland also reported about De Maizière’s
alleged Stasi involvement.183 In this one-page article, the allegations were disclosed and followed
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by a few paragraphs that contained more detailed, straightforward statements of the main
complainant – a former Stasi office. Although it is stated in the article, that the believed file
containing De Maizière’s alleged involvement was destroyed, the complainant claimed that a
copy should definitely be available, thus, a “thorough search” should reveal the truth. The article
did not include any slanted language and the topic was not turned into a sensationalized tale.184
Globally, a myriad of articles reported on De Maizière and other East Germans’ alleged
Stasi involvement and, as Böhme anticipated, De Maizière resigned, explaining that “I must
recognize that in resolving the Stasi problem, the difficult situation has arisen that an accused
must prove his innocence and that suspicion alone carries enormous weight.”185 In an interview
conducted in 2019 by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, De Maizière admits that the
accusations of the past had hurt his feelings tremendously. As proof of his innocence, he
mentions that in 2008, the federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of
the former GDR (Bundesbehörde für Stasi Unterlagen or BStU) had to open a new inquiry on his
involvement in the Stasi. 186 It was conducted based upon the intent to reward an honorary
pension to the last ministers of the GDR regime’s cabinet. However, this pension was proposed
on the premise that each minister would display no former ties to the Stasi. For this, the De
Maizière case was reevaluated and determined that collaboration with the Stasi could not be
traced.187
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De Maizière allowed his case to be reopened and upon evaluation of Stasi documents, it
is apparent that he supported making Stasi files public. In November 1989, the Ministerium für
Staatssicherheit was converted into the Office for National Security (Amt für Nationale
Sicherheit or AfNS). From then on, the agency had to report to the prime minister and not to the
SED. In an AfNS document deemed “top secret,” the turmoil in December 1989 was described. A
crowed attempted to force its way into government agencies housing Stasi files in the Gera
district, following rumors that files were being deliberately destroyed. De Maizière, then vice
president of the Council of Ministers, is said to have assured the inquiring Pastor Morgenrot that
access to the buildings would be granted if demolition of the files was suspected.188
Since De Maizière resigned from all political offices after unification to work in his
profession as a lawyer again, most public scrutiny and animosity towards him have vanished.
This has not been the case for other East-German politicians, who decided to remain in office,
even after Stasi accusations had come to the surface. The most prominent example is EastGerman attorney and politician Gregor Gysi. Gysi studied law at the Humboldt University in
Berlin from 1966 to1970 and graduated with a Juris Doctor degree in 1976. In 1967, he joined
the SED party and actively engaged in efforts that would bring forth more democracy in the
socialist state. Following Marxist-Leninist ideas, he - together with other famous critics of the
regime, such as Christa Wolf - was actively engaged in protests or works in the hopes of
engendering a reform of the system. He represented, for instance, Rudolf Bahro and Robert
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Havemann, political opponents and dissidents in the GDR, who were put under house arrest and
imprisoned for opposing the regime.189
On November 4th, 1989 he participated in the largest protest in the history of the GDR,
the Alexanderplatz Demonstration, when the demise of the GDR had yet to be decided. The fall
of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of the GDR, at that point, was still unimaginable and
the purpose of this protest was solely the democratization of the GDR.190 Gysi’s speech called
for new laws, a more nuanced constitution that expanded basic rights for its citizens, new voting
rights, more attorneys to assist citizens, a phone line - not surveilled by anyone - for every
household, and overall new relationships between politics, laws, and the truth.191
Examining his speech, it is obvious that he proposes to reform the GDR, not liquidate it.
There is no evidence in his word choice that indicates the imminent failure of the East-German
state. In fact, he ends his speech with the request to not only embrace anglicisms that have
emerged from the West, but to celebrate Perestroika and Glasnost, which stood for transparency
and openness, and a reform of politics and economy in Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union.
Selecting these Russian terms, he tacitly signified to the audience his embrace of their socialist
culture and Russian influence.
Gysi did not participate in the unification treaty negotiations, but he actively voiced his
disapproval of it and spoke for the GDR’s sovereignty. Numerous East Germans in grassroots
movements, such as the New Forum (Neues Forum), Initiative for Peace and Human Rights
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(Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte), and the Democracy Now (Demokratie Jetzt), that
had participated in the peaceful protests that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall demanded a “selfdetermined, grassroot democratic socialism in East Germany and at best a gradually equal
merging of both German states.”192 In a joint declaration (Gemeinsame Erklärung) of November
3, 1989, the movements asked to end the one-party system and democratically reform the
GDR.193 The declaration is concluded with the request to all East-German citizens to support
these demands with input and action.194
Nevertheless, on August 25, 1990 the Volkskammer decided in a vote to join West
Germany on October 3 of the same year. Gysi declared in his speech that those rushed conditions
would bring forth the “demise of the GDR” and that “the GDR … was for every one of us … the
hitherto existing life.”195 He claimed that the unification process had degraded the enterprise into
an annexation of the GDR by West Germany and not a joining of both states.196 On October 4,
once unification was officially signed into existence, he addressed the Bundestag with specific
concerns about the treatment of East Germans in a unified Germany.197
He first explained that the SED emerged from antifascist parties that later presumed a
post-Stalinist system that many of the members and the citizens of the GDR did not want.198 Its
undemocratic organization, according to Gysi, created great contradiction between the leaders
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and its members. Gysi claimed that East Germans own their history and their responsibility;
however, what he asked for is a “fair and differentiated evaluation of GDR history and its former
citizens.”199 He stated that besides assessing the damaging aspects, such as criminal oppression
of its citizens and an undemocratic system, the progressive accomplishments should be part of
the narrative as well.200
Anything that could undermine the self-confidence of the East Germans, according to
Gysi, should be avoided, so that they do not feel like second-class citizens. Gestures, such as the
appointing of five former GDR politicians as ministers, who were equally told that they did not
have any functions, were dishonest and hollow. A delegate of the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) party interrupted the speech with the words, “You don’t have a function, either!” Without
reacting to the interruption, he continued to refer to the five ministers and stated that the gesture
had the veneer of importance but was in fact substantively meaningless. He was then again
interrupted by the CDU, with “The PDS [Gysi’s party] is meaningless, too!”201
In his speech, Gysi called for a modern society, where sections 175 and 218 did not have
a place. He warned that both sides should meet as equals, and laws should not be used to divide
and give people roles that could damage future developments. His last statement was that the
parliament should represent the culture and dignity of the country and that the East Germans had
hitherto (assuming in the unified country) behaved cultured and dignified, which was answered
by a CDU member yelling, “Not for 40 years!” The aggressive interruptions to Gysi’s valid
arguments and the labeling of East Germans as uncultured and undignified were not entirely
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surprising, given the patronizing attitude of German elites. Having had no interaction with a
people in 40 years, how could they evaluate an entire society’s degree of sophistication? Gysi’s
advocacy of the integration and dignity of East Germans generated criticism among his
colleagues and the press, with many going so far as to calling his agenda nonsense.202
Upon unification, Gysi, too, was accused of having worked with the Stasi, but countless
articles discussing his alleged involvement all failed to produce any tangible evidence. 203 Still,
Gysi decided to remain in the PDS and therefore, in the public eye. Throughout the years, from
unification until the present day, Gysi repeatedly faced allegations that each time he had to deny
and comment on. The latest occurred in 2013, when German prosecutors opened preliminary
proceedings again.204 Every time, he claimed to not have knowingly worked for the Stasi. He
explained that he had conversations with them when defending his clients Bahro and
Havemann.205
From unification until the present day, Gysi’s agenda and policies concerning East
Germans have never changed. On October 3, 2019, the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin
Wall, he addressed the Bundestag again. In this speech, he evaluated the SED regime more
critically and received loud applause after stating that “all deaths there [in the GDR] are not
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acceptable.”206 However, when addressing the lives of East Germans, for instance, that salaries
and pensions were still not always equal to their counterparts in the West, and the fact that fewer
East Germans held executive positions in the new unified state, the cheering silenced until a
shouting and booing erupted at the end of his speech:

It would have been reasonable to adopt specific measures from the GDR, such as
the higher gender equality, the policlinics, the apprenticeships with a high school
diploma, to transfer to a unified Germany instead of totally negating all East-German
structures and partially even vilifying them. It would have strengthened the selfconfidence of the East Germans and increased the quality of life for West Germans.207

Although no sufficient evidence, such as a Stasi file, has been presented to prove his Stasi
involvement, Gysi has had the strength to stand up against the continual allegations over the
years. The lack of evidence of his Stasi involvement did not appear to make a difference in the
severity of judgment by the West-German media and West-German politicians. Some of Gysi’s
colleagues were not as strong as him. For instance, the Stasi files of constitutional lawyer and
former PDS delegate Professor Dr. Gerhard Riege proved an involvement with the Stasi from
1954 until 1960. However, the files also indicated that Dr. Riege’s actions did not cause any
harm to anyone.208 Nonetheless, the media initiated a smear campaign that drove Riege into
despair. In February of 1992, he decided to take his own life, leaving the following suicide note:
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I do not have the strength to fight and to live. My life was taken from me in the
new freedom. I am afraid of public opinion, how it is created by the media. I cannot
defend myself against it. I am afraid of the hate that the Bundestag shows me through
their words, stares, and the attitudes of people, who have no idea how immoral and
merciless the system they have subscribed to is. They willfully relish their victory over
us. Only the complete destruction of the opponent will allow them to rewrite history and
to erase all brown and black spots.209

One of the hateful experiences he referred to was during a speech he gave on March 13,
1991 in front of the Bundestag. Riege pleaded for the conservation of cultural programs of East
Germany, such as choirs, orchestras, or cultural organizations in East-German universities for
instance. During his description of the loss of this culture, he was continually heckled
predominantly by the CDU/CSU. They booed him, laughed at him, and shouted for instance,
“Now you defend the old regime! I would be ashamed if I were you!” or “You should not utter
the word “justice”! It is embarrassing!” “What we have to listen to by such a Stasi-fool.
Unbelievable!”210 After the vice presidents asked everyone to calm down and stop the heckling,
the CDU again shouted, “That’s a Stasi-brother. Such a Stasi-bigwig.”211 During his sevenminute speech, Riege was interrupted 29 times until he was cut off for going over his speaking
time limit. As previously discussed in Gysi’s case, such disrespectful behavior is still exhibited
in the Bundestag today.
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At the present time, the Stasi involvement of former East-German citizens has continued
to be an abundantly discussed topic, especially when a new “case” is alleged, such as in 2017.
The former state secretary of housing in Berlin, Andrej Holm, was identified as a former Stasi
member. The fact that Holm had been a mere 18 years old when he was only hired for an
internship at the Stasi that concluded just a few months later with the demise of the GDR, did not
spare him for being dismissed from his position.212
Another example is mentioned in the 2019 New York Times article, “Exposed as Stasi
Spy, a Newspaper Owner Tries to Reclaim His Story.” Christopher F. Schuetze informs the
reader about Silke and Holger Friedrich, who – in 2019 after purchasing the Berliner Zeitung –
called for a rethinking and retelling of the story of East Germans. Shortly after, a competing
newspaper accused Holger Friedrich of having worked for the Stasi.213 Mr. Friedrich, however,
did not despair, took ownership, and explained how he was forced into working for the secret
police. Unapologetically, he published his narrative in the Berliner Zeitung.

CONCLUSION
The unification of East and West Germany brought together all Germans. A physical separation
was overcome through peaceful protests, negotiations, and working together within a brief period
of time. However, the actions and rhetoric surrounding the unification of many West Germans,
such as the leading conservative party CDU discussed in this chapter, have created a social and
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cultural divide that still exists until the present day. In this chapter, I illustrated that WestGerman politicians who negotiated the unification treaty, refused to adopt cultural norms of the
East and rejected symbols that would have allowed East Germans to transition to a new country
and life easier. I moreover exemplified that it became also common practice to refuse to
acknowledge East-German accomplishments and use divisive and condescending rhetoric when
referring to East Germans and their culture.
The press contributed to this narrative with a Stasi witch-hunt against former EastGerman politicians without offering legitimate proof or without differentiating the level of
involvement. Whereas there was a certain degree of East German – voluntarily or not – Stasi
involvement, numerous East-German politicians were tarnished by unsubstantiated claims that
continue to resurface today. These actions partly contributed to the East Germans’ feeling left
behind. In a poll conducted in 2007, three-fourths of all East Germans still felt like second class
citizens.214 Telling the story of East Germans today to counteract the biased narrative is crucial if
society is to change the perception of the East Germans. Only when perceptions change will the
statistics mentioned by Gysi—wage and executive disparity—appear more equitable.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE GERMAN-GERMAN LITERATURE DISPUTE:
THE DELEGITIMIZING OF EAST-GERMAN IDENTITY

In the first chapter, I discussed how the unification treaty brought together all Germans
on West-German terms, with West-German actions and rhetoric surrounding the unification
creating a social and cultural divide. West Germans refused to adopt cultural norms of the East
and failed to acknowledge any accomplishments of the East Germans. Whereas there was a
certain degree of East German – voluntarily or not – Stasi involvement, numerous East-German
politicians were tarnished by unsubstantiated claims that continue to resurface today. These
actions partly contributed to the East Germans’ feelings of being treated unfairly and as secondclass citizens.
In this chapter, I examine how West Germans used similar rhetoric to discredit EastGerman artists and intellectuals. First, I discuss the German-German Literature Dispute
(Deutsch-deutscher Literaturstreit). I demonstrate how influential authorities, such as several
leading West-German intellectuals, used cultural channels to undermine East-German identity
and accomplishments. To do this, I discuss the Literature Dispute in 1990 that discredited
literature produced by East-Germans writers during the Cold War, such as the novel What
Remains (Was Bleibt) by Christa Wolf.
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The dispute was initiated by the most influential German speaking literature critic,
Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who was not only highly influential among critics, but also considered the
“Pope of Literature” by the media; thus, he wielded significant power in influencing/steering
public opinion.215 Reich-Ranicki and other fellow critics accused Wolf of political apathy in the
GDR and debated whether art could be produced within an oppressive system.
In the second part of this chapter, I transition to film to examine how West-German
filmmakers portrayed the conditions of East Germans in their everyday life, especially the ways
in which they were treated and perceived by West Germans. For this, I conduct a close reading
of two German films, Good Bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany! Those films, as cultural
products, offer further insights into West-German society and its attitude and stereotypes of East
Germans.

IT IS ABOUT CHRISTA WOLF, PRECISELY: IT IS NOT ABOUT CHRISTA WOLF216
Just no fear. In that language, that I have in my ear, but not on my tongue yet, will
I speak about it one day. Today, I knew that it would still be too early.217
These are the opening sentences of Christa Wolf’s novel, What Remains (Was bleibt), which
broke her public silence in 1990. When Wolf wrote this novel in 1979, she was still living in East
Germany and not yet ready to publish it. It took her 11 years. The resulting criticism by WestGerman literary critics was excessively harsh und unwarranted; one called her artistic and
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intellectual abilities “modest”218 and another described the publishing of her novel, “a sad
case.”219
By 1990, Wolf was recognized as an accomplished and acclaimed writer, even receiving
praise in West Germany prior to unification. She excelled as an editor for multiple publications
before embarking as a novelist. Although she had believed in the socialist state and supported the
Socialist Unity Party, her works reflect increasing disapproval and disappointment with the
socialist project and her rejection of the state’s artistic dogma of Socialist Realism
(Sozialistischer Realismus). Her support for the state was rooted in her perception of the
regime’s benevolent treatment of the intelligentsia in the 1950s and 1960s, when they were
living economically comfortable lives that were supported by the SED.
In 1949, Christa Wolf graduated high school and joined the SED party, to which she
would remain loyal until unification. From 1949 until 1953, she studied German language and
literature in at the universities of Leipzig and Jena. After college, she worked as a Scientific
Associate (Wisschenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin) for the German Writer Association, was editor-inchief for the publisher Neues Leben in Berlin, editor for the magazine Neue Deutsche Literatur,
as well as lector of the Mitteldeutscher Verlag. After that, she decided to solely focus on her
career as a freelance writer.
Published in 1963, her first novel, They Divided the Sky (Der geteilte Himmel), tells the
story of Rita and Manfred, two lovers struggling with their relationship, who are finally
separated by the Berlin Wall, after Manfred had previously left for West Berlin. As a chemist, he
believed that he would not be supported in communist East Germany. Rita, however, is a loyal
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supporter of the state and its politics. After visiting Manfred in West Germany and attempting to
convince him to join her in the GDR, all the while questioning where her place should be, she
decides to return to East Germany. The couple, just like the two states, is separated. Wolf never
specifically mentions the construction of the Berlin Wall; however, she established the historical
context in the first sentence of the book, when she wrote about the “August days of the year
1961,” when the actual Berlin Wall was built, and later stated: “We didn’t know then, none of us
knew, what kind of year lay ahead: a year of the most exacting ordeals that were not easy to
survive. A historic year, is what they will say later.” 220
When Manfred and Rita meet for the last time, he mentions that at least they did not
divide the sky, but Rita begs to differ; Wolf writes: “The sky? This enormous vault of hope and
yearning, love and sorrow? ‘Yes, they can,’ she said. ‘The sky is what divides first of all.”221
Therefore, the sky mentioned in the title becomes a symbol of the divided countries. Rita’s
struggle is palpable, but because of her unyielding loyalty to her country, she gains control over
her life and emotions again. Wolf depicts neither Manfred nor Rita as hero or villain. But
because Rita finds her place in society, the story offers the illusion of a happy ending.
Situating this novel in a historical context, a more nuanced reflection of Rita’s, and
possible Wolf’s, conflict is evident. Having experienced the horror of the Nazi regime, Wolf
joined the SED party at a young age because she believed that “democratic” socialism in the
GDR would “develop a solidary society that could ensure peace and social justice, freedom of
the individual, mobility for all, and the conservation of the environment.”222 This optimism was
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not always shared by the people outside of the intelligentsia.223 William H. Rey described an ongoing alienation of the East-German intelligentsia and the citizens of the GDR.224 While Wolf
thought that most of her readership was identifying with her socialist ideology, part of the society
was demonstrating in the streets in protest against the regime that propagated this ideology,
while violating its tenets in practice.225 Wolf’s misconception about the benevolence of the
regime was rooted in a certain degree of privilege that she had enjoyed as an intellectual and
artist in the GDR.
Wolf had seen the birth of the party and the state and had personally experienced its
entire development: the SED was founded in 1946, the GDR in 1949. She had been a university
student and had later begun her career during Walter Ulbricht’s leadership, which lasted from
1950 until 1971. After a period of de-Nazification, Ulbricht’s regime created a new intelligentsia,
or new cultural elite, that consisted of students, faculty, artists, and anyone that could influence
public opinion. The party diffused its ideology through an attempt to find new supporters: for
example, peasants, who had been denied access to university during the Nazi regime, were now
able to receive an education. The party created a form of dependency through a sort of spoils
system, by giving away scholarships, stipends, and awards, and methodically forcing students to
become loyal members. Likewise, faculty received disproportionally high salaries and other non-
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monetary services, such as free taxi services to work.226 Members who showed any form of
bourgeois notions, or signs of resistance, were repressed or pushed to the West.
While peasants, the intelligentsia, and the “technical” middle class received considerable
benefits if they kept their loyalty to the party, as production rose, workers had to endure
increasingly less desirable work conditions. When protestors gathered together to demonstrate
against the new work norms on June 17, 1953, the intelligentsia did not support their cause. On
the contrary, they either remained passive and loyal to the regime or actively supported the
Soviets when their tanks rolled into Berlin. They believed the official SED account that the
protest “was the work of paid Western agents and provocateurs.”227
One prominent example of this facile trumpeting of the SED line was Berthold Brecht.
Brecht, a committed supporter of communism and the SED, believed in a dialogue with the
workers, but also thought that Nazis had infiltrated the protests; consequently, he welcomed the
Soviet intervention and was one of the people waving at them upon their arrival. Brecht, whose
role in the GDR has been highly contested, spent considerable time in exile after he fled
Germany in 1933. Brecht, even more so than Wolf, had experienced the terrors of the Third
Reich and believed that the bourgeois intellectuals during the Weimar Republic were directly
responsible for its demise and the rise of the Nazis, which further motivated him to support the
communist cause.228
After the uprising of workers, he published a statement in the official newspaper Neues
Deutschland to express his solidarity with the SED:
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On June 17, I directed a short letter to the SED, in which I exhibited the necessity
for an extensive discussion with the workers. Only the last sentence of it was published.
The SED has made mistakes that are very grave for a socialist party and these mistakes
enraged the workers. I am not part of it. But I respect many of its historical achievements
and I feel connected to it, when it was attacked - not for its mistakes but because of its
merits - by the fascist and warmongering mob. I stood and I stand on its side in the battle
against war and fascism.229

Just like Wolf’s fictional character Rita, Brecht realized that the state had committed
errors, but the overarching goals, the fight against fascism and the creation of social justice and
freedom, remained his priority and the reason why he justified the SED’s actions. Although
twenty-one people died from the application of violence by the Soviet military forces during the
protest, Ulbricht’s power increased.230 Wolf justified military action in the name of socialism,
too. For example, she supported the Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovakia during the Prague
Spring in 1968.231
Although Wolf supported the system, increasing disapproval and discontent with the SED
and her life in the GDR is noticeable in her succeeding work. Wolf’s second novel, Nachdenken
über Christa T., (The Quest for Christa T.), more accurately translated Reflecting on Christa T.,
was published in 1968. A nameless narrator, who presents the story in the first-person
perspective, reflects on the life of a friend called Christa T., a few years after she had died of
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leukemia at the age of 35. The friends were from the same generation and shared a similar life
story; both lived through the chaotic aftermath of the Second World War, went to the same
school, attended the same college to study German, and later became teachers, wives, and
mothers. Although they were friends, the narrator has little memory of Christa T.’s life and has
to get to know her again and learn about her by reading Christa T.’s journals and the stories she
had written. To understand Christa T. and construct a coherent picture of her and her life, the
narrator projects her own ideas and experiences while evaluating the documents.
Although Wolf does not mention the GDR or communism, the story is about her
generation, when the young adults’ enthusiasm and desire to build a new country was devastated
by broken promises. What remained was only the “Mief der DDR” (“the stink of the GDR”),
according to critic Reich-Ranicki.232 Compared to her first book, Wolf criticized the GDR more
noticeably in this work. This change in tone and content did not go unnoticed by the party. They
Divided the Sky was praised in the GDR, widely distributed in West Germany, and gained Wolf
the Heinrich Mann Preis, an award issued by the former Deutsche Akademie der Künste in East
Berlin, now Akademie der Künste in Berlin.
While there was significant debate whether this novel fell under the Sozialistischer
Realismus umbrella, the party allowed it to be released for publication. Christine Cosentino
describes Sozialistischer Realismus as an “art theory that under instructions of the party should
develop a socialist awareness and the reflection of communism.”233 One of the attributes of such
art was the optimistic and idealized hero in the story, who would advance Marxist-Leninist
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ideology. It can be debated whether the fictional character Rita is such a “positive” hero. Rita is
burdened with significant doubt before remaining loyal to the GDR and choosing a life in the
socialist society. Still, the happy ending, at least from the party’s perspective, allowed for the
story to be published.
Whereas there are subtle signs of a break from the mold of Sozialistischer Realismus in
They Divided the Sky, Nachdenken über Christa T. confirms Wolf’s departure from it. The
central theme of this novel, thinking about Christa T.’s defeat of her personality because of the
lack of honesty, enthusiasm, individuality, and her eventual death, is undoubtfully pessimistic
and hopeless. Cosentino speaks of a “Sozialistischer Realismus literature that gives way to a
literature depicting realistic socialism.”234 After a charade of evaluations that assessed whether or
not the novel should be censored, the SED Central Committee (Zentralkomitee, ZK), which was
its decision-making body, decided to allow its publication. Although Wolf did not exhibit a clear
political position in the novel and therefore failed to meet the ZK’s central culture-political
requirements, the publisher reminded the committee that censorship would be a difficult
endeavor, since the West-German press had already been made aware of the book’s existence.
Still, the ZK decided to reduce the number of copies from 20,000 to 4,000, and, prior to its
publication, circulated a series of negative reviews of the work in an effort to criticize the book
and discredit its author. These reviews, as political attacks, aimed to manipulate public
opinion.235
Wolf ‘s reception in West Germany was more positive. Its harshest and most respected
critic, the Polish-born German Marcel Reich-Ranicki was a larger-than-life literary critic who
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would later be referred to as the Pope of Literature throughout Germany.236 In a lengthy Die Zeit
article from May 1969, Reich-Ranicki evaluated Wolf’s work in a favorable way, even calling it
a “highly pleasant case” (“höchst erfreulicher Fall”).237 In his review, he claims that Wolf had
developed from an unskilled writer - he calls They Divided the Sky an insignificant
accomplishment - to one who had learned technical skills and new means of expression. ReichRanicki furthermore states that Wolf must have adopted the new skills from West-German
writers. He also assesses the work’s worth based on Wolf ‘s evaluation of the GDR and her
narrator’s and Christa T.’s struggle for “poetic justice of the individual” against the
authorities.238 A common tendency is already noticeable: Wolf’s art is measured according to
Western standards and the content of her work, while the disapproval of the socialist system is
pivotal to receiving a favorable recension in the West.
Wolf’s discontent about and objections against the regime were again noticeable during
the German-German Literary Exile (Deutsch-Deutscher Literaturexil) in 1977, when EastGerman singer and songwriter Wolf Biermann was expatriated. During a show in Cologne – for
which he had obtained a visa– the SED took away his citizenship so that he was forced to stay in
West Germany. As previously discussed in this chapter, this action by the party was an effort to
push dissidents or people who openly criticized the regime to the West. Biermann, like Wolf and
many others, had criticized the GDR but nevertheless felt at home there. In an interview,
Biermann stated that as a poet he wanted to remain in a country that he knew and where he knew
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his friends and foes.239 Furthermore, he said, “As a person, who interfered with the conflicts of
the world, I was dead [in West Germany].”240 Wolf and many authors and artists shared this
feeling, and in an open letter to the party, requested for Biermann’s expatriation to be
reconsidered.241
The party did not reconsider the decision and furthermore exiled many other artists to
West Germany. Wolf was not one of them. Until the end of the GDR, she believed in socialism
and reforming the state. At a press conference on November 28, 1989, she delivered the plea, For
our People (Für unser Land), for the continued existence of the GDR that she had composed
with 31 other GDR citizens, a plea in which she admits to the weaknesses of the GDR and the
necessity for reform. She stated that the people of the GDR had two choices: to either remain an
independent country and work towards a socialist society, where peace, social justice, freedom of
the individual, liberty for all, and the conservation of the environment are ensured, or accept the
sellout of material and moral values of the GDR and later the assimilation of the GDR by West
Germany.242 She pleas to remain an alternative to the FRG and to remember the antifascist and
humanistic ideals from which they once built their state.243
Her warning turned out to be prescient. The GDR was assimilated into West Germany,
and the values, and even artistic talents, of East Germans were delegitimized by West Germans.
To reiterate, Wolf was an accomplished editor and writer, praised by the harshest West-German
critic, who processed her experiences, frustrations, and gradual disapproval with the regime
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through her literary work. From the beginning she had shown unyielding support for the main
components of its ideology but, when the circumstances allowed it, she criticized the party. The
opposition that West Germans demanded from her would have meant being exiled from her
home and a system of government that she believed could be reformed. But her initial sentiment
to create a society that was the opposite of the Nazi regime she endured as a child remained her
artistic purpose.
After unification, on June 5, 1990, Wolf was finally able to talk about the most
controversial side of her life in the GDR, her attitude toward the Stasi. On that date, What
Remains (Was Bleibt), her novel about the Stasi (not so secretly) surveying the narrator - told in
the first-person perspective - was published. A literary criticism battle against her book followed
that was, while “about Christa Wolf, precisely… not about Christa Wolf,” as Wolf Biermann
described it.244 What is referred to as the Deutsch-Deutscher Literaturstreit (German-German
Literature Dispute) in 1990 occurred in several phases.
Before discussing the phases, it is necessary to mention an article published before
unification. In 1987, Reich-Ranicki wrote an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ), “Macht Verfolgung kreativ?”(“Does persecution make one creative?”),” as a response to
Wolf’s speech during the Heinrich Kleist award ceremony for Thomas Brasch.245 In a shockingly
malicious manner, Reich-Ranicki begins his argument by discrediting Wolf’s good reputation
based on the supposed fact that East Germans simply had no appropriate choices of competent
writers. For this, he used the metaphor, “Where there is a lack of wool and silk, one can do good
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business with cotton and artificial silk.”246 He continues, “But that such writer, whose artistic and
intellectual abilities are rather modest, is also praised in the West […] is less understandable.”247
This concludes his opening paragraph. In this first paragraph, Reich-Ranicki had done two
things: he criticized the GDR and furthermore discredited all East-German intellectuals or artists
by suggesting that they did not measure up against – superior – West-German standards. Second,
he claimed that Wolf was a dilettante.
In his ensuing paragraphs, he criticizes Wolf for her lack of character and courage to
stand up against the injustices committed by the state. He especially condemns her support for
the party and coins the term “GDR State Poet” (DDR-Staatsdichterin) for her. When he cites
Wolf’s speech praising Thomas Brasch (“The GDR made Thomas Brasch creative”), he answers
that this is cynicism, hypocrisy, or sheer effrontery.248 At that time, Reich-Ranicki was a highly
regarded literature critic, having gained the earlier mentioned nickname, Pope of Literature
(Literturpapst). His reviews were highly anticipated and highly regarded. Of all literature critics,
it was his opinion that mattered most. It is puzzling why he attacked Wolf so blatantly, when,
twenty years earlier, he had praised Nachdenken über Christa T. This article, however, was just
the beginning of his quest to condemn Wolf, who stood for all artists and intellectuals in the
GDR.
Two years later, on November 30, 1989, Reich-Ranicki raised the following question in
his show Literarisches Quartett: “In Germany, a revolution took place. And whenever there is a
revolution on this earth, the writers like to say that they had substantially contributed to it. How
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is it then, did the writers in the GDR win or fail?”249 The Literarisches Quartett was a show
consisting of four literature critics reviewing books before a live audience. The already intense
discussion among the critics was interrupted that evening when a spectator came forward to
make a statement. The format of the show did not allow for the audience to ask questions or
make statements, thus, Reich-Ranicki asked him in a rude and impatient manner to leave.
However, the man stubbornly tried to make his statement but each time he was interrupted after,
“I think it is not reasonable that the writers of the GDR...”250 Reich-Ranicki was not willing to
listen to this man and called for a security guard to remove him. But the man stubbornly stayed
and, after a long back and forth, was able to finish his sentence, “I think it is not reasonable that
the writers of the GDR, who offered a ray of hope for the people who had worked towards
revolution, are dragged through the dirt by you.”251 His statement was not dignified with an
answer and the guest was asked to leave.
The way in which this man was asked to remain silent and sent off stage was
uncomfortable to the viewer. Although the format of the show did not include the live audience
to participate in the discussion, it seemed unnecessarily rude not to at least listen if someone felt
such a strong need to speak up, especially since the man appeared quiet and collected and
showed no sign of aggressive behavior. Although it is not known whether this man was East
German or not, it appears as if he was personally concerned and felt that he had to justify or
stand up for East-German writers. Through this example, it becomes evident that the issue at
hand was not just about Christa Wolf or the East-German regime; it was the GDR culture and
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identity that East Germans tried to defend. Nevertheless, during this show, Reich-Ranicki
condemned East-German writers who supported a totalitarian regime after knowing about the
crimes the state had committed and called for a new assessment of East-German literature in this
light/from this perspective.252
The first phase of the Literaturstreit then really began on June 1 and 2, 1990, when
Ulrich Greiner (Die Zeit) and Frank Schirrmacher (FAZ) published “reviews” of Was Bleibt prior
to the novel’s publication.253 Greiner set the tone of his article, “Mangel an Feinfühligkeit“
(”Lack of Tactfulness”), in his first sentence: “That’s quite something: The secret police of the
GDR surveilled the state poet of the GDR.”254 The word choice and tone he used throughout the
article were neither factual nor professional, and the recension appeared to be a personal attack
against Wolf and her decisions in life. He referred to the Stasi as a “monstrous apparatus,” – the
common tendency of West-German journalists described in chapter one – her decision to publish
it after the fall of the Berlin Wall, “literary calculation,” the content, “literary dishonest,” and
Wolf’s situation “a sad case.”255
The main issue that Greiner condemned was the publication date. According to him, the
book would have been relevant and honest, if she would have published prior to the demise of
the GDR. In the unified Germany, she was safe from the East-German communist party’s
retaliation. The fact that Wolf decided to not confront the SED when the GDR still existed was
reason enough for Greiner to call the publication of the book “embarrassing.”256 It seems that
Wolf was representative of all East-German intellectuals who had decided to remain in the GDR
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and whose art was now discredited for that reason. The debate whether art that was produced in
an oppressive regime could be appreciated at all had been discussed in the past. Thomas Mann,
for instance, had called for all books that were written in Germany between 1933 and 1945 to be
destroyed.257
However, in her work Wolf clearly condemned the Stasi and its methods and depicted
herself as one who suffered from it. The novel’s time of completion and Wolf’s publication
timing lead to believe that she was either unable or afraid (or both) to publish it in the GDR. If
we consider works, such as Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski’s A World Apart: A Memoir of the
Gulag or Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956, that were written during
a dictatorship and published when both writers were released and safe, as crucial, then Wolf’s
work has merit. Again, this example does not aim to compare atrocities but to evaluate whether
art and literature can be evaluated and legitimized on the basis of timing, since this was the main
criticism that West Germans initially expressed.
In the second article that started the Literaturstreit, “Dem Druck des härteren, strengeren
Lebens standhalten” (“To withstand the pressure of a harder, stricter life”), Schirrmacher also
evaluated Wolf’s work based on her biography, rather than as a work of literature on its own.258
In his article, he showed no interest in her work but rather focused on her career in general. In a
more subtle way than Greiner, he mainly criticized her unyielding loyalty to the party and the
late publication date of What Remains.
Despite all this dismissive criticism of Wolf’s novel that had little to say about the actual
novel, some West-German critics were able to assess her work in a professional manner. Volker
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Hage’s (Die Zeit) article, “Artful Prose,” published on June 1, 1990, is helpful to recognize how
polemical, aggressive, and unprofessional both Greiner’s, and Schirrmacher’s articles were. First
and foremost, Hage referred to Wolf as a writer, not a “state poet.”259 In his well-structured
article, he established the following points: Wolf’s fame came due to her many achievements in
the GDR; writers should not be seen or treated as leaders in difficult circumstances and writers
aren’t always heroes in life but should be judged according to their literary texts; Wolf’s What
Remains is an exemplary work of prose; and the quality of a book is not measured by its
publication date.260
Around thirty “pro and contra Christa Wolf” – predominantly Western – newspapers and
magazines articles followed. 261 The main questions discussed were whether art could be
produced in an oppressive regime; West Germans had the authority to judge East-German
intellectual work (since they had not lived as subjects of this regime); art could be judged
according to the moral compass of its author; and how to move forward in the future in a unified
country. Although moral questions became the central point of the debate, critics still paid
attention to and evaluated Wolf’s prose to some extent.
By the end of 1990, the discussion shifted, when intellectuals debated the Deutsche
Gesinnungsästhetik (German attitude towards aesthetics). Surprisingly, the discussion
completely broke away from Wolf’s text and took aim at all literature – East and West –
produced after the Second World War. According to Greiner, all German post-war literature was
never art for art’s sake but dependent on the author’s morals. Greiner claimed, “In
Gesinnungsästhetik, and Christa Wolf is an excellent example, the work and person and morals
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are inseparable.”262 He continued, “This is all in the past […] it all had its necessity, even if no
good literature came out of it.”263 Although he had initiated the dispute by criticizing Wolf’s
morals (or better: the lack thereof), in this article he called for the end of such
Gesinnungsästhetik.
Christa Wolf remained silent. In order to escape the media attention, she decided to move
to Santa Monica, California. After the heated controversy ceased for a while, it ignited again two
years later. In 1992, Wolf was accused of having been involved with the Stasi. This time, she
responded with an article in the Berliner Zeitung, in which she admitted that she had not only
been a victim of the Stasi but had also worked for them. A lengthy article in Der Spiegel, “Die
Ängstliche Margarete” (“The fearful Margarete”) replied to her confession in typical Spiegel
manner. The unknown author of the article first raised the question, whether Wolf was telling the
truth. 264 Since she had admitted to her involvement, it was safe to say that she was telling the
truth. The next question raised was why she had waited so long to reply to the allegations.265
Because she was living in the USA, receiving the file via fax, working through it, and then
writing a confession, it took time. Because there was not much to add, the author then took the
time to retell the meetings that were described in the Stasi file in his or her own words,
embellishing them here and there to make it sound more interesting than it really was. For
instance, the “story” started with “The dark chapter of the world-famous author’s life
began…”.266 When referring to Wolf speaking to Stasi members, the author referred to her
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“chatting away,” instead of the term “speaking.”267 At the end of the article, Wolf was again
criticized for her lack of resistance in the GDR and her affirmation of fear. The Staatsdichterin
der DDR was referred to as Die ängstliche Margarete (The fearful Margarete), as Margarete was
her secret Stasi name.
Comparing the language, tone, and content of the Spiegel news coverage with other
sources, a lack of professional reporting and a great amount of uncalled editorializing is
noticeable. Wolf’s involvement with the Stasi, described in 38 paragraphs in the Spiegel article,
is summarized in one paragraph by Christine Kanz:

Wolf’s long search for truth did not preclude self-deception and amnesia. Her
short role as a Stasi informer, when she was a thirty-year-old enthusiastic but naïve
socialist, consisted of a single handwritten note containing innocuous information on a
writer colleague who acknowledged Wolf’s belated apology and [subsequently] publicly
defended her against the media defamation. It also contained some irrelevant reports on
her meetings with other colleagues, which were not written by her but by some Stasi
agents.268

The attacks against Christa Wolf were a “part of a campaign against everything that came
out of East Germany,” as Günter Grass appropriately stated.269 Lothar De Maizière, Gregor Gysi,
and Christa Wolf are just examples of the many East Germans who were publicly ridiculed and
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had their work discredited. Another prominent example is the Deutsch-deutscher Bilderstreit (the
German-German picture dispute) in the early 1990s, when West-German painters criticized the
work of their East-German colleagues – Bernhard Heisig, Wolfgang Mattheuer, Willi Sitte,
Werner Tübke – and even tried to prohibit the displaying of their art in the Berliner
Nationalgalerie.270 Again and again, West Germans did not take East-German politicians and
artists seriously. This criticism was widely displayed in the media. However, the everyday Ossi
(slang for East German) was under attack, too, which is evident from the manner in which they
were depicted in films about East Germany.

EAST-GERMAN SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
This section examines the everyday East German navigating through assimilation into West
Germany and finding a new identify in the face of constant criticism from West Germans.271 To
suggest reasons explaining why their identity is contested by West Germans, as evident in the
films Good Bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany, it is necessary to define the concept of
identity. In a contemporary, relevant definition, cited in Culture and Identity, Simon Clarke
explains:

...the notion of identity as shaped not just in relation to some other, but to
the Other, to another culture. The notion of cultural identity becomes much
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stronger and firmer when we define our ‘selves’ in relation to a cultural Other.
We start then to see ideas around ‘ways of life’, ‘us’ and ‘them.’272

According to Clarke, identity is therefore defined by differences amongst people in
relationship with one another; it does not focus primarily on an individual’s development of self
in isolation. Through the lens of the Frankfurt School, and in particular supported by the work of
Franz Fanon and Slavoj Zizek, Clarke further argues that identity is socially and psychologically
constructed, citing that, “in constructing our cultural identity both socially and psychologically,
we tend to construct, play with and destroy the identity of others.”273 What is most relevant is
his argument that people’s constructions and perceptions (regardless of whether they are fiction
or fact) of the way they imagine their world and the way others exist in it has actual effects in
real life. The primary examples I use to illustrate this argument are the films Good Bye, Lenin!
and Berlin is in Germany.
These films provide ideal examples of the ways in which identity is negotiated by EastGerman citizens as a result of West-German cultural biases and stereotyping. For instance, in
similar scenes in both films – the dinner party – the ways in which the protagonists, Martin and
Alex, are perceived and thus treated by others have specific repercussions for their agency and
power. In both instances, the main characters’ physical inferiority, for instance, their clothing,
“marks” them as less significant individuals, ultimately discrediting their participation with
(acceptance by) others (in particular, West Germans). While fictional, these characters’
challenges – as East Germans who have seemingly become unwelcome foreigners in their own
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land – reflect the disorientation experienced by East-German citizens as inferior guests in their
own home.
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson’s argument about the concept of
community supports the films’ illustrations of the identity crises experienced by East-German
citizens, as they are attempting to navigate their once-familiar homeland.274 Anderson explains
that a nation is a socially constructed and imagined community, in which people share affinities,
such as language or behavior, but in fact never know every single member of the group or nation
and are therefore engage with imagined relations.275 The implications of this theory are that a
nation is perceived as a product of modernity – created as a means to political and economic
ends. This suggests that a nation is not predetermined; it is flexible and constructed. More
specifically, it is necessary to discuss the way in which nation-states establish and alter their
identities in regard to policies, such as immigrants and migration.
If a person’s – and even a nation’s – identity can be defined by demonstrating differences
amongst people, then the argument proposed in this chapter – that East Germans are identified as
Other and also perceive of themselves as such both in contemporary film and in reality, has
theoretical leverage. Good Bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany reveal patterns that explain the
lingering disunity between East and West from an underrepresented lens: an East-German
perspective. Both films confront the audience with a new East German who has to navigate a
foreign terrain and is forced to adapt to this new culture. They imply that the East-German
sentiment of longing for GDR culture and values is an attempt to maintain an East-German
identity while being threatened by dominant West Germany. I argue that the constant and
continual lack of respect and legitimizing of East-German accomplishments and identity caused
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an even greater desire to maintain or claim their East-German identity; East-German writer Ingo
Schulze asserted, “[o]nly in the 1990s did I become East German.” 276
Good Bye, Lenin! focuses on the period of time immediately following the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the hectic transition and reorientation involved in negotiating a new system and
place. The pervasive theme of a “gesamtdeutsch" (all-German) future becomes ironic because of
the exclusion and ostracization of East Germans. Berlin is in Germany, however, takes place
eleven years after unification and focuses on contemporary East/West-German issues that,
according to director Hannes Stöhr, depict the East German as the new foreigner and subsequent
Other - as opposed to the West German - representing a much more negative interpretation of
the unification process. The East Germans are not only depicted as the Other, but their social
standing is compared to that of a Gastarbeiter (discussed later in this analysis).
In order to illuminate this unique cultural condition, I compare two scenes from each
film, focusing my analysis on the specific markers, for instance, clothing and dialect, that
identify East Germans’ otherness and thus stigmatize them as inferior to West Germans’ cultural
practices. In both films, a dinner party scene is particularly rich with setting and dialogue that
explicitly highlights the East-German protagonists as a minority within the majority culture. This
particular cultural condition is unique because as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall, East
Germans – as German citizens in their own right – experience a deeply personal and profound
disorientation: their homeland becomes physically different and culturally foreign, yet they are
expected to immediately assimilate because of their shared identity with the West as German.
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BERLIN IS IN GERMANY
The first scene I analyze occurs in Berlin is in Germany when the main character, Martin (Jörg
Schüttauf) joins, without invitation, a dinner party hosted by his ex-wife, Manuela (Julia Jäger),
originally from East Germany. Also present are her new partner, Wolfgang, who is from West
Germany and another couple, Pierre (from France) and Pierre’s girlfriend, from West Germany.
This scene is particularly interesting because the director, Stöhr, infused his mise-en-scène with
visual and narrative evidence to emphasize Martin’s differences in appearance, language,
behavior, and way of life (thus culture) from the other party guests but also because it depicts a
unified and harmonious Western relationship between West Germans and French and a divided
Eastern Europe. The way in which Stöhr works to contrast Martin with the other guests leads his
audience to think that, due to Martin’s differences, he is inferior to the West Germans present.
For instance, when Martin enters the frame and dining room setting, all of the guests are already
sitting at the table.
During a formal introduction via handshake, it is immediately noticeable that Martin is
dressed in an inferior, informal way as compared with the other four guests: he is wearing white
sneakers, blue jeans, a white shirt, and a blue jeans jacket. This attire is clearly a fashion
statement more suitable to the 1980s than the present. The other members of the party wear
contemporary fashion, such as dress shirts in dark colors and discreet patterns. When Pierre, the
only real foreigner, introduces himself, Martin pauses for a short while and repeats his name
twice, giving the audience the impression that he has never heard that (ostensibly exotic) name
before. The camera’s focus on Martin, as he pauses to comprehend Pierre’s name, reveals to the
audience that Martin is not only different in his appearance, but is also differentiated – othered –
by his intellect and naïveté.
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A few moments later, at the dinner table, each couple is seated facing one another and
Martin, in contrast, is located at the end of the table with the consequence that he is further
disconnected – again, physically – from the group. He has no partner and nobody across the table
to look at; therefore, he seems to be the proverbial fifth wheel and is arguably odd both because
of his cultural difference and because he is lacking a better half; while the couples appear as
harmonious sets, he is set off by his singleness. Additionally, the viewer is immediately informed
about Martin’s status as an outsider because he is framed in the very center of a wide/straight-on
shot that implies he is under special scrutiny (which also extends to his status among the guest
who treat him like an animal in a zoo). The position of Pierre and Wolfgang – as both are sitting
vis-à-vis at the table, slightly turned towards Martin so that the audience can only see their backs
– further reinforces that Martin is not only the focus of attention because of his physical
otherness, but also the object of scrutiny and the stranger or Other to be inspected.
After being seated, Martin is asked whether he wants to eat dinner: “Paella. Das isst man
so in Spanien” (“Paella. That’s what one eats in Spain”), says Manuela.277 At this moment, it is
interesting that she has to explain to him that paella is a Spanish dish, which suggests that Martin
is not as culturally sophisticated as she is. The notion of cultural superiority is further reinforced
when Martin answers in a strong Berliner dialect: “Joa, schmeckt jut. Schmeckt echt jut.” (“Yes,
tastes good. Tastes really good”). At this point, Martin is not only physically othered by his
clothing and lack of a partner but additionally because of his dialect. His use of dialect serves as
an aesthetic and intellectual marker of inferiority: aesthetically, he sounds unrefined, and
consequently, appears less intelligent. Recent linguistic scholarship reinforces this argument,
citing Germans’ contemporary opinions about dialects: “Dialects are dated and make a person
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sound uneducated. Whoever wants to achieve something, needs to speak High German according to widespread opinion [in Germany]).”278
Martin is therefore shown not only as the Other physically, but intellectually as well. In
addition to undermining Martin’s dialect, Martin also quotes the Russian writer Alexander
Pushkin at another point during the dinner, which underscores that Martin grew up in East
Germany and in an educational system that valued a Russocentric view of the world.
After 1945, West Germans were reared to speak English as a second language and
focused on Western literature and philosophy, whereas East Germans were instructed in Russian
and steeped in the Russian as well as Soviet classics. Russian had been a requirement in EastGerman schools from fifth to at least tenth grade from 1948 until unification, when Russian
language education became a Randprogramm (side show).279 After unification, an “AntiRussian-Trend” began and almost all students living in the East decided to take English to be
more competitive in the job market, since all West Germans were educated in English and
participated in the global capitalist market. Furthermore, the Russian language became a
scapegoat for criticism of the former socialist educational system, which was accused of
imposing its ideology onto students.280 In light of this contextual information, the implications of
this scene, as well as the Pushkin quote in Berlin is in Germany, can be appreciated for their
symbolic significance.
In addition to Martin’s performative otherness and the cinematic tools employed, such as
the camera’s positioning and focus, affect the viewer’s understanding of Martin as a symbolic
character. When Martin quotes: “Wo der Tisch voll Speisen war, dort steht ein Sarg” (“Where
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there used to be a table full of food, a coffin now stands”), the camera’s position changes from a
medium shot to a close-up of Martin’s face. This close-up shot makes it possible for the viewer
to see that as he is saying the word “Sarg” (coffin), he is also turning to Wolfgang. Stöhr then
cuts to a close up of Wolfgang’s frowning face replete with pinched lips and pierced glance. The
direction of Wolfgang’s gaze indicates to the audience that he is looking back at Martin and
understanding that this remark was aimed specifically at him. When Martin proceeds to mention
the poet’s name, Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, Stöhr cuts to a close up of Manuela, who
quickly follows up Martin’s quotation with a wry smile and a toast, suggesting that she is
uncomfortable with Martin’s odd comment as it reveals his alien East-German identity or
culture, implying that it is something that would generate embarrassment. Contrary to Martin and
Wolfgang, who are gazing at their opponent, the close up of Manuela suggests that she is
avoiding her guests’ gaze; she looks at her wine glass instead. Manuela is depicted as feeling
ashamed for Martin and perhaps she believes that she, too, is negatively implicated because of
her former association with him and the GDR. Instead of feeling guilty about the party’s
treatment of a fellow German and defending her former husband, she is turned into a guilty
bystander.
Stöhr reinforces Martin’s isolation in this scene through Martin’s inappropriate behavior
during dinner: while the four Western guests display impeccable table manners, sitting with
straight backs at the table and occasionally sipping their wine, Martin sits hunched forward,
leaning on his elbows, and speaking with his mouth full. The scene concludes the way it started:
a medium shot shows Martin framed in the center, all guests slightly turned towards him with
their backs to the audience, continuing their observations until the conclusion of the gathering.
Martin is never able to penetrate their closed circle and remains firmly at the periphery. As a
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final act, Martin loses all dignity and while answering a question about his specific location
during the fall of the Berlin Wall, he stands up, intoxicated, and concludes his account by
screaming out loud that he rose up against the GDR regime but, as if to undermine his own
account of defiance, falls onto the floor.
Manuela is the only one to react – she gets up to assist him immediately; however, the
other three guests do not move. Pierre and his wife stare with disbelief in Martin’s direction and
Wolfgang turns his head away from Martin’s position on the floor. At this point in the film,
Martin is no longer visible in the frame, as he is lying on the floor behind the table. The lack of a
reaction from the West Germans and Martin’s absence from the frame visually suggest the
guests’ indifference toward Martin’s existence and well-being and confirm his isolation from the
group; whether he is present or absent does not appear to matter. Reconsidering Martin’s Russian
quote, “Where there used to be a table full of food, a coffin now stands,” it becomes clear that
the protagonist has fallen into this proverbial coffin; not only has the Russian and Soviet cultural
legacy been extinguished in the newly united Germany but also the East German has been
destroyed, too.
If one considers Anderson’s concept of a nation as a socially constructed community in
which its members appreciate shared interests, despite a lack of acquaintance with individual
members it becomes clear that Stöhr’s film suggests an extra-national relationship between East
and West Germans as opposed to the relationship of French and West Germans, founders of
postwar European unity. In the duration of this scene, the audience is shown that despite public
declarations of each other’s support, East and West Germans do not share affinities that could
form the basis of a unified Germany, due to more than 40 years of separation and the
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development of different cultural values; thus the film highlights that assumptions of shared
interests, language, and behavior simply because of a shared space are naïve and even false.
The concept of nation as constructed predates Anderson’s shared community and is
illustrated in Ernest Renan’s 1882 essay Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (“What is a nation?”). He
describes a nation as:

a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which are really one, constitute this soul
and spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other, the present. One is the possession in
common of a rich trove of memories; the other is actual consent, the desire to live
together, the will to continue to value the undivided, shared heritage [...] To have had
glorious moments in common in the past, a common will in the present, to have done
great things together and to wish to do more, those are the essential conditions for a
people. We love the nation in proportion to the sacrifices to which we consented, the
harms that we suffered.281

In Berlin is in Germany, the “glorious pasts” that East and West Germany may have had
in common appear as too far in the past to be tapped in the present. Furthermore, judging by the
film’s depiction of the ignorant way Martin is treated, it is not foreseeable that a “common will
in the present” to do great things in the future is possible.
Comparing the behavior, and specifically the table manners, of the East and West
Germans in this scene, the 1960s term Positivismusstreit (the dispute about methods and value
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judgments of the social sciences, primarily in West Germany) and the resulting concept of
Sekundärtugend (“secondary virtues”) are immediately useful for understanding traditional East
and West-German ways of raising and educating children and young adults.
These secondary virtues were understood to be character traits implemented for the
practical handling of everyday life. However, these virtues are often criticized for lacking ethical
merit. In “Contemporary Ideas in a Traditional Mind-Set,” Astrid Mignon Kirchhof suggests that
these secondary virtues were implemented as “social rehabilitation [from the horrors of the
Second World War].”282 Originally borrowed from the catalog of Prussian virtues, some of these
virtues are politeness, restraint, and orderliness, which are still esteemed in contemporary
Germany, and are especially obvious with regard to table manners.
Since the East German in this film is depicted as behaving like a peasant who is unaware
of the most basic social skills, it is necessary to elaborate about potential reasons explaining
Stöhr’s decision to depict this character in this unfortunate light. Rather than suggesting that
Stöhr purposefully cast Martin as a character who represents the uncivilized Ossi, it is possible
that as a West German, Stöhr may have allowed his own prejudices to interfere with what is
otherwise a portrayal of an affable protagonist. In support of this suggestion, there is evidence
that potentially contradicts Stöhr’s suggestion that in the East a less refined attitude toward
etiquette was part of the social norm. For instance, in an article in Die Zeit, Susanne Gaschke
explains that in the former GDR behavior, effort, collaboration, and tidiness were mercilessly
graded within the classroom, unlike in Western educational institutions, which had given up
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teaching and acknowledging secondary virtues in schools in the 1970s.283 In addition, another
lengthy 1990 Der Spiegel article titled “Bald brennt die Luft” (”Soon the air will burn”) lists
many examples supporting that East Germans demanded stricter manners than West Germans.284
Noteworthy is also the first sentence of the article: “According to Stephanie Heim, 19 [years
old], GDR citizens are ‘somehow different’”.285 Heim was referring to the more formal manners
of East Germans, for instance, when her host family would greed her with a formal handshake
every morning; a custom she was not used to in West Germany.
In Berlin is in Germany, however, this difference is depicted in exactly the opposite way.
Filmmaker Stöhr’s West-German identity might lie at the core of this depiction; however, in
addition to reinforcing stereotypes, the depiction of the East German as the Other or specifically
the loser, in this story, also has ideological implications. If the East German is portrayed as a
misbehaving brute, then it becomes more reasonable to demand that the East Germans behave
like the sophisticated West Germans and adopt West-German values.
In “Ossis sind Türken” (“East Germans are Turks”), Toralf Staud explores the reasons
justifying why it makes sense to compare East Germans to immigrants and how this comparison
helps dissolve most East/West-German conflicts. He claims that the majority of East and West
disputes can be explained as issues of West Germans’ demand (as the majority of the population)
for East Germans’ assimilation and conversely, the East-German “immigrants” asking
permission to preserve, at the very least, some of their historical identity.286
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This comparison perfectly characterizes the scene analyzed above. Martin, the immigrant,
displays his unrefined socialist and Russian-infused culture. It was common practice in the
German press to depict Russians as drunk, and associate them with “messiness, uncleanliness,
and chaos.”287 Martin ends up defeated and degraded on the ground. Manuela, on the other hand,
has assimilated into her new West-German surroundings, and is subsequently trying to distance
herself from Martin, implying that his cultural identity is inappropriate and unwelcome in her
new place.

GOOD BYE, LENIN!
The negative portrayal of East Germans is similarly evident throughout another post-Wende film
and one that enjoyed great popularity in German cinemas: Good Bye, Lenin! by director
Wolfgang Becker. A particular scene in Good Bye, Lenin! proves a similar pattern in the
portrayal of East Germans in post-unification German cinema. Toward the end of the film, Alex
(Daniel Brühl), the main protagonist, is shown in a taxi in East Berlin, giving the driver the
destination Wannsee. It is noteworthy that the driver in this scene looks like the former EastGerman astronaut and Alex’s childhood hero, Sigmund Jähn. Jähn appears in other scenes of the
film, in a series of flashbacks that were shot using video equipment of the past (colors are faded,
edges are rounded). These flashbacks provoke nostalgic sentiments and possibly even insinuate
glorification of the GDR, as they are, within the narrative, used to show the good old days of
Alex’s happy childhood in the GDR.
The film leaves to the viewers’ discretion whether the taxi driver is indeed the cosmonaut
or whether he merely looks like him. What is important, however, is the fact that it is absolutely
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plausible that even a cultural icon like Jähn could now be reduced to a mere taxi driver. Within
the taxi, the audience sees the former GDR hero driving “ein kleines stinkiges Lada Taxi” (“a
tiny, smelly Lada taxi”) as Alex narrates it, clearly indicating that his idol has been relegated as a
“ghost of [his] past,” an icon not venerated in the newly unified nation. This scene also
reinforces the sentiment evidenced within Berlin is in Germany, that the GDR and West
Germany experienced different pasts that cannot be magically merged or disregarded because of
unification. The more practical purpose of the taxi ride is for Alex to visit his estranged father,
who had supposedly abandoned his family in East Berlin to live a new life in Wannsee, an
affluent district in West Berlin. During the ride, Alex’s voiceover comments on the experience
and alludes to the cosmonaut driver: “[a]nd so we flew through the night as if gliding through
outer space, light years from our solar system. We passed strange galaxies harboring unknown
life forms and landed in Wannsee.”288
The content of this narration, inspired by the presence of Alex’s childhood hero, is not
merely a nostalgic way of describing the drive from East to West Berlin, it is Alex’s
recapitulation of the feelings he has about his estranged father and the perceived spatial and
cultural disconnection that exists between them. It pinpoints Alex’s central concern of the West
“harboring unknown life forms” that are “light years” away from his part of the city.
This cultural and spatial separation of East and West Berliner neighborhoods is cleverly
depicted in the scene in which Alex first enters his father’s house. Similar to Martin in Berlin is
in Germany, Alex also enters a West-German household, uninvited. Here, too, a dinner party is
in progress. What is immediately noticeable when comparing the scenes within these two films is
the similar mise-en-scène and more specifically, the similarities between the main characters’
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wardrobe. Alex, like Martin, also wears blue jeans and a blue jeans jacket, the outfit of choice for
young people in the 70s and 80s, but a relic of the past in the new millennium. Considering now
that both filmmakers chose blue jeans to represent the East Germans, it is useful to evaluate this
significant symbolism: what does the characters’ clothing insinuate about their cultural
otherness?
Besides representing fashion trends of particular decades, the potential symbolism of blue
jeans is an issue wrought with contention among scholars: while some literature suggests that
Germans’ choice to wear denim reflected their political rebellion against the “political
paternalism of the state,” other scholars disagree, contending that wearing denim represents the
desire to blend in, to become less conspicuous. 289 In that historical context it plays an inherently
persuasive role in determining personal and national identity – and in this case, for explaining the
significance of East Germans’ choice to wear blue jeans before and after unification.
In “Jeans und Pop in der DDR,” Rebecca Menzel explains that in the 1970s, blue jeans
were considered a product of the Western ideological enemy of the GDR; therefore, they were
typically worn by the youth to rebel against the political paternalism of the state.290 So while
West Germans might have worn jeans to revolt against parental authority and regulation, against
the Nazi generation, for East Germans – on the other hand – there was more at stake than
generational conflict: during the existence of the Berlin Wall, according to Menzel, wearing
jeans signaled opposition to a totalitarian socialist system. However, this rebellious attitude
changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the socialist regime in the East. After
unification, wearing jeans no longer seemed to be an act of defiance but rather a desire to blend
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in and an attempt at being comfortable in one’s skin. This is reflected in anthropologists Daniel
Miller’s article, “Anthropology in blue jeans,” in which he evaluates the various reasons for why
people decide to wear blue jeans.291 In order to determine these reasons, he conducted an
ethnographic experiment within two streets of London, where immigrants are the primary
population. His research specifically focuses on the population wearing inexpensive denim, as
designer jeans denote expressions of class and represent a minority of the denim worn by this
population. The study concludes with the following observation:

Migrants use jeans to become ordinary in the same way that nonmigrants use
them to become ordinary. To avoid status competition at school in the absence of a
uniform, parents encourage their children to wear jeans. In college, when students wish to
become part of a community without being marked, they wear jeans. When coming from
work to relax, our participants wear jeans. Jeans can be dressed up without being too
dressy but also dressed down. They resolve contradictions and deflect offense or
argument. They allow people to relax into a comfortable state of ordinariness, which is
not to be denigrated as a failure to become special but is an achievement in its own
right.292

As I argue that cultural and ideological differences between East and West Germans and
the take-over of West Germans included forcing Western values and concepts upon the new
citizens, the treatment of migrants and immigrants can be compared to the treatment of East
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Germans, in the sense that both groups have to navigate a non-familiar culture, one that is
foreign to their previous experience.
East Germans’ choice to wear blue jeans could be motivated by the desire to be ordinary,
to feel comfortable, and thus to blend in. But in the scene in Good Bye, Lenin!, discussed above,
it becomes clear that Alex, like Martin, does not blend in. In Good Bye, Lenin!, the Caribbeanthemed party that is in progress consists of a live band playing inconspicuous Caribbean music,
with numerous guests dressed in suits, ties and evening gowns, holding nicely decorated cocktail
glasses, and greeting each other with a polite “Guten Abend” (Good evening). Alex responds
with a “Guten Tach,” speaking with a dialect that makes him appear ignorant and out of place. In
proper, high German, it should be “Guten Tag,” with a soft “g.” Upon entering through the front
door and asking where Herr Kerner is, he is immediately told, “the buffet is outside,” rather than
given a coherent answer, indicating that the guests assume that Alex is attending the party only
for the food. The Caribbean theme and the foreign word “buffet” not only illustrate a WestGerman penchant for exotic and foreign cultures, but also their finesse and insight into other
cultures’ traditions and foods. It also highlights the urge to display this inter-cultural
sophistication.
The camera follows Alex on his way from the front door to the living room, as he
searches for his father. The camera continuously alternates from his point of view to the point of
view of the other guests. Due to these shot/reaction shots, the audience is able to see the guests
standing in groups and comfortably chatting and laughing with each other. On the other hand,
Alex, who is visibly walking uncomfortably through the gathering, is visually and literally
isolated.
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When Alex pauses for a moment to look around the room, an off-screen sound of the
German children show “Sandmännchen” interrupts his search. This show is of particular cultural
and metaphorical significance as its development parallels the East-West division and
unification. In 1959, this children’s show and its basic storyline was shown as separate
productions on West and East-German television. In 1989 the East-German version continued to
be shown on TV in a united Germany and a new generation of Germans experienced it as a
program for all Germans. Upon hearing the Sandmännchen tune and drawn to this familiar
sound, Alex enters the TV room and finds his two younger half-siblings watching the show.
Suddenly, Alex is not the outsider anymore and his newfound comfort is visible on his relaxed
facial expressions. After his half-sister asks him to sit next to them, all three are framed in a
medium shot sitting closely and harmoniously next to each other and watching what seems to be
a cultural production they share, since all are familiar with this version of the Sandmännchen.
The tranquility of the scene is interrupted, however, when Alex’s half-brother mentions
that there is an astronaut in the picture. Alex answers that where he comes from, an astronaut is
called a cosmonaut.293 When his half-brother then inquires further about his origins, Alex
responds that he is “from another country.” Alex’s attempt to assert his cultural difference and
his alterity of language exemplify Staud’s argument that the immigrant continues to strive to
maintain his different identity within the dominant culture.
For various reasons, Sandmännchen provides a boundary object, representing the
complicated ideological tension in the East/West conflict. “Boundary objects” are things – in this
case, a television show – that represent different meanings in different social worlds, despite the
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fact that they share the same shape/form. 294 The theoretical concept of the boundary object
works well here as a way of explaining how Sandmännchen works as a symbol of East/West
differences and the implications of unification; the East Germans’ struggle for social currency
and credibility. For instance, “Sandmännchen in Ost und West. Wir müssen die gegnerische
Sendung treffen“ (“Sandman in East and West. We must hit the Opponent’s show)”, Heike
Hupertz recollects how East and West Germany engaged in a race to possess the rights to this
object and to broadcast the show first.295 The show, as Hupertz explains, even alters the different
appearance of the Sandman figure and features different stage props, in order to convey politicalideological meaning, for instance, the East used important rockets symbolizing the pride
accompanying Sigmund Jähn as the first German in space.296 The key term opponent, in the title
of the article, clearly reflects the mindset of East and West Germans in 1959 and exemplifies
once more how these two “nations-in-development” competed against each other. Hupertz
concludes the article by suggesting that the East-Sandmännchen is one of the very few
Wendegewinner (winners after unification).297
Here again, it is important to emphasize the language that is used in the article: the author
refers to winners, reinforcing again the perception of a competition between the two nations. In
“Negotiating Nostalgia: The GDR Past in Berlin is in Germany and Good Bye, Lenin!,” Jennifer
Kapczynski argues that the Sandmännchen scene described above is “Ostalgie,” [the longing for
the GDR culture, products, or GDR past in general] as a gesamtdeutsch phenomenon” because
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“both East and West “consume” the GDR past; on one hand as nostalgia of the East German and
on the other, as a “product of Western, capitalist marketing strategies.”298
In this scene, Alex’s Otherness is again reinforced when his father enters the room and
sits down on the sofa with his three children. The two half-siblings immediately surround their
father: one is sitting on his lap and the other closely next to him, while Alex sits alone on the
other side of the sofa. The camera then contrasts close-up shots of the father with his two
children with a close up of Alex, further emphasizing that both parties are separate and do not
belong together, despite their inhabitance of the same space and their biological connection.
When father and son reunite in the TV room after the father delivers a speech to his
guests, they are sitting on a sofa facing the audience. Framed at a medium distance, which
emphasizes their contrasting clothing, another parallel to Berlin is in Germany emerges: Alex is
dressed in jeans clothing from head to toe, whereas his father is wearing an elegant black suit, a
black shirt, as well as an expensive watch on his wrist. What might be a depiction of an
emotional reunion between a young son and his older father becomes the juxtaposition of the
sloppy East-German intruder and furthermore, the naïve person who would disrupt a dinner party
for which he is obviously not appropriately dressed.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that both films’ protagonists, Martin and Alex, seek refuge
in children’s company at some point during the evening. In Berlin is in Germany, Martin asks to
see his son Rocco immediately after being asked a question about his profession, seemingly as to
avoid being asked further questions and thus escaping judgment. Similarly, Alex is drawn to his

298

Jennifer Kapczynski, "Negotiating Nostalgia: The GDR Past in Berlin Is in Germany and Good Bye, Lenin!" The
Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory 82, no.1 (2007): 84, DOI: 10.3200/GERR.82.1.78-100.

120

young siblings when he recognizes the music of the Sandmännchen, after wandering lost and
forlorn, searching for his father through the unfamiliar house.
Alex and his father, Robert, are also shown in contrasting postures in the TV room.
Robert is sitting upright, with a straight back, and Alex is shown leaning against the sofa and
somewhat hunched over. During their short conversation, they remain in this position,
occasionally looking at each other but more often avoiding each other’s gaze; their alignment
appears forced and the two figures resemble strangers, sitting neutrally side-by- side in a waiting
room. Both Alex and Martin face well-postured West Germans in these similar scenes in which
Germans – as outsiders and insiders – confront one another.
These particular scenes represent poignant moments in which the main characters try but
ultimately fail to maintain their individual identities and battle the conceptions of West Germans’
biases against them. In these films, the protagonists try to make sense of a unified Germany
where East-German culture was delegitimized, based on erroneous assumptions of what
constitutes national identity and how it is constructed. Whereas individual identities can
collaboratively make up a nation, identity, and concomitantly national identity, is constructed in
a far more complicated and multi-layered process. National identity cannot be conjured up at will
to serve a political purpose; it is tied to the ways in which cultural and ideological differences
among individual groups influence one another. It goes beyond a shared geographic space and
language to encompass a larger range of issues. Moreover, national identity is constantly in flux
because of the historical contexts that are defining and re-defining it. For a post-unification
German context, then, West Germans’ presumed authority and superiority, based on economic
strength and reinforced by cinematic representations of post-unity difference, negatively affects
and precludes both sides’ perception and acceptance of German national unity.
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Although these films did not dwell on a Stasi narrative, such as films like The Lives of
Others, the Stasi is omnipresent and ultimately greatly contributed to each character’s sorrow –
and even failure – in life. Alex’s father fled the Stasi and was able to build a new life in the
West. His mother’s fear prevented her to join him later, which resulted in the family’s ultimate
separation; an event that traumatized Alex and his sister until adulthood. Martin’s family was
separated because of the Stasi, too. His resistance against the Stasi caused his incarceration, and
the inability to see his son grow up. Numerous post-Wende films that illustrate issues pertaining
to East Germany or East Germans have a similarity: the Stasi content. Lives of Other (2006),
Barbara (2012), Wir wollten aufs Meer (2012), Westen (2013), Wie Feuer und Flamme (2001),
Der Tunnel (2001), and the most recent Balloon (2018), are just a few amongst many films that
depict the oppressive SED regime.

CONCLUSION
The Stasi-laden content and the often-biased portrayal of East Germans in film and the
discrediting of the intelligentsia haves created a negative stigma that East Germans still face
today. In this chapter I provided evidence that East-German artists were not always assessed on
their merit but on their level of opposition of the SED regime. Artists, such as Christa Wolf, who
had supported the socialist ideology and stood for a reforming of the failed system, were publicly
humiliated so much so that she felt the need to “exile” to the United States. Furthermore, her
level of Stasi involvement that was proven to not have caused any harm, was disproportionally
criticized.
In this chapter I illustrated that East Germans, the artists and intellectuals, were
disrespected and their work, once again, delegitimized based on certain West-German standards
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that were only applied to the East Germans. East-German art was not evaluated for its merit or as
art for art’s sake, but by the “righteousness” that West Germans assigned to the artist/intellectual.
The West German was once again not able to see an accomplishment through the eyes of the
East German.
I would like to end his chapter with a few words about the East-German astronaut
Sigmund Jähn. On August 26, 1978, Jähn was the first East German in space and became the
official “hero of the GDR.”299 A day later, the Neues Deutschland newspaper proudly called him
the “first German in space.” Yet, after unification, he did not become a gesamt-deutscher Held
(pan-German hero). In fact, many West Germans don’t even know the first German in space.
Sociologist Rai Kollmorgen explained that “Sigmund Jähn disappeared in the Hades of the
marginalized GDR.”300 The journalist Gerhard Kowalski, amongst others, addressed the
Bundesregierung for the 40th anniversary of Jähn’s space flight and later again for his 80th
birthday; he pleaded for an official meaningful recognition of Jähn’s accomplishments. Still, the
Bundesregierung remained indifferent. During a press conference in 2019, when this topic was
brought up again, a group of representatives of the Bundesregierung claimed that he was
honored; they referred to two “Tweets” that were posted for the 40th anniversary of his flight
(from two personal accounts, not an official Twitter account of the Bundesregierung).301
The cultural impact that Jähn left on East Germans’ lives that West Germans consistently
and continually refuse to acknowledge can be seen in the following note that my East-German
friend Tilo Braun-Wangrin wrote in the condolence book of the late cosmonaut Sigmund Jähn:
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Dear Sigmund Jähn, every human being leaves footprints on earth. You even left
them in space. And in many hearts of people. Besides Winnetou and Old Shatterhand,
you were the hero of my childhood. All the children of my generation in the perished
GDR knew your name. As someone who moved to Strausberg, I was proud to live in the
same city as you. I have great respect for your strong character, your courage, your
humbleness and affection. Nowadays, the greatest attributes for a hero. In eternal
memory of the hero of my life.302
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEMOLITION OF THE PALACE OF THE REPUBLIC:
THE FORCED REMAKING OF EAST GERMANY

In chapter two, I discussed the Literaturstreit, when Christa Wolf’s intellect and work
were harshly criticized by West Germans. In a country-wide dispute, in which Wolf did not take
part, the merit of her work was evaluated and discussed and finally discredited when Stasi
allegations arose. Wolf, as many of her colleagues assessed, was just a scapegoat for all East
Germans. The hostility against her was aimed to devalue all things East German. The arrogant
West-German attitude against East-German art and politicians was not the only conflict that was
fought after unification. East-German architecture and entire cities had to change or completely
disappear, too, in order for the socialist past to disappear from the face of the world, at least, the
German world.
In this chapter I focus on how East Germany, specifically East Berlin, physically changed
after unification and how West Germans pushed through these changes, often over the objections
of East Germans. I discuss how the destruction of the Palace of the Republic (Palast der
Republik), which housed the East-German Volkskammer, divided the nation again. The palace
represents the most famous example of the destruction of East-German historical architectural
heritage. The Palast der Republik was a beloved building amongst many East Germans because
it largely housed spaces for cultural events and entertainment. It, therefore, gained a positive
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connotation amongst most East Germans. The destruction of it, in 2003, was widely protested,
especially because the city of Berlin lacked funds and no alternative plan had been proposed. The
destruction, therefore, was considered yet another affront against East-Germany culture and
another faux pas in the process of coming to terms with Germany’s past.
In the second part of this chapter, I analyze effective scenes in the previously discussed
films Good bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany, as they expose spatial transformations in East
Berlin that resulted in either unsettled ground or in a disorientation of the East Germans’ sense of
place and home. Architecture represents an important element of the story of unification, as it
relates to national identity and historical memory. These spaces were central to East-German
everyday life and their demolition “wiped out the cultural memory of the German Democratic
Republic, which had been stored there as a potent symbol of collective identity.” 303 Cultural
heritage scholar Veysel Apaydin claimed,

The meaning and values embodied in heritage and material culture store
memories for different groups, and have varied meanings and values for different groups
and communities. While some groups and communities may not value a given specific
aspect of heritage, it might be crucially important for other who consider that specific
heritage to be linked to their collective identity and whose memories may be linked to a
specific place.304
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THE PEOPLE’S PALACE
The Schloßplatz, where the East-German Palast der Republik once stood, has caused much
controversy amongst Germans. In order to discuss the history of the Palast der Republik and the
dispute about its demolition after unification, it is necessary to examine the conditions of the
square prior to the formation of the GDR and to the present day.
The construction of the Berliner Schloß (Berliner Castle) on the Schloßplatz (Castel
Square) in Berlin began in 1443. The baroque castle underwent multiple architectural changes
until its completion in 1894. It mainly served as the residence of the House of Hohenzollern,
with its final inhabitant William II, the King of Prussia and last German Emperor, who remained
there until his abdication in 1918. It was in the Lustgarten, the garden in front of the castle,
where Karl Liebknecht proclaimed the “free socialist republic of Germany” in the afternoon on
November 9, 1918, which was one of the events that ultimately concluded the highly contested
monarchy in Germany.305 During the Weimar Republic, from 1918 until 1933, the castle served
as a museum. When the Nazis took power, the regime was more interested in the Lustgarten for
its military parades. Later, the bombings during the Second World War, especially during the
final Battle of Berlin, partially destroyed the castle and only the facades, the supporting walls,
and a few sections remained.
After the Second World War, the city then organized several exhibitions in the castle
until the magistrate of East Berlin controlled by the SED prohibited it. After the division of East
and West Germany in 1948, the remnants of the castle were located in East Berlin. Although
experts considered the remaining body to be restorable, the GDR regime decided to demolish it
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in September of 1950.306 Walter Ulbricht officially explained during the third-party meeting of
the SED: “[t]he center of our capital, the Lustgarten and the area of the castle ruins, has to
become a large site for rallies, where the willingness for battle and reconstruction of our nation
can be expressed.”307
This decision was contested especially by West Germans who wanted to keep the
building as a reminder of history. West-German architect Hans Scharoun, who had created the
Kollektivplan, a plan to rebuild Berlin after the Second World War, voiced his opinion against
the demolition of the castle, stating that the conservation could be justified for historical reasons.
Although Germans might have had a negative perception of the castle as a symbol of a
militaristic and oppressive monarchy from the then most recent past, Scharoun argues that the
castle also reminded people of the brandenburgisch-preußische past around 1700, when the
attempt was made to build a Kulturstaat rather than a military state.308
Nonetheless the East-German regime demolished the castle and in 1951 renamed the
square Marx-Engels-Platz, after Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. For over twenty years, until
1976, the square stood empty and was only used for parades and political rallies because the
party could not agree on an appropriate building.309 The change of leadership from Walter
Ulbricht to Erich Honecker on May 3, 1971 was responsible for the introduction of new policies,
somewhat out of necessity. Honecker presented a Five-year Plan (Fünfjahresplan) that should
offer “an increased material and cultural living standard for the people based on a high speed of
development in socialist production…”310 This new concept of consume socialism
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(Konsumsozialismus) was initiated partially because of the increasing debt or shortage of foreign
obligations the GDR was facing. In an effort to reduce its national debt, the government relaxed
previous trade restrictions to increase exports through boosted manufacturing. West-German
loans were also granted and used to finance Honecker’s Konsumsozialismus.311 Beginning in
1969, West-German chancellor and leader of the SPD Willy Brandt’s détente – Ostpolitik –
allowed closer economic relations and normalization of diplomatic interactions between East and
West Germany. It was under these new conditions that a grand project, such as the Palast der
Republik, could be realized.
The golden years of socialism and Honecker’s “liberation” called for an appropriate
symbolic representation of the nation.312 The GDR regime, then trying to compete with its
neighbor, decided to construct a building that would serve two purposes: the outside had to
reflect an image of a glorious, grand GDR, whereas the inside should offer space for government
meetings but also for the people, the working class, to gather for cultural events and other
entertainment; the building should offer the illusion of freedom.313 The government wanted to
create a new image that would show a modern GDR and replace the grey and boring socialist
state that was seen, for instance, at the Alexanderplatz. But what kind of building could meet
these expectations? Erich Honecker called for a House of the People (Haus des Volkes or
Kulturhaus) that was also part of Soviet culture, where the Palace of the Soviets (that was
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planned to be built in Moscow but never realized), was supposed to be “bigger and more
spectacular than all the other [Soviet Houses of Culture].”314
It is necessary to elaborate what Volkshaus/Kulturhaus means historically to better
appreciate the design, purpose, and functionality of the palace. In 1925, Heinrich Peus, writer
and politician in the city of Dessau and member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD),
advocated for the working-class’ right to its own culture and demands with regard to housing.315
Peus believed that the Bauhaus style could architecturally represent his political ideology.
Bauhaus was a German art school that operated from 1919 to 1933, during the Weimar Republic.
The design sought to combine aesthetics and functionalism through mass production. Peus’ idea
of mass-producing homes in factories that could be assembled on-site would allow the workingclass access to affordable housing. This became realizable because of the modern technology and
modern architecture of Bauhaus.316 Although Preus worked with architect Walter Gropius, the
founder of Bauhaus, he believed that Bauhaus’ basic principles were a part of modernism that
everyone could realize.317 After all, the goal was the application of concrete, glass, and steel and
the rejection of ornamental features. This style called New Objectivity or Neues Bauen (modern
architecture) sought simple forms, functionality, and aesthetics, realized through massproduction.
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Peus also strongly advocated Volkshäuser. Volkshäuser were buildings constructed for
the labor movement in Europe starting around 1890.318 These houses offered accommodations
for political and cultural gatherings and entertainment, as the new workers’ class was struggling
to find appropriate loggings. Workers, who supported the Social Democracy, considered
themselves to be part of a “cultural movement,” that sought to unite their desire for “solidarity”
and “community” in such buildings.319 Peus described the function and design of Volkshäuser as
follow:

The Volkshaus of the future will be the most beautiful house of the city or village.
It has to be nicer than the church of the past. […] The Volkshaus will be the church of the
future. Its exterior structure should be grand, as its high purpose demands. Its halls should
be an archetype of solidarity and elegance. Every picture that adorns the walls should be
a beautiful work of art. One should not tolerate ugly posters, especially not those relating
to business. The Volkshaus should at all times convey the ideals of human community
living to its visitors.320

The Volkshäuser became a symbol of the political left and, therefore, highly contested
during the Second World War. The Nazi regime detested the Bauhaus style, anything modern
and avant-garde, the communists, and Social Democrats. In an attempt to break-up the worker
movement, the Schutzstaffel and Sturmabteilung (the SS and SA were paramilitary organization
under Hitler) systematically looted and destroyed the Volkshäuser under the pretense to
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undercover illegal weapons and misappropriate funds.321 After 1945, because of Germany’s
division, it was juridically difficult to distribute restitutions to former parties or associations that
used Volkshäuser so that new foundations of such parties or associations did not occur.322 From
then on buildings that functioned as cultural everyday gathering place for the people were called
Kulturhaus in the GDR and Dorfgemeinschaftshaus in the West Germany.
The Volkshaus became the archetype of the Palast der Republik. With this historical
content in mind, Honecker’s decision to have a Kulturhaus built, fit into the GDR narrative of a
peasant/worker society that deserved its own culture, especially in the new era of
Konsumsozialismus. The Haus des Volkes, which is what Honecker called the palace during a
celebration when he put down the first foundation stone, was completed and open to the public
on April 25, 1976, after only three years of construction.323
Heinz Graffunder, the architect of the palace, had studied in West Berlin but chose to live
in East Berlin and remained in the GDR after the divide.324 When commissioned to design the
palace, he received instructions on the necessary functions needed in the building, but he had
artistic freedom in the choice of design.325 By 1970, the architectural style in the GDR was the
DDR Moderne. It was no longer oriented towards the soviet Sozialistischer Klassizismus
(socialist classicism) architecture that went out of style after Stalin’s death.326 Sozialistischer
Klassizismus had been characterized by monumental palace-like structures with towers, columns,
and numerous adornments. Examples of this monumental architecture are still present today, for
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instance, on the Karl-Marx-Allee in the east of Berlin. These are the buildings that are often
associated with GDR architecture. However, this monumental style was quite the opposite of the
succeeding DDR Moderne.
Graffunder chose a DDR Moderne architecture style for the palace that strongly
resembled Bauhaus. The Dessau-Bauhaus, for instance, looks very similar in shape and design.
Both buildings are rectangular, have a glass facade, and lack any kind of ornamental features.
Their designs are simple and functional. Graffunder chose a modern and transparent glass facade
that reflected the neighboring monuments, for example the Deutsche Dom. He stated that such an
enterprise would have never been allowed during the strict Ulbricht regime.327 The transparent
glass facade, according to Graffunder, embodied the visions of architects at the beginning of the
century, who sought to build luminous Volkshäuser that would allow the self-expression of the
workers.328 Graffunder had materialized Peus’ “grand exterior structure” of the Volkshaus; he
created a five-story tall, rectangular building with a transparent facade that would allow visitors
to see the beautiful skyline of East and West Berlin from inside and a beautiful reflection of
other monuments from the outside.
The inside of the palace was grand and luxurious and more adorned than the outside
would suggest. Upon entering the building from the Marx-Engels Platz, visitors walked through
the main entrance that became notorious because of the large “socialist heraldry” – the national
emblem of East Germany that consisted of a hammer and a compass surrounded by a ring of rye
hanging above the door. Once entered, visitors walked up a large light granite staircase to the
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first floor, where they discovered a luxurious white marble main lobby with an open ceiling that
reached up to the third floor.329 The lobby was adorned with marble columns and the Gallery of
the Palace (Galerie des Palastes), a gallery that showcased paintings of renowned GDR artists,
such as Werner Tübke and Willi Sitte.330 The theme of the exhibition was “Are communists
allowed to dream?”331
The foyer became famous for its round-shaped Gläserne Blume (glass flower) in its
center - with the aim to convey the transparency of the building - and the lighting system
hanging off the ceiling.332 An abundancy of ball-shaped lamps hung off the ceiling that
eventually gave the palace the endearing nickname Erich’s Lampenladen (Erich’s [Honecker]
Lamp Shop). The nickname, according to Christian van Lessen, was evidence of “mocking high
respect.”333 He claimed that Honecker had achieved a building with which most East Germans
could identify.334
Whereas the ground floor accommodated a post office, or cloak rooms, the first floor
provided the service area, such as the famous Mokkabar (coffee shop), an information desk,
amongst other services. The flooring was covered in green, light pink, and grey marble that had
been imported from Sweden, Bulgaria, and former Yugoslavia. Besides the marble in the foyer,
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the floors of the five-story building were cleverly marked with different colored carpet, so that
the visitors would recognize the floor number.335
The main attraction of the building was the third floor. Here, the visitor found the
Plenarsaal - where the Volkskammer met - conference rooms, a gallery, a bar, and the Große
Saal. The Große Saal was a spectacular high-tech room that within minutes could transform into
a ball hall with dance floor, a TV show station, or a seating area for over 4,000 people watching
a show on stage. The stage and the seating areas were all hydraulically moveable, allowing the
space to change for a specific purpose within minutes. The multifunctional room was used for
political meetings, banquets, concerts, shows, ballets, and conventions.
A total of thirteen restaurants, a discotheque, a bowling alley, a wine and beer bar were
amongst the entertainment choices that the palace offered. Noteworthy were also the
meticulously organized and crafted details, such as the modern uniforms for the staff that were
made just for the palace, the little souvenirs that depicted the palace that were given to the guests
in the bathrooms, the variety of silverware in the restaurants - a total of 120,000 - and the palace
stamps in the post office. The visitor’s enjoyable experience was well thought-out and
orchestrated.
Peus’ previously addressed assessment of the Volkshaus not only corresponded with the
outside of the palace but especially the inside. The marble made the halls elegant and the
beautiful artwork was present throughout the palace. The amount of entertainment made the
building suitable for community life. The palace offered events and art throughout the year and
was therefore more considered a Kulturhaus than a government building, as the government only
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met two to three times a year.336 Architect Bruno Flierl commented that because East Germans
esteemed the palace so much, the building became more significant for the public than for the
state functionaries.337

TEARS FOR THE LOST PALACE
However, after unification and per instructions of the Hygiene Department in Berlin
(Bezirkshygieneinspektion Berlin), the Volkskammer had the palace’s doors closed on September
19, 1990, because of asbestos contamination.338 Between 1965 and 1980, asbestos was
commonly used in East and West Germany, and was finally banned in 1993. In the Rundfunk
Berlin-Brandenburg (rbb) documentary called Ein Palast und seine Republik, So schön kann
Sozialismus sein (”A Palace and its Republic, Socialism can be so nice”), the audience witnesses
a female employee of the palace who has to lock the doors for the last time.339 The woman is
crying and can barely utter the words, “When you have to lock the doors today for the last time,
it is…” the rest of the sentence is incomprehensible.340 Still, the newspaper Berliner Zeitung - an
East-German publisher that was bought by the Hamburger Gruner+Jahr after unification declared: “[t]he Palace of the Republic [Palast der Republik] makes off … Erich’s lamp shop
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ends on the garbage dump of history […] Nobody is shedding a tear.”341 Since unification, the
nickname Erich’s Lamp Shop no longer reflected “mocking high respect,” but was rather used in
an insulting way that demonstrated ignorance towards East-German culture and the arrogant
attitude from West Germans. This arrogance was expressed in many ways.
After the palace was closed, the socialist heraldry symbol was removed, followed by the
renaming of the Marx-Engels-Platz to Schloßplatz in 1994. The palace architect Graffunder, like
other East-German architects, was subject to public ridicule and their work, too, was discredited.
In the architecture newspaper Arch+, architect Hoffmann-Axthelm writes about East-German
architects the following withering evaluation:

Instead of the architects and construction manager acquiring qualifications and
quality in 40 years, whatever they had was destroyed and entire generations had the
opportunity of self-fulfillment taken away. The current architects, city planners, and
skilled workers learned too little and only gained bad experience because they could not
do what they wanted. They practically have to start at zero.342

Other West-German voices claimed, “almost all [East-German] architects are busy finally
becoming architects,” or “we should take their favorite toys away: the production catalogue, the
Plattenwerke, the tower cranes, and bobtails.”343
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However, as previously stated, Graffunder and his team did not receive specific
instructions on the design of the palace, so they were able to apply their creativity as they wished
when they designed the building. Although Graffunder’s palace did not have the Bauhaus “seal,”
the building showed characteristics of Bauhaus. Referring back to Peus’ statement, anyone could
build Bauhaus-like structures by simply following the design and the function and purpose of the
building. Today, Bauhaus is a highly regarded architectural style and can be found as far away as
Tel Aviv, where visitors can embark on Bauhaus Tours.344 Furthermore, the Bauhaus site in Tel
Aviv is a UNESCO World Heritage site.345
Graffunder was confident about the quality of his work and fought against the
dismantling of the palace. As an alternative to the demolition, Graffunder and two other
architects, Arzt and Gericke, suggested to rebuilding the Stadtschloß next to the palace and
connect them. 346 The architects sought to create public buildings and keep the Kulturhaus
concept. Their project called Berliner Forum was supposed to stand as a symbol of German
unity: uniting East and West Germans. It would have also allowed the coming to terms with the
contested past and seeing both German cultures as equal. Historian Martin Sabrow states that the
palace was demolished because it did not support the preferred collective memory of an
Unrechtstaat (Unethical/Unjust State) and because the connotation was too positive.347
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East-German architect Bruno Flierl considered the demolition a form of Geschichtssäuberung a cleansing/purge of history.348
The palace remained intact but vacant until 1998. During the asbestos removal in
November 1997 and in fear that the entire palace would be dismantled, Gregor Gysi went on the
roof to display a large banner, “Stop the palace demolition.” For that, he was ridiculed, his
protest called an “illegal climbing tour,” and the construction company even claimed to sue him
for 200,000 Deutsche Mark for their three-hour “forced break.”349 Throughout the years, many
associations, individuals, parties, organizations, groups, and artists demonstrated against the
demolition. One of the largest protests was in 1993, when the PDS, Gysi’s party, organized a
protest walk (Protestspaziergang) that was attended by around 10,000 people.350
In April of 2002, the Historical Center of Berlin (Internationale Expertenkommission of
the Historische Mitte Berlin) published a final report in which it recommended the demolition of
the palace and the rebuilding of the Stadtschloß, an idea that some citizen initiatives had
advocated for since early 1990.351 By 2003 the entire interior decoration of the palace was
dismantled and stored in a warehouse, where it still sits today. The asbestos was removed, and
the shell of the building opened to the public. Pop-up exhibitions, such as the showcasing of the
Terracotta Army from China, tours, even by boat in the flooded cellar, and art shows were
appreciated by tourists and Berliners. In 2005, shortly before its demolition, artist Lars Ø
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Ramberg decorated the roof with large illuminated letters that spelled the word Zweifel (doubt),
which accurately depicted the different opinions and disputes that divided the nation once again.
Just as Scharoun had advocated for the Berliner Castle to be saved due to its roots in the
Prussian-Brandenburger state’s intention for it to be symbolizing a Kulturstaat in 170 rather than
a militaristic regime, it is undeniable that culture was also celebrated in the palace. Even WestGerman artists, such as the famous Udo Lindenberg, performed in the palace.352
Members of the Volkskammer met there infrequently and, furthermore, undeniably
positive and progressive politics for the people were decided and announced in the palace, too,
such as the first democratic elections, and the approval of the unification treaty (the joining of
the GDR to the FRG), the Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag, and the Währungsunion (the contract of the
adoption of the Deutsche Mark in the GDR).353 Recollecting his experiences, De Maizière stated
that the palace was integrated into the everyday life of many East Germans and the fun and
especially affordable activities made the palace so successful.354 Yet, for West Germans, the
palace remained “an unpleasant relic of the East-German unjust state.”355
Another crucial fact to consider is the palace’s landmark status. Although the palace had
not been officially registered as landmark in the GDR, after unification, many experts offered an
appraisal of the palace of it as such. For instance, Anke Kuhrmann, an expert on landmark
decisions who also volunteered at the Landesdenkmalamt Berlin (“Office of the Preservation of
Historic Sites”) between 2004-2006 stated:
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The Palace of the Republic played an important role for the history of architecture
and city construction. Because of its place and function, the palace was the most
prominent example of public architecture in the GDR between 1971 and 1989. It had the
same status as the nowadays landmarked Karl-Marx-Allee […]356

The Berlin State Historic Preservation Office (Berliner Denkmalamt) published a
document that strongly supported the landmark status of the palace.357 The document stated that
the palace would exemplify to future generation a past that they did not experience. Furthermore,
the committee “insisted” on the preservation of the palace.358
However, all efforts to protest its demolition turned out to be in vain. In 2006, the
Bundestag finally decided on the demolition of the palace, after years of irresolution and the
continuous effort to shift the decision to another generation. In the article “Zwischen Bauhaus
und Barock: Zur Ästhetik des Palastes der Republik,” Ulrich Hartung eloquently states in his
conclusion:

It is almost a joke of history that those who want to re-erect the destroyed
structures of the Berliner Castle would extinguish the real witness to history of this place,
not only the foundations of the castle that are still in the ground but also the testimonial
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of a past sovereignty that was also German. Currently it is not a dismantling of a precious
ruin [the skeleton of the palace] but a destroying of an intact building, ignorant of [the
fact that it denies] the functional and aesthetic merits of the Palast der Republik.359

Although polls indicated that two-thirds of all Germans were against the reconstruction of
the castle, the consensus of politicians, left and right, was for the rebuilding.360 That the “old”
West Germans are still not ready to acknowledge East-German culture today is illustrated by the
numerous relicts of the palace that are still rotting away in a warehouse.
The Humboldt Forum, which is the museum inside of the Stadtschloss, published a
brochure called “Palast der Republik – Ein Erinnerungsort neu diskutiert” (“PdR – A place of
memory recently discussed”) in 2017. In this brochure, several experts discuss the
commemoration of the palace; they especially debate the integration of the relics (and whether an
integration at all). Numerous times, experts express the possibility of integrating the Gläserne
Blume into the new Humboldt Forum museum. The Gläserne Blume is of such importance
because it is considered the representation of the palace, as it stood in the center of the foyer,
where everyone met.361 However, on December 4th, 2019, the Humboldt Forum announced that
for “functional, technical, and conceptional reasons,” the piece of art could not be included in the
new museum.362 The artwork is 5.20 meters high and allegedly weights a few tons. However,
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using its size and weight appear to be a poor excuse, given that a replica of a 1443 castle was
built, while a work of art, such as the Gläserne Blume, could not be accommodated.
De Maizière made a crucial point in the discussion of the relics. He was not necessarily
interested in the memorialization of any items, but rather thought it important to remember what
had been accomplished at the palace, such as, for instance, the agreement of the unification
treaty.363 He furthermore stated that some of the items could simply be used in the castle
restaurant, not because they are East German, but because they are beautiful.364 This, however,
would require West Germans to admit that not everything in or from the GDR was bad. But a
recent event has illustrated that Germans might still not be ready.
In 2019, Dr. Thomas Oberender, director and manager of the Berliner Festspiele,
organized for the house of the Festspiele to be decoratively transformed into the Palast der
Republik, since the buildings’s shape and look resembles the former palace. During this threeday event, “Palast der Republik – Kunst, Diskurs & Parlament (PdR – Art, Discourse,
Parliament), artists and researchers presented their work around East-German history. As
mentioned in my introduction, Dr. Oberender did not intend to glorify the GDR with this
exhibition but to retell the story of his past in a form that is not all disavowing.365 The Spiegel
responded to this event in a typical scoffing manner calling the debate building Palast-Ufo and
the debate a “palaver,” which translates to “endless wordy, mostly unnecessary chitchat.”366
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I was in the original Palast der Republik only once to see the Chinese Terracotta Army
exhibition in 2004. At that point, the building had been removed of the asbestos and stripped to
its bones. Only the skeleton of the building was left. It was a wonderful exhibition, but I
remember thinking how ugly the building was. Growing up in West Germany, I had always
heard how atrocious looking this building was and seeing it in this shape only reinforced it.
When I started my research about the palace, and specifically when I saw the Rundfunk BerlinBrandenburg (rbb) documentary (discussed above) that showed the beautiful interior when it was
fully functioning, I was utterly shocked and quite sad. It showed me the palace in a new light and
changed my mind: I had never seen the palace so beautiful. The interior was exquisite and
modern. What I saw was an elegantly designed Bauhaus-like building. As a German, I felt that
its demolition robbed me of this experience and it dawned upon me that it could and should have
been part of my culture, as well. The fact that the palace was demolished and replaced by a castle
that now hosts an exhibition of the palace is incomprehensible.
The Palast der Republik represents the most famous example of the destruction of EastGerman cultural heritage by West Germans. The palace symbolized the aspirations and pride of
the GDR, where everyday people could enjoy fun, communal activities in a beautiful setting and
it was a roaring success, if measured by the total of 70 million East Germans visited it during its
short 15-year existence.367 West Germans decided to take that culturally significant and
functional building away from not only East Germans but all Germans. They proceeded to
replace it by a castle to house a museum, when Berlin already has 170 museums.368 The
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demolition of the palace was just one of countless examples that “cancelled their culture” and
left a void in many East Germans’ everyday life.
The ways in which East Berlin, and East Germany in general, rapidly changed, and the
loss of orientation East Germans felt, has also been illustrated in the two films discussed in
chapter two. While I elaborated on identity in the previous chapter, I here want to examine how
these films depicted East Germans who had to adapt to constant physical changes in a new
Germany, especially changes they were not able to influence. Moreover, as I have argued, these
changes in the landscape of East Berlin deeply affected residents of the city. By destroying their
lived space and cultural heritage, the unification process disrespected the history and memory of
East-German citizens and thereby undermined the construction of a shared German identity.

NAVIGATING IN A NEW WORLD
Whereas chapter two discusses East-German otherness, as exemplified in post-unification
German cinema by means of the East-German characters’ distinctive speech, dated clothing, and
odd behavior, this chapter focuses on how German unification, or rather the West-German TakeOver, brought forth a spatial transformation that resulted in either unsettled ground or in a
disorientation of the East Germans’ sense of (home) place.369 More specifically, within this
chapter I illustrate how East Germans not only had to integrate into a German society that was
foreign to them, but also how their once familiar country and family homes became suddenly
unfamiliar. In “Ossis sind Türken,” Strauf explains the phenomenon of East Germans’ sudden
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de-familiarization with their country and abrupt displacement into a newly nationalized German
state:

However, in reality East Germans [...] came from a completely different country.
They left their home country behind, came into a pre-conceived state, into a demure
society that had not waited for them, to which they were not able to contribute, but rather
had to adapt to [...] what is remarkable about their migration status is that they migrated
without having moved. The new country had come to them, not vice versa.370

Good Bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany depict all East Germans almost identically in
terms of their appearance, speech, and way of life. Furthermore, both films address their sense of
disorientation similarly. In both films, the audience is confronted with the male East-German
protagonist who is wrestling to continue his existence after the disappearance of his home
country, in a world that has become unknown to him. Both films make strong references to
everyday reality as presented by mass media, specifically television. During a substantial portion
of Berlin is in Germany, Martin carries a TV and frequently explains that “Det kenn ick nur
aus’m Fernsehn” (“I only know that from TV”), suggesting that East Germans are trying to make
sense of the new, progressive world through the medium of television. However, this concept
becomes complicated because throughout the film, Martin’s TV screen often remains blank,
implying that ultimately, he is on his own and needs to discover the new world without any
mediation. What is perhaps even more symbolic, though, is that whenever Martin turns on his
TV, the coverage depicts current events or topics that are completely unfamiliar to Martin;
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therefore, he is confronted with a mediated new reality without the benefit of physical
interaction. This becomes especially apparent in a scene that depicts Martin in a toy store
shopping for an item he had seen on TV for his young son. When the sales associate asks Martin
if the item he wants to buy is a Game Boy, he replies: “[n]o, but not a Tamagotchi. I have seen a
TV report about it. I find it totally absurd. I think feeding an electronic pet is perverted. No, it’s a
thing that you have to use with two hands. But maybe I should just simply buy a soccer ball,
right?371
It becomes clear to the audience that Martin does not understand what the sales associate
is suggesting and furthermore, that he did not fully comprehend the toy commercial he had seen
on TV, either. Martin cannot properly articulate the name of the item, nor what its purpose is. He
only remembers how to use it and imitates it to the sales associate by using another toy’s
controller. His idea of buying a soccer ball seems to be his way of surrendering after so much
confusion and complication about the more technologically advanced toy.
It is possible that Stöhr may be alluding to his personal opinion here, considering that the
“good old soccer ball” is a toy that is more universal and pedagogically useful, as it is, in the
majority of cases, used by a group of children/adults, thereby promoting social interaction. The
Game Boy, on the other hand, is for an individual person’s solitary enjoyment. Additionally, the
Tamagotchi and the Game Boy are both Japanese products, drawing viewers’ attention to the
implications of globalization and the inundation of domestic markets with foreign products. The
many different versions of the Tamagotchi and the Game Boy available on the market suggest
that capitalism stops at nothing – not even children. Since capitalism is a product of the West,
Martin expresses yet another moment of alienation and disenfranchisement.
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The implicit suggestion that Western ideology and capitalism are taking over is visually
reinforced when Martin is in the center of the frame of a medium shot, standing in front of a
robotic dog that is visible only from its back and side. Its head, with an open mouth and jagged
teeth, is pointing towards Martin’s throat. Because of the camera angle, the robotic dog (which is
actually rather small in reality; sitting on top of a shelf) appears to be the size of Martin’s upper
body, giving the impression that it is about to attack him. Martin, on the other hand, is standing
partly hidden by the toy dog with uncombed hair and a partially unbuttoned shirt, seeming
confused, lost, and about to be taken over by the toy dog, the beast of capitalism.
Overall, the TV helps and hinders Martin at the same time. He is able to access shows
about current events or commercials about the newest products on the market, but this
information gives him no currency for navigating through this new country. The TV, along with
other modes of technology (such as the airplane that frequently flies overhead) reminds him that
in theory, he has newfound possibilities; however, in reality, he is disoriented or displaced and
remains an outsider or a spectator, as he is without means for pursuing those possibilities. From
Martin’s perspective, the new possibilities seem like nagging reminders that he is the Other and
the baggage of this social stigma hinders his opportunity to attain work, hence, restricting him
from moving freely wherever he wants to. As Jennifer Kapczynski explains, because a Western
ideology is permeating the country, East Germans find themselves polarized, in a sense, between
nostalgia and nowhere: they are “going nowhere and with nowhere to go the old days of the
GDR travel restrictions seem suddenly appealing.”372
The television also plays a symbolic role in Good Bye, Lenin!, as Alex, the protagonist,
uses the TV to create false newscasts which are meant to trick his mother into thinking that the
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Berlin Wall is still standing. What inadvertently happens, however, is that he constructs a
fictional GDR, a “DDR, die ich mich gewünscht hätte” (“GDR that I had wished for)”, as Alex’s
voice-over comments at the end of the film. Within this voice-over narration, the audience learns
about Alex’s relationship with his mother, who has since died, and the GDR, “[a] country that in
reality had never existed in this way. A country that in my memory I will always associate with
my mother.”373 By equating his mother with the GDR and her death with the disappearance of
the
GDR, Alex seems to suggest an extremely close relationship between an individual and her/his
home country or nation, implying that the loss of this nation brings forth emotional trauma.
Stöhr’s and Becker’s films accomplish two different things by using TV or media within
their films: In Berlin is in Germany, the TV (the device itself as well as the shows it features
while it is on) evokes current issues related to unification rather than reconstructing a GDR past.
Additionally, the TV is a metaphor for a new world that communicates its ideas, products, and
ways of life more anonymously. Through this new, anonymous network, Martin also gains
access to a world that has become more complicated: the good old soccer ball is replaced by a
Tamagotchi, an electronic “pet” that needs to be fed and taken care of in an artificial, cyberworld. On the other hand, in Good Bye, Lenin!, Becker uses the TV as a medium that encourages
the audience to understand that allegiance to one’s nation (or homeland) is part of a complex
relationship and the memories of this relationship will accompany the citizen far beyond the
dissolution of this construct. Becker uses this strategy frequently by inserting flashbacks via
home movie footage of Alex’s childhood. As a result, the audience sees how Alex is trying to
make sense of the end of his home country and to make the transition to a unified nation. Alex
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acts out this transition by creating fake broadcasts for his mother; symbolic of the nostalgic
longing for his childhood home. Both films, however, share a conclusion: the audience is told
where Alex and Martin come from, but where they are going is unknown, leaving the audience –
as the protagonists – in an unsettled and displaced state.
The themes of disorientation and displacement are also depicted in the filmmakers’
attention to the physical changes within the city of Berlin following unification, changes which
contribute to the disconnection of both protagonists with their once familiar surroundings. No
longer at home and not welcome in the newly unified country, the Ossi has become the Zoni (one
who lived in the Zone, a derogatory term that is used to describe the former GDR area as part of
a continued Russian occupation), whose social standing is lower even than the foreigner,
according to Stöhr’s film. This becomes evident in one scene, when Peter, Martin’s best friend,
talks about his hardship in gaining employment in a unified Germany. He explains that anyone
else, even a foreigner, would be considered ahead of him.
Throughout Berlin is in Germany, Stöhr shows the audience specifically how Martin has
become a foreigner in his own country. The effects of this inferiority are apparent immediately,
at the beginning of the film, when Martin is released from prison. In the beginning of this scene,
an officer hands him the three items he had owned before unification: his ID, his driver’s license,
and his wallet. Now, fourteen years later, all of these items are somehow useless pieces of paper.
The ID of the GDR was valid until December 31, 1995. After that date, citizens of the
former GDR were required to obtain new IDs – the same ones citizens of West Germany had
already been using – alluding once again to the presumption that the rule of West Germany and
its constitution (Grundgesetz) assumed dominance over the new members of the unified
Germany, instead of establishing new laws and documents for all citizens.
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The second item that is returned to Martin on the day of his release, his wallet, contains
GDR Marks, a currency which became invalid on June 30, 1990. It is important to note that once
this change was initiated, former GDR citizens were required to exchange their money for
Deutsche Marks within a strict deadline and with a diminished value (2 to 1). In fact, both films
illustrate the process of exchanging currency after the Fall of the Berlin Wall. In Berlin is in
Germany, we see Martin making little paper planes with it; since he was released from prison
after 1990, he did not have the chance to exchange his money, rendering it useless. In Good Bye,
Lenin!, Alex’s family hides their money in his apartment but when they decide to exchange it,
his mother cannot remember where she had hid it. After remembering the hiding place, only
mere days after the exchange deadline had expired, the bank teller refuses an exchange, leaving
Alex angrily throwing their money onto the street.
The last item that Martin receives upon his release is his GDR driver’s license. However,
when Martin attempts to take a taxi driver certification, having lived in Berlin his whole life and
therefore, knowing the city, he now struggles to find his way around, as most of the streets in
East Berlin have been renamed. In a recently published article in Die Welt, titled “Wie die
Deutschen ihre Vergangenheit entsorgen” (“How Germans dispose of their past”), Alan Posener
discusses Germans’ compulsion to rename streets and squares after every historical change, in
order to replace the signs, both physical and metaphorical, of the past: “[o]ne can live with the
past. Or dispose of it like stinking trash. In Germany ... one has always favored the second
option.”374
Posener elaborates that every political system in Germany, for instance, that of the Nazi
regime or the East Germany’s government, imposed their ruling personages symbolically onto
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their people via street-naming and notes that all of these street names disappeared (and replaced
with endorsements of the newest leadership) after the extinction of their political control.
Posener concludes: “[t]he German renaming-furor is not a sign of a democratic disposition. It
simply proves the desire to live with no history. This wish however, is – as George Orwell has
shown in “1984” – totalitarian at its core.”375
It would be difficult to prove whether most East Germans were for or against the
renaming of the streets in East Berlin; however, considering that, “each street name wants to bear
a specific remembrance” the renaming of most East-German streets could be seen as an attack
on/a rejection of the socialist system.376 But rather than reading Germany’s ever-changing street
names as an ideological maneuver, or attempting to determine whether the re-naming was in the
spirit of popular demand, I argue that the change of the physical landscape of the former East
Germany had an impact on how its citizens coped with loss and displacement as a result of West
Germany’s dominance.
In a relevant environmental psychological study, Gerda Speller, Evanthia Lyons, and
Claire Twigger-Ross argue that people’s constant identification with a certain place or home is
imperative to the individual, as they define themselves and determine who they are in the world.
In the six-year-long study, they research the place-identity relationship in a community that was
forcibly relocated to a nearby town. Noting that the residents first supported the town relocation,
as the community was hoping that facilities as well as quality of life would improve as a result,
the sense of community was ultimately destroyed due to the solidarity (collectiveness) of the old
town’s replacement by an “individual distinctiveness” attitude of competitiveness, where
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“everyone wants to outdo their neighbors.”377 The most significant finding of this study is that
place can shape identity, arguing that peoples’ bonds with places (in the present or the past) can
account for a positive or a negative sense of self. In her conclusion, they recollect: “[the town of
Old Arkwright’s] physical structure had embodied many symbols which were invested with
social meanings and importance. The loss of these represented a discontinuity for the residents,
the loss of tangible connections to their identity.”378
This insight underscores the nostalgic sentiments in the films. Specifically, Berlin is in
Germany evokes this discontinuity when the narrative highlights that many East Berlin streets
have been renamed and, on a larger scale, the entire city seems transformed. For instance, when
Martin returns to Berlin for the first time after imprisonment, he is sitting on a train next to a
window and looking outside. The audience is afforded his perspective in a point-of-view-shot as
he first enters the city. In the first shot of Berlin, the TV tower, which formerly represented the
pride and greatness of East Germany, is framed in the center of an extreme long shot, as a
reminder that Martin is arriving home.
In fact, the TV tower perpetually appears during the film and is one of the very few
identifying shots of East Germany that Stöhr offers, confirming that the area Martin is roaming is
East Berlin, but where, specifically, remains unknown. The TV tower in this first establishing
shot, however, is barely visible due to heavy clouds hiding it. In the forefront we see a
tremendous construction site with seven tower cranes pointing in all directions. Buildings and
people are not visible; the construction site dominates and hides the entire city. This continuous
shot lasts for six seconds, in which, through Martin’s point of view, an entire landscape of
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construction is visible, thus making the part of the city that Martin is traveling through entirely
unrecognizable.
The film then cuts to a six-second medium long shot, showing Martin sitting in the rail
car, closely observing the new sight. A cut again to a long shot shows further construction sites
from a closer distance, which allows the audience to see scaffoldings, building materials, more
tower cranes, and entire buildings being erected, but there are still no people shown within the
frame. This shot lasts for another 19 seconds, for a total of 31 seconds of construction images, a
lengthy sequence that emphasizes the dramatic changes the city is going through and
foreshadows the drastic adjustments Martin will have to endure. The dramatic, nondiegetic music
of piercing string instruments and the dark fog over the city implies an unwelcoming
environment for Martin’s arrival home. In light of Speller/Lyon/Twigger-Ross’s argument about
how physical structures hold social meanings that have implications for an individual’s identity,
the implications of this scene – which depicts tremendous physical transformation – are rife with
symbolic significance and lead to the conclusion that Martin can never go home again.
Following the construction sequence, an abrupt cut shows a long shot of Martin in the
center of the frame, walking in a public square full of people, carrying his TV. Three different
off-screen sounds of cell phone rings occur; like Martin, the audience automatically tries to
identify the origin of the sound and expects the cell phone owner to pick up, but no cell phone is
visible, thus adding to Martin’s confusion and even fear of the unknown and undetectable. The
sound of the cell phones, which in reality should disappear in the midst of the big city sounds
such as people chatting or passing trains, is exceptionally loud, implying that Stöhr wants to
emphasize the new, stressful and hectic ways of a technologically adept Berlin.
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The abrupt cuts from the construction shots to the view from inside the train to Martin
walking in the city holding his TV is a pattern that Stöhr constantly follows: the audience never
knows where Martin is going and most of the time it is unclear where he is coming from,
resulting in a confusion that not only leaves the viewer unsettled but also indicates Martin’s
confusion and dispossession. Kapczynski comments on this pattern:
Stöhr’s editing disrupts all sense of spatial continuity, with the result that Martin
seems entirely disconnected from the urban space through which he moves. Following
the lead character on his numerous travels through the landscape of Berlin, the film cuts
from one journey to another with no clear indication of progression, fostering an
impression of directionlessness and detachment.379
Although Martin is constantly in transit – either in a car, train, trolley, subway, or by
foot – he never seems to arrive anywhere, literally and figuratively. Whenever there is a glimpse
of hope for the amelioration of his situation, his hopes are trampled. For instance, in the scene in
which he inquires about getting a taxi driver certification, he is told that ex-cons are not allowed
to take the driving test, leaving him relegated to being a perpetual passenger, with dashed hopes
for a new beginning, and a sense of helplessness because he cannot take control of his
life/situation. Martin’s situation is akin to that of his former home, because as a nation, East
Germany is also relegated to the passenger seat, perpetually playing a passive rather than an
active position, object rather than subject.
Alex, the protagonist in Good Bye, Lenin!, is seemingly in constant transit as well. In his
case, however, it is apparent that he is moving back and forth between the East and West side of
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Berlin in an endless struggle to “unify” East and West Germans; for instance, his West-German
father, Robert, with his own identity as an East German, and East and West Germany
(places/space). Subconsciously, he seems to be attempting to “unify” both parts of Germany in
his mind. In the scene analyzed in chapter two in which Alex takes a taxi from the hospital in the
East, where his mother is staying, to the West Berliner neighborhood Wannsee, where his father
lives, it becomes apparent that the spatial separation of a once-married couple from the GDR
brought forth both ideological and cultural differences that resulted in entirely separate ways of
life. Robert’s extravagant lifestyle – with his mansion in Wannsee (a very expensive Berliner
neighborhood), his fancy clothing and elegant jewelry, and exotic, Caribbean-themed dinner
parties is a sharp juxtaposition to the lifestyle of Alex’s mother, who lives in a small flat, which
is decorated with 1970s wallpaper, in the “Plattenbau area” (the “concrete-jungle” of Berlin).
These contrasts exemplify how his once-familiar and cohesive family is now so foreign and
detached that his own identity – as a son and as a citizen – deconstructs and causes the type of
alienation he experiences, for instance, when visiting the West and taking refuge next to the
children in the TV room.
This sense of pervasive alienation is also depicted in Berlin is in Germany, although
Martin seems to be navigating solely through East Berlin (in which the TV tower is a constant
reminder) his former Heimat. After arriving in Berlin via train and failing to get on the subway
because he fails to purchase a ticket from the machine, he ends up in a tram. Thus far, the
audience has seen Martin in constant transit: from a train, to a tram, and then walking aimlessly,
with no idea as to what his final destination is. One of the most significant shots illustrating this
“homelessness” and disorientation is a scene in which a glass door with big black letters, which
read “Hotel,” indicates that Martin resides in a place where nobody knows him, a place that
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signifies the opposite of home. The hotel location also makes it clear that Martin does not have a
home to go to. Throughout the film, he resides in this same hotel room, suggesting that he is a
guest, not a resident, a visitor to a new and unfamiliar place.
The scene following Martin’s entry into the hotel then cuts to a shot of the inside of his
room. In this frame, the TV he has been carrying with him now sits askew on top of towels and
wash cloths, in the very center of a nicely made bed, suggesting that it takes on the role of
Martin’s companion. However, due to the way in which the TV has been uncomfortably placed,
it doesn’t seem to be intended as a suitable replacement for a human being. The film then cuts to
a close-up of Martin as he is looking out of an open window, to a point-of-view-shot of the TV
tower, and back to Martin’s face. Martin has a smile on his face, which insinuates that he is
happy to see the familiar sight of the TV tower and perhaps content that some things are still the
same. This short, pleasant moment of nostalgia is quickly interrupted, as the following shot
reveals the Plattenbau building he is residing in, with its big letters spelling Hotel on top of its
roof.380 Looking closely, the audience can see Martin in one of many windows that is right under
the hotel letters, suggesting that he is alienated from his former home and now in a place of
constant transit, where strangers come and go. The hotel sign reappears multiple times
throughout the film as a reminder that, despite Martin’s effort to live a prosperous life (as all of
the commercials and, on a larger scale, Western capitalism, have promised) he will remain a
foreigner and at best, a guest in his own country.
This idea is further reinforced in the next shot in which the audience sees a close-up of
GDR Marks on the table and Martin’s hands making little paper planes with them. These images
strongly imply that his home has become so unrecognizable that even the once-valuable tools

380

Plattenbau is a building made out of prefabricated concrete slabs.

157

that provided him with the power to navigate through it have now become useless. It is important
to mention a subsequent scene in which Martin receives his new West-German passport. This
scene correlates with the previous shot of Martin making paper money airplanes because both
suggest that valuable social tools must now be obtained through a new system and that East
Germans can literally bring no value into the new system without “conversion” (conversion of
money and power and conversion of ideology).
In the scene, in which Martin receives his new passport, the camera cuts to a close-up of
a green passport of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, which implies the beginning of a new life
with a new gesamtdeutscher [pan-German] identity. In the following shot, however, Martin is
framed on the left, sitting on a chair across his parole officer, who is seated to his right. In the
center of the frame are two big windows that provide a view of the outside. Not surprisingly, we
see the East-German TV tower, once again, alluding to Martin’s allegiance to his East-German
identity, which he is not willing to relinquish even though he is now bearing a passport of the
“new” Germany.
Shortly after this scene, Manuela (Martin’s ex-wife) visits his parole officer in the same
office. Manuela sits on the chair that Martin had been sitting on before and the officer is now
seated across from her. They are sitting in the same way, in which the previous shot of Martin
was framed, however, the camera positioning, and specifically the angle, has changed. The
framing of Martin and the officer is straight-on, which allows the audience to see the TV tower
in the center – a symbolic division between them. In the scene featuring Manuela, the camera is
positioned slightly to the left, giving the effect that the TV tower is not in the frame.
Reflecting on the scenes in which Manuela has been depicted thus far – including her
new relationship with a West German, speaking High German, dressing neatly in suits and
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hosting dinner parties for West Germans, it becomes clear that she is consciously rejecting her
East-German roots and trying to assimilate into the new, Western lifestyle (and perhaps
succeeding). On the contrary, however, a more critical analysis of her behavior and dress might
suggest that Manuela represents Stöhr’s approach to depicting different “kinds” of East
Germans, implying that stereotypes or generalizations about East Germans who cannot
assimilate should be avoided.
Alternatively, it could also be argued that she represents the East German who appears to
have negotiated a new identity, out of necessity, but still internally longs for aspects of her
former life. I argue that this latter interpretation is more plausible, due to the continued affection
for and support she bestows on Martin. We first see this affection when she caresses his face
after he had passed out drunk on the floor.
Later in the film, she even chooses Martin over Wolfgang, which clearly indicates that
she still values parts of her former life. After all, Martin’s imprisonment meant that he had been
taken away from her by force and not by choice and the affection for him did not die over the
years. This close relationship between Manuela and Martin can be compared to the relationship
between Alex and his mother that I have discussed earlier. Both relationships ended
involuntarily, resulting in physical and emotional trauma, which called for negotiations of a new
and unfamiliar situation. This is comparable with the alienation East Germans felt, when the
Berlin Wall was dismantled, and a completely new hometown/city was erected.
Daphne Berdahl elaborates on the idea of East Germans negotiating a new identity in her
monograph Where the World Ended. She specifically explores how residents of a former EastGerman border town negotiated their identity after the political/economic system collapsed
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seemingly overnight.381 What makes her work interesting and valuable for my project is that, as
an anthropologist, Berdahl focuses on writing about the stories and memories of East Germans,
which allows the reader to understand post-unification changes from an underrepresented lens.
Her ethnographic approach reconstructs the past through the experiences of the individuals
affected, which allows the reader a better understanding of how physical borders generate
cultural implications or seemingly trivial daily rituals that resonate even after their political
agenda has vanished.
This is illustrated in Good Bye, Lenin! when Alex’s mother, despite her potentially
deadly illness, insists on having her Spreewald Gurken (pickles from the Spreewald region). The
happiness she experiences when eating the pickles suggests that regardless of the terrible
situation she finds herself in, her routine, which is specifically tied to her Heimat, offers comfort.
Furthermore, Berdahl investigates how the disappearance of these borders (or traditions
and boundary objects) can cause destabilization. This destabilization, in a figurative sense, is
depicted in Berlin is in Germany when Martin comes under scrutiny at the dinner table.
Suddenly, he not only has to “compete” against another German but also against the French. His
fall then symbolizes his defeat and the boundaries that still exist between West and East
Germans. Berdahl defines boundaries, which is an imperative concept for this project, as follows:

Boundaries – cultural, geographical, and territorial – identify people; they define
who is inside and who is outside. The simple crossing of a border is a “territorial
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passage” that may alter spatiotemporal experience ... indeed, it is an act of definition and
a declaration of identity, transforming one, in an instant, from a citizen into a foreigner.382

The main part of her work concentrates on the consequences of dismantling the
East-German borders and the dramatic changes it brings forth. The changes people had to go
through, according to Berdahl, were mostly felt by East Germans. She lists many examples that
expose implicit notions of West-German dominance by means of economic affluence and
material abundance. Furthermore, she notes that, “It was clearly up to East Germans to catch up
with, adapt to, and later simply adopt this system.”383
Berdahl’s definition of boundaries and her argument about the implications of breaching
boundaries can be seen in the film scenes analyzed in this chapter. It becomes apparent that with
the disappearance of the Berlin Wall, East-German culture and their homes had become
memories of their past. The notion of transit and, especially in Martin’s case, the idea of never
progressing or “getting somewhere” may symbolize the disorder and fiasco of the German
unification process.
In the second section of this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate the specific ways in
which the transformation and ultimately the dispossession of East Germans’ homeland affected
East-German citizens’ identity. I also pointed out how their tools of identity to navigate through
their former home had been taken away from them, according to post-unification German
cinema. In Berlin is in Germany, this results in a message of skepticism about German unity, as
Stöhr depicts East and West Germans as disconnected entities and, moreover, the East German
as the new foreigner. Good Bye, Lenin!, on the contrary, alludes to the issues of unification but
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generally seems more positive towards a “gesamtdeutsche Zukunft” (“all-German future”), as
Alex continually attempts to symbolically and figuratively unify both parts of his identity.
Ultimately, however, it remains unclear in both films whether his project will succeed or fail.

CONCLUSION
Good bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany reflect developments in real life; the East-German
struggle to come to terms and navigate through a new space that is in constant flux, often against
their wish. In this chapter, I discussed the most prominent and contested example of physical
change in the city of Berlin: the Palast der Republik’s. Its demolition illustrates how a beloved
cultural center of East Germans, which they considered an important historical site, was cast
away by West Germans. In its place, the Bundestag decided to revive a German history that is
linked to a detested and overthrown monarchy in the form of the old Prussian castle that had
been largely destroyed during the Second World War. This top-down decision demonstrates that
“economic and political power aim at changing the natural process of accumulation and
development of cultural memory and heritage” to cause a “raptured history” and reinforced its
“ideology of [the] current German political power.384 The irony of destroying a palace to rebuild
an old castle to house an exhibition of the palace is absurd. The evidence provided in this chapter
again prove how East-German accomplishments have been delegitimized.
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Figure 3: The National Emblem of the GDR (above the entrance of the Palast der Republik)385

Figure 4: The Dismantling of the Palace
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Figure 5: The City Castle (Stadtschloß)
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROSTOCK-LICHTENHAGEN RIOTS:
THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE NEW EAST

In the previous chapters, I illustrated the marginalization of East Germans in different
areas of life, such as in politics, the arts, and entertainment. However, the alienation and
marginalization brought about by unification was felt by a broad cross section of society in East
Germany. The post-unification experience of disruption, discrimination and nostalgia was not
limited to ethnic Germans. Non-Germans in the East shared similar experiences. Not only were
East-German citizens left behind, but the GDR’s international relationships were abandoned as
well. Many of these close ties were forged across vast distances. In this chapter, I focus on
Vietnamese contract workers in the GDR, who struggled to gain legal status and acceptance in
unified Germany. The challenges Vietnamese contract workers experienced after unification
were similar to the ones East Germans faced and demonstrate the global ramification of the hasty
and flawed unification process.
While exploring Central Vietnam in May 2016, my German-speaking tour guide, Mr.
Nguyen, introduced me to the cities of Hoi An and Hue.386 His German pronunciation was
excellent, and I noticed that whenever we would meet, he would always arrive early, waiting for
me. From what I had been told about Vietnamese behavior, such exhibition of punctuality was
highly unusual. One time, when we were taking a break from the heat on a bridge in the
386
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countryside of Hue, I asked him where he had learned to speak German so well. What he then
described surprised me and made me consider another group left behind after unification.
In the 1980s, young Mr. Nguyen came to the GDR as a contract worker
(Vertragsarbeiter). He spoke very fondly about his time in the GDR and how much he enjoyed
living in East Germany. He claimed that, if he had been given the opportunity to stay after the
fall of the Berlin Wall, he would have stayed. Mr. Nguyen, in a way strangely relevant, even
called Germany his Heimat.387 When Mr. Nguyen went back to Vietnam, he continued to study
German and eventually became a German-speaking tour guide. When I asked him if he ever
went back to Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he explained with deep regret that he had
not been able to afford to go back. However, he proudly shared that his son was now studying
German. He added that it was very important to him that his son knew German and traveled to
Germany, as it was the only way for him to learn about his father’s past and identity.
Mr. Nguyen’s story was not only moving and melancholic, but also highly significant for
my research. Up until then, I had neither considered the Vietnamese contract workers as part of
the GDRs’ past, nor how their lives had been interrupted after unification and the ramifications
their presence had – and still has – on present-day Germany and Vietnam. Significant literature
exists that discusses their lives in East Germany during the SED regime.388 Mr. Nguyen’s
experience in the GDR clearly had a lasting impact on his life and, ultimately, on that of others.
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He proudly admitted to me that the reason he was always early to our meetings was because
promptness was a habit he had learned in Germany. He not only conveyed his fascination with,
and love for, Germany and its culture and language to me through his stories and actions, but
also conveyed these sentiments to his own son, who might soon experience present-day Germany
for himself.
After being introduced to a citizen from a different culture, who not only identified as
German but also held fond memories of his time in the GDR, the question of identity in the GDR
was more complex than it often appeared. Of course, in an odd way Mr. Nguyen’s life echoed or
mirrored that of the West-German Gastarbeiter, who also arrived as contract-laborers from the
1950s onward, but more often than not—for a variety of reasons—decided to remain in Germany
rather than return home to the Maghreb, Yugoslavia, Spain, or Turkey where they had been born.
Different from Mr. Nguyen, of course, they had been allowed to stay in the FRG, even if they
had not always been welcomed there, nor could acquire full German citizenship until the 2000.
As a result of this poignant experience, I decided to dedicate one chapter to another group
that was left behind after unification: the Vietnamese contract workers in the GDR. Although the
GDR hosted contract workers from other socialist countries, such as Cuba, China, or
Mozambique, I chose to illustrate the conditions of the Vietnamese contract workers for two
reasons: Vietnamese were amongst the first who arrived in the GDR in the 1950s and stayed
until the demise of the GDR, and, with more than 70,000 workers, the Vietnamese were the
largest group of contract workers in the GDR.
Second, the Vietnamese in Germany after unification suffered similar coethnic challenges
as the East Germans: whereas the “anti-communist” and mostly southern Vietnamese “Boat
People”, who had fled after the Vietnam War in 1975, found refuge in West Germany and had
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become respected citizens, the mostly northern Vietnamese contract workers in East Germany
struggled to be allowed to reside and work in unified Germany. Furthermore, their reputation
amongst the Vietnamese in West Germany was tarnished, as they were seen as the communists
who had come to the GDR voluntarily and – in large part and rather unfairly– earned notoriety
for participating in small crime business activities to support their families in Vietnam.
In this chapter, I first address when the contract workers in the East Germany and the
“Boat People” in the West Germany arrived and how each government and the German
population received them. Furthermore, I discuss the challenges the contract workers faced after
unification. In the final section, I provide a brief analysis of the 2014 German film, We are
Young. We are Strong (Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark), an account of East-German adolescents’
violence against Vietnamese contract workers that is based on the Rostock-Lichtenhagen Riots of
1992, when a building called Sonnenblumenhaus accommodating Vietnamese contract workers
was set on fire.389
This film provides a unique opportunity to probe elements of East Germans’ identity as
they emerged from the Communist era, and which groups were left behind after the demise of
the GDR. My goal is to describe the paradoxes of East-German identity (as experienced by East
Germans and the Vietnamese) in order to better understand the challenges of German unification
in forging a common identity and generate a collective sense of belonging among those who
previously lived in the GDR.390 I argue that the euphoria of unification experienced by the
majority of Germans and contract workers rapidly vanished among the residents of the Neue
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Bundesländer.391 The often hasty process of unification resulted in not only the desolation and
desertion of native East Germans but also the contract workers who had moved there.
The experiences and patterns I describe in this chapter are based on archival documents
pertaining to contract worker laws, regulations, and even propaganda between the Ministry of
Labor in the GDR and the administration of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), which
were obtained from the federal German archive located in Berlin. Furthermore, I interviewed Dr.
Wolfgang Richter, who was the foreign representative (Auslandsbeauftragter) in Rostock and
happened to be inside of the Sonnenblumenhaus on the night of the xenophobic attacks. In the
interview, he was able to provide detailed information on the political and social disruption
leading to the escalation of the situation. I was also fortunate to interview Burhan Qurbani, the
director of We are Young. We are Strong, who offered insightful commentary about his
reasoning to tell the story of East Germans and their contract workers.

VIETNAMESE CONTRACT WORKERS IN THE GDR
Vietnamese history has been significantly determined by Chinese and French colonization
projects, triggering a resistance that ultimately led to its decolonization and the establishment of
the leading Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). For the purpose of my argument, I discuss the
condition of Vietnamese after the First Indochina War – a battle between the communist Viet
Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, and the French – that lasted from 1946 until 1954 and resulted in the
departure of the French through the negotiations conducted at the Geneva conference. At this
conference, the participating diplomats decided to temporarily divide Vietnam in two zones: the
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Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and the State of Vietnam in the south.392 It was
agreed that a general election in 1956 should reunite the country. This did not occur, however,
and in 1955 the Second Indochina War (the Vietnam War, or as the Vietnamese and many
Germans call it, the American War even if the US only became heavily involved after 1960)
ignited between North and South Vietnam and their pro- and anti- communist allies, eventually
ending in 1975 with the fall of Saigon and the reunification of the country under communist rule.
In this section, I elaborate on the three waves of Vietnamese contract workers in the GDR,
paying especially close attention to the third wave that occurred because of the April 1980
Contract Worker agreement, as it represents the greatest influx of foreign workers in the GDR. I
demonstrate that although by law Vietnamese contract workers had the same labor and social
security rights as East Germans, everyday life turned out to be more challenging for them. While
in many instances Vietnamese identified as German and considered the GDR as their Heimat,
they were not always welcomed by its indigenous citizenry. This frequently harsh opposition to
share space and place with foreigners was often rooted in language barriers and differences in
cultural background.
Already in the 1950s the East-German administration collaborated with the North
Vietnamese regime for the first time, by inviting Vietnamese students to East Germany and,
later, by inviting a Vietnamese work force to East Germany. In 1955, the North Vietnamese
government – with the active participation of its leader Ho Chi Minh – sent a group of
approximately 350 children from North Vietnam between the ages of 9 and 15 to the EastGerman city Moritzburg; although some later went to Dresden as well, they were known as the
Moritzburger. The GDR authorities were given the impression that these children were war
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orphans, who should receive a proper education in East Germany and then be sent back to
Vietnam.393 It turned out, however, that these children’s parents were war cadets, privileged
communist cadres, who had successfully fought and resisted the French during the First
Indochina War.394
In the 2015 Spiegel article, “Als ‘Onkel Ho’ seine Kinder schickte” (“When ‘Uncle Ho’
Sent his Children”), Maximilian Kalkhof uses oral history of several Moritzburger Vietnamese
still residing in Berlin today to demonstrate that the children considered East Germany paradise
until the fall of the Berlin Wall. 395 Children of the ruling elite, they lived with their German and
Vietnamese teachers. Mingling with locals was discouraged, as the goal was to send them back
to Vietnam upon completion of the program. Kalkhof interviewed a Vietnamese girl, Vo Cam
Trang, who arrived in the GDR when she was 12 years old. She explained how East Germany
represented paradise for her and the other students, because they were able to go to school and
study. She also stated that, while in Germany, she felt like she belonged to a big family where
everyone cared for each other. According to the Vietnamese students’ testimony, their
experiences were positive.396
In 1959, this student agreement was terminated, and these young people were forced to
return to Vietnam. Le Duc Duong, one of Kalkhof’s interviewees, did not want to leave the GDR
because, as a 17-year-old, he strongly felt as though he could not cope with his native
Vietnamese culture anymore. The newly acquired identity that Le Duc Duong describes that he
had acquired is the sort of experience my tour guide in Vietnam described to me as well.
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However, in contrast to my tour guide, Le Duc Duong was able to return to Germany three years
later to start an apprenticeship in the East-German city of Jena, through a program that allowed
150 former Moritzburger Vietnamese to return to the GDR to learn a profession.
This was one of several agreements in the 1960s that allowed Vietnamese students and
later student apprentices to study or begin internships in the GDR. All students were required to
stay in boarding school-like accommodations that allowed the GDR administration continuous
surveillance, which was desired by both sides. This paternalistic behavior towards the
Vietnamese can be seen throughout their stay in the GDR.397
There were such programs elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, one of
which was the Lumumba University in Moscow that planned on expanding by 4,000 students in
1966 in an effort to create “an atmosphere conductive to [Marxists-Leninist] indoctrination and
instilling discipline.”398 Although there were numerous reports of conflicts between applicants
and the respective authorities, for instance, complains about dire living conditions, these
programs were still pursued and seen as great opportunity.399
The two Moritzburger Le Duc Duong and his friend Vo Cam Trang matriculated at local
universities. However, upon graduation, because of issues related to their residence permits, they
both had to leave East Germany, once again against their will. It was not until about 10 years
later, through the contract worker agreement of April 1980, that both were able to return, resume
positions in the GDR, and eventually stay. Many of these transient Vietnamese citizens found
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themselves adopting two identities simultaneously. Vo Cam Trang, for example, described
herself as a “German-Vietnamese-In-Between-Thing.”400
What makes these stories remarkable is the degree to which Vietnamese contract
workers, who lived as foreign laborers in the GDR, identified as East-German citizens. It is
therefore pertinent here to briefly elaborate on questions of identity. In his chapter “Culture and
Identity,” Simon Clarke addresses the question of whether we choose our identity or if it is
outside our control. He claims that cultural identity is not fixed but undergoes constant
transformation; it is not only about “being” but also “becoming” in a certain “context.”401 If we
consider space as the “context,” then this place can shape identity.
Furthermore, the environmental psychological study conducted in 1992 by Gerda Speller
et alia –discussed in chapter three– confirms that “physical structures … embodied many
symbols, which [are] invested with social meanings and importance” and that people constantly
identify with certain places as a means of defining themselves and where they stand in the
world.402
Taking these concepts into consideration, it becomes evident that some Vietnamese, after
living in East Germany for an extended period of time and getting accustomed to German habits
(such as my tour guide Mr. Nguyen, who according to him, acquired the habit of punctuality),
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identified as Germans, too, and considered the GDR their Heimat, the place where they felt
(most) at home.
Le Duc Duong and Vo Cam Trang were part of all of the three waves of Vietnamese
people that were invited to the GDR and had therefore spent a substantial amount in East
Germany, first as part of the Moritzburger in 1955 and, subsequently, as part of a contract signed
on October 22, 1973 (which remained in effect until 1983), which allowed 10,000 Vietnamese to
complete their apprenticeships in the GDR.403 This agreement, however, did not allow for the
Vietnamese to remain in the GDR upon completion of their apprenticeships or course of studies
at university, so they were forced to return to Vietnam.
The third wave of – mostly north - Vietnamese came to the GDR due to the contract
worker agreement.404 These Vietnamese were selected from poor households, without any
advanced prior education. In order for the program to run smoothly and to ensure all workers
would return to Vietnam and use their acquired skills to rebuild the country, the regime chose a
sort of worker who had not illustrated any political resistance prior to the departure and had
exhibited loyalty to the communist regime in Vietnam.405 On April 11, 1980, the administrations
of the Ministry of Labor and Public Affairs of the GDR (Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales)
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SRV signed an agreement “led by the wish of
strengthening brotherly collaboration” between the two countries that would allow the temporary

403

Oliver Raendchen, Vietnamesen in der DDR: Ein Rückblick (Berlin: SEACOM, 2000), 4.
The Agreement between the GDR and the SRV for the temporary employment and qualification Vietnamese
contract workers in factories of the GDR (Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der SRV
über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung und Qualifizierung vietnamesischer Werktätiger in der Betrieben der DDR).
405
Christina Schwenkel, “RETHINKING ASIAN MOBILITIES,” in Critical Asian Studies 46, no.2 (2014): 246,
DOI:10.1080/14672715.2014.898453.
404

174

employment and qualification of Vietnamese contract workers between the ages of 18 and 35 for
up to four years.406
In the same file that contains the agreement and other documents pertaining to laws and
regulations of contract workers in the archives in Berlin is a pamphlet that offers educational
information about Vietnam and its people, translated from Vietnamese. It introduces Vietnam, its
population and people, culture, geography, history, and politics. It was filed among other official
documents of the GDR, which suggests that it was sent by administrators of the SVR in an
attempt to educate GDR officials and assure a smooth cultural transition for the guest workers.
This pamphlet reveals how the SRV administration described particular events and used
persuasive language to convey its political agenda, and furthermore how it attempted to persuade
the East Germans of the necessity of this new enterprise. The concept of “brotherly” duties
towards a devastated country could have been an effort to persuade East-German authorities to
collaborate with their new foreign colleagues.
The East Germans, however, concluded the work force agreements for a more practical
reason, that of labor shortages. As Karin Weiss argues in a book chapter, “Migration und
Integration in den Neuen Bundesländern,” the reasons and purpose for employing contract
workers were never openly announced to the general public.407 Doing so would have meant that
the GDR administration would have to admit to persistent labor shortages and, therefore,
economic difficulties. The concealment of information imposed upon the GDR citizens had been
such an integrated practice of the SED’s political strategies that even when Gorbachev suggested
glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (restructuring/reforming) in the 1980s in the Soviet
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Union, the East-German Politburo rejected such measures.408 When citizens started a movement
for such reforms, the SED even prohibited the press from mentioning perestroika.409 Kurt Hager,
chief ideologist of the SED and member of the Politburo, commented on Gorbachev’s new
strategy, “If your neighbor puts up new wallpaper in his apartment, would you feel obligated to
put up new wallpaper in your apartment, too?”410 What this concealment of information meant
for the collaboration between contract workers and East Germans will be discussed further in this
chapter.
The Vietnamese pamphlet explains in depth why there was a dire need of the Vietnamese
people to acquire either an education or technical skills that would help rebuild the economy and
country. It reveals communist/socialist thinking patterns and worldviews that are still propagated
today. The pamphlet begins with a section Short Historical Overview.411 This brief history
mainly describes the events and patterns involved in the exploitation of the Vietnamese people
and the destruction of its land by other countries. The pamphlet traces Vietnam’s history of
exploitation and begins with the arrival of the French marine and the subsequent bombing of Da
Nang in 1847, followed by the colonial conquest of Imperialist France in 1858 that ended with
the Treaty of Saigon in 1862 (Saigon and three southern provinces, Cochinchina, became French
protectorates) and the 1884 Patenôtre Treaty, which resulted in the absolute subjugation to the
French. Then, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Imperial Japan invaded French Indochina
in an effort to impede China from receiving French support. The Japanese army remained there
until the Japanese coup d’état in the spring of 1945 that was launched in anticipation of an
408
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uprising of the French army after the end of the Second World War. The brochure then refers to
the French colonial war that started in 1946, after the signing of the Franco-Vietnamese
Agreement of March 6, 1946 when the French government accepted the Republic of Vietnam as
a free state.412 There is also an allusion to the Vietnamese opposition, which resulted in
organized resistance, such as Ho Chi Minh’s Revolutionary Youth League that spread Marxist
ideas among the intellectual and working class and finally ends with Ho Chi Minh’s declaration.
On September 2, 1945, he declared the independence of Vietnam from France by founding the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam).
It is apparent that the purpose of the text was, in part, to demonstrate that Vietnamese
workers had appropriate Marxist credentials, having experienced exploitation at the hands of the
capitalists and imperialists. The document, for instance, explains that in violation of the signed
agreements between France and the DRV, France continued its “dirty colonial war” from 1946
until the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954.413 The word choice clearly indicates the
administration’s communist political stance, which is further demonstrated in its description of
the subsequent reconstruction of the North and its description of South Vietnam, which is
deemed a puppet regime (established with the help of the U.S.), the conflict with which escalated
with the American “bombing terror” in 1965. There is further mention of alleged 1977 and 1979
aggression by the Democratic Kampuchean Pol-Pot regime and, finally, the large-scale
aggression of the Chinese government that failed due to the determined resistance of the
Vietnamese people. The pamphlet’s brief history ends with a closer look at the 1976 unification
of the South and the North and the establishment of a unified SRV. The tone and word choice in
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this section underscores the regime’s opposition to French and American culture (or Western
culture, in general), and is steeped in classical communist rhetoric. This anti-Western stance in
the text becomes even more apparent in the “Foreign Policy” section, which is discussed shortly.
The segment titled, “About the Development of the SRV,” again outlines three decades
of imperial exploitation through aggressive wars that intellectually, culturally, and materially
devastated Vietnam and its people. It likewise mentions natural disasters, such as flooding and
typhoons, in 1977, 1978, and 1980 as other causes of extensive destruction to Vietnamese
citizens’ lives. It is worth mentioning that the administration suggests that the SRV’s inability to
meet industrial production goals was explained as an outcome of trade embargos from
capitalistic countries and that the “socialistic brother countries need to show extensive
international solidarity to ban hunger from the Vietnamese people and secure their living
conditions.”414
This statement, in particular, is evidence of the fragility of the system. On one hand,
independence from capitalist societies is the ultimate goal of the Vietnamese iteration of
Marxism-Leninism, but on the other, it remains a theoretical idea the realization of which seems
faraway. Section Six, “Foreign Policies” of the SRV, more directly criticizes the U.S. and its
foreign policies. It indicates how “the SRV renders a worthy contribution in the battle against the
China-USA relations,” and furthermore stands “against the dangerous and adventurous politics
of the Reagan administration.”415 Which kinds of “adventurous politics” are being referred to are
not clarified, but this was a welcome statement about Vietnamese foreign policy wholly in line
with that of the Eastern Bloc, not least the Soviet Union . By underlining the sentence, the

414

BArch, DQ 3/860, pag. 3, Regierung der DDR und Regierung der SR Vietnam geleitet vom Wunsch zur
Vertiefung der brüderlichen Zusammenarbeit.
415
The original German reads as follows: „Die SRV leistet einen würdigen Beitrag im Kampf gegen das Komplott
China-USA... gegen die gefährliche und abenteuerliche Politik der Reagan-Administration.“

178

document emphasizes that the SRV maintained diplomatic relations with all capitalistic
industrial countries – with the exception of the U.S. To justify this, the document states that all
efforts to “normalize” the relationship with the U.S. in the past have failed due to the Carter
administration’s “discriminatory political provisions” toward the SRV. What the author of this
pamphlet refers to as “discriminatory political provisions” is not further explained.
In conclusion, the pamphlet was not only designed to introduce Vietnam and its citizenry
to the GDR administration, but also to depict Vietnam and its people as victims of continuous
Western aggression and exploitation and that, as a result, the country was in desperate need of
assistance against their mutual enemy. Clearly, Vietnam was not innocent of its own aggressive
moves in establishing itself as a regional power in South-East Asia. And that is no surprise, given
its history and its Marxist-Leninist ideology. But it is more opaque why it felt necessitated to
portray itself as an eternal victim to a friendly fellow communist state and its people. Obviously,
Vietnam could use any sort of aid to rebuild after the devastating and incessant wars in which the
country had been involved for decades. But the pamphlet’s rhetoric seems to play at the
campaign (which in some ways went back to the early 1950s in the Soviet Union) that depicted
the Eastern Bloc countries as champions a peace movement, selflessly working to a more
equitable world, in which the exploitation of human beings for any reason was a thing of the
past. To show that this druzhba narodov (Friendship of the Peoples) writ large was not mere
rhetoric, the communist governments of East-Central Europe were sensitive to pleas by
“developing” countries, especially if they were declared communists, for support.416
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Vietnam certainly faced tremendous economic hardship after the Vietnam War. The
unemployment rate was rising sharply due to demobilized soldiers who were returning to the
workforce of an underdeveloped, still largely agricultural country. By sending Vietnamese
workers to East Germany, the SRV government hoped that these individuals would not only
support their families in Vietnam, but also acquire valuable qualifications, such as work skills
and German language proficiency. The contract worker program would also enable Vietnamese
workers to become familiar with European or Western cultural norms, such as patterns of
thinking and working, skills they could then employ in Vietnam upon return.417
In line with this perspective, the GDR consequently justified the employment of
Vietnamese workers as an act of altruistic, brotherly foreign aid after decades of war,
destruction, intellectual/spiritual/cultural exploitation, and unforeseen natural disasters. Although
the GDR genuinely intended to help its anti-imperialist socialist comrades in the fight against the
Western threat, the GDR’s main motive was nonetheless its own pressing need to overcome
labor shortages in all areas of the East-German economy, especially in its industries such as iron
and steel mills, electrical machine building sites, optical plants, shoe, leather and sewing
machine factories, and cement plants. These were often multi-shift operated factories that were
lacking sufficient numbers of East-German workers to work all the shifts.
The 1983 Spiegel article “DDR Meistens zu spät. Chronischer Mangel an Arbeitsplätzen
zwingt DDR-Betriebe zur Rationalisierung "(“GDR Often-too-late: Chronic Labor Shortage
Forces GDR Factories to Rationalize”) describes the creative ways in which companies were
recruiting new workers and even enticing them away from competitors; many factories had
boards placed in their entrances indicating that “all kinds of” workers were appreciated, even the
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“non-working population” (by which they most likely meant stay-at-home mothers).418 The
article furthermore states that enticing workers away by means of offering vacations at the Baltic
Sea or free company housing was forbidden, implying that this had been the practice at some
point.
According to this article, labor shortages occurred because of people’s flight before the
Berlin Wall was built in 1961, and subsequent departures for the West. Another reason was the
stagnation regarding technological developments in the GDR; capital for investing in
competitive technologies (in which manual labor was replaced by that of machinery) was
lacking, therefore, physical labor in the form of guest workers had to replace this deficit.419
Previous measures taken against shortages were the mobilization of women into the workforce or
the employment of the elderly, but the yield of such strategies was limited.
These resources were eventually exhausted, and other actions were taken, such as the
employment of contract workers. This was why the East Germans and SRV decided upon the
contract-workers' agreement as mutually beneficial. As previously mentioned, in
communist/socialist countries it was common practice to refrain from confessing to shortages in
any form. In 1977, however, Honecker explicitly admitted to labor shortage but only when
visiting Vietnam during a secret meeting with Le Duan, General Secretary of the Communist
Party of Vietnam (CPV), not as a public announcement to the general public of the GDR.420
Nonetheless, enlisting foreign workers under the pretense of helping a socialist fraternal nation in
need provided a convenient and effective “way out,” that avoided having to give any public
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explanation. This illustrates how the GDR obfuscated its objectives from the public, so it could
realize the contract-worker enterprise without disclosing any flaws in its (economic) system. On
the other side of the agreement, the devastating economic situation of the Vietnamese suggests
that their need to work and live in the GDR was pressing.
As previously mentioned, a total of ten countries sent contract workers to the GDR.
However, the Vietnamese population in the GDR between 1980 and 1990, totaling
approximately 70,000 contract workers, represented the largest foreign ethnic group amongst all
contract workers in the country. According to a protocol from January 29, 1980, signed by the
Vietnamese and East-German administrations, Vietnamese contract workers had the same labor
and social security rights as East Germans, and the GDR administration generally seemed to
honor the equality of their contract workers.421 They were ensured the same pay, appropriate
housing, and annual vacation by law, and in factories they had the same contracts, and health
insurance as East-German workers.
In everyday life, however, the living situation turned out to be more contentious.
Administration officials exhibited a patronizing attitude, for instance, by prohibiting any spouses
to unite with their significant others. Until 1987, pregnant women were invariably deported,
while after 1987, a somewhat stark choice was offered of abortion assistance or the choice to be
sent back to Vietnam. Since it was considered dishonorable to be forced to go back to Vietnam,
most women chose abortion. Furthermore, when Vietnamese workers violated the terms of their
contract, the employer had the authority to terminate the working relationship; this, however,
was not a two-way right, for Vietnamese workers could not leave in search of another job.422
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Since the aim was to send contract workers back to Vietnam after four or five years,
“incorporation into the host society was neither expected, nor desired,” which meant that
intensive language or cultural courses that would help the Vietnamese to adjust to a new
environment were not provided.423 Marriages and even friendships between Vietnamese and
Germans were frowned upon. Moreover, all contract workers were accommodated in special
housing separate from East Germans, which further alienated them from the citizens.
Vietnamese workers mostly followed the rules, though, fraternized with mainly their own
kind and ascribed to a rigid work ethic in order to send as much money to their families in
Vietnam as possible. Disputes, especially of violent nature, were quite rare amongst the
Vietnamese. However, when after some time numerous contract workers intended to ameliorate
their economic situation by engaging in small crime activities, such as illegally selling cigarettes
or buying scarce goods that they would trade on the black markets, xenophobic sentiments
amongst East Germans increased.424 While some xenophobia also existed in the West against the
Vietnamese there, it never escalated into violent attacks, as I will discuss later in this chapter.

VIETNAMESE “BOAT PEOPLE” IN WEST GERMANY
In her essay, “Kubanische Vertragsarbeiter. Leben in einer anderen sozialistischen Realität”
(“Cuban Contract Workers: Life in a Different Socialistic Reality”),” Sandra Gruner-Domic
outlines the problematic background of migration policies in both East and West Germany.425
She suggests that in order to avoid any parallels with Nazi forced labor practices, both states

423

Gertrud Hüwelmeier, “Transnational Vietnamese – Germany and beyond,” in Asian Migrants in Europe.
Transcultural Connections, eds. Sylvia Hahn and Stan Nadel (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2014), 83
424
Christina Schwenkel, “RETHINKING ASIAN MOBILITIES,” in Critical Asian Studies 46, no.2 (2014): 246,
DOI:10.1080/14672715.2014.898453.
425
Sandra Gruner-Domic, “Kubanische Vertragsarbeiter. Leben in einer anderen sozialistischen Realität,” in Die
‘Gastarbeiter’ der DDR: Politischer Kontext und Lebenswelt, ed. Almut Zwengel (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 54.

183

were recruiting workers from countries whose economy would benefit to some degree from
sending their workers to Germany. One argument, for instance, was that sending workers to
other countries could help the country’s unemployment rate. Whereas the GDR claimed its
foreign aid initiative was motivated by “socialistic brotherhood,” West Germany, according to
Gruner-Domic, described its migration policies as part of its “liberal and cosmopolitan
stance.”426 In other words, both Germanies suggested that hiring foreign workers was a sort of
developmental aid, which would help the countries of origin of the Gastarbeiter or contract
workers.
However, West Germany also suffered from acute labor shortages after the Second
World War.427 In the 1960s, the West-German Bundesregierung invited guest workers
(Gastarbeiter) from other European countries, such as Turkey, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and
more. As the name suggests, the West-German administration had planned that the temporary
guest workers would eventually return to their home country once their contracts were fulfilled.
This concept proved challenging in practice, which is readily apparent today with the large
Turkish and Italian populations in Germany. The government had initially not taken into
consideration that those guest workers would put down roots in Germany and would be reluctant
– or refuse – to return to their home country.
The Vietnamese “Boat People” who arrived in Germany after the Second Indochina War
in 1978 were not considered temporary migrants and their return to Vietnam was not anticipated,
however, as they were fleeing the communist Vietnamese regime, after the US, the leading
nation in NATO, had lost the war against it and had withdrawn their troops. The German
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government was initially reluctant to accept refugees, but since the US and France accepted them
in great numbers – most likely out of guilt – they first decided to offer at least monetary
assistance.428 Eventually, the US as well as states (Länder) in Germany in which ChristianDemocratic Party (CDU/CSU) was the largest party in the government started pressuring the
Bundesregierung into accepting “Boat People” into West Germany.
A new and unique circumstance had pressured the government into accepting more
people: the televising of the Second Indochina War and the events at its very end in 1975, such
as the arrival of the Vietnamese on the Hai Hong, the cargo ship that was used to flee Vietnam.
The visualization of these atrocious events and the resulting media coverage mobilized many
Germans to exhibit solidarity, which then put even further pressure on the government.429 For
instance, one Spiegel article, “Große Gefahr” (“Great Danger”) dramatically started with the
following paragraph:

A stinky cloud of urine, feces, and sweat surround the ship. People relieve
themselves on the railing, others lay motionless on the rusted iron deck of the
deteriorated cargo ship. Everyone is emaciated and has red, feverish glossy eyes. The
children have rashes and scabs all over the body.430

A total of sixteen paragraphs discuss the “Odyssee” in a typical he said, she said Spiegel
fashion. The article concludes with a fragment of US Republican Senator Edward M. Kennedy’s
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quotation criticizing the “wait-and-see attitude” of West Germany that made him “seriously
question [their] human rights policies.”431 The news coverage and solidarity did not stop there;
the publishers of Die Zeit sent their journalists to the Malaysian island Pulau Bidong to report on
the overcrowded conditions of the countless “Boat People”. Upon reporting, the publisher
organized for 250 refugees to come to Germany, which the FRG government allowed in the
summer of 1979.432 Moreover, during the UN Indochina Conference in July 1979 in Geneva,
West Germany was pressured into taking 10,000 refugees.
The extensive media coverage informed West Germans about the Vietnamese suffering
and the conditions in their country, which then started solidary acts in different forms; not only
monetary aid was collected but jobs, adoptions, or sponsorships were offered.433 Compared to
East Germans, who were not informed of the reasons why contract workers were invited and
therefore developed hostile feelings towards them, West Germans were overall more welcoming
and accepting of the situation. Still, this welcoming attitude provides a rather shrill contrast with
the far less friendly behavior of many Western Germans toward the Gastarbeiter.
Over the years, the West-German government relaxed its policies and by 1990 around
45,000 Indochinese refugees were living in Germany.434 The refugees came to Germany under
the protective umbrella of the decisions made at the Geneva conference in 1954, when
participating nations defined rights of refugees. In practice this meant the offer of temporary
residence with the option of naturalization, and the right to education and work, among other
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things. However, since the “Boat People” were refugee in the sense that their lives and freedom
were put in danger, but they were not individually persecuted in their home country, their status
as de-facto refugee was not entirely clear.435 In West Germany, the “Kontingentflüchtling”
(“quota refugee”) – as the “Boat People” were termed because of the specific quota restriction –
did not have a clear legal status until the federal passed the “Program of the Federal Republic for
foreign refugees” that gave them the legal status of an asylum seeker on August 29, 1979.436
This clear political definition resulted in a more efficient and stronger integration into
Germany’s every-day life and culture than the North-Vietnamese contract workers in the GDR.
The economic situation of the West Germany’s “Boat People” was therefore more stable. This
became especially noticeable after unification, when contract workers not only struggled to
remain in Germany but also fought prejudice from both East Germans and their fellow
Vietnamese in the former West Germany.

AFTER UNIFICATION: WHAT NOW, MR. R?
The federal archives in Berlin house a few documents that perfectly reflected the chaotic and
uncertain state of affairs in the GDR after the fall of the Berlin Wall. A ruling decided by the
GDR and SRV administrations on January 25, 1990, determined the following changes of the
contract worker agreement from April 11, 1980: henceforth, enterprises would have to determine
the number of contract workers they want to hire in their facilities, while all the resulting costs
for this enterprise were to be absorbed by the companies (here an exact translation is interesting:
435
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“all costs associated with the commitment of the contract worker employment are to be
generated additionally by businesses”); the responsibility and organization of flights for the
contract workers (specifically mentioning the vacation and return flights) were to be realized by
the businesses/factories and the costs were to be assumed by either the guest worker or the
foreign country whose nationals they were; contract workers had the right to transfer to other
companies if both parties agreed; and lastly, the agreement was limited to four years with the
option of extension.437
How can this action taken towards the conservation and continuance of the agreement
after the fall of the Berlin Wall be interpreted? The GDR administration realized the
impracticality of maintaining its responsibility of the agreement, for example, covering all of its
high costs, considering the turmoil and diffuse situation during the unification process. The
administration undoubtedly anticipated that the enterprise would not be sustainable in the future.
By May of 1990 extensive meetings took place in Hanoi between both administrations to limit
the contract workers’ agreement to December 31, 1990. The new protocol signed on May 13,
1990, sought to lessen the financial burden imposed by contract workers upon the businesses that
were causing great distress and frustration among business/factory owners.438
In a lengthy exchange of letters that spanned over several months between Mr.
Meichsner, director of the textile factory VK Intex Chemnitz, Mrs. Klinke, sales representative
of the airline company Region Charter, and Mr. Schröder, GDR Ministry of Labor, a dispute
erupted over who was responsible for covering the flight costs of 2,000 Vietnamese contract
workers who were vacationing and then stuck in Vietnam and waiting for their return flights to
the GDR to be scheduled and paid – a quite pressing situation for everyone involved, especially
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the Vietnamese. All parties were eager to evade their responsibility in the matter. In the final
telex, dated June 19, 1990, Mr. Meichsner informed Mr. Schröder and Mrs. Klinke that the VK
Intex Chemnitz textile company would not exist any longer after July 1, 1990, and that therefore
all coordination of the contract workers’ flights will be concluded. On this telex is a handwritten
note, “What now Mr. R?”439 This question is particularly poignant, as it indubitably sums up the
chaos and ambiguity of the situation and also the overall debacle and perplexity the GDR, its
citizens, and its contract workers were experiencing. What now? Nobody knew the answer.
In the years since unification, a number of German journalists have examined
Vietnamese contract workers’ reflections on their time in East Germany. What many of these
accounts have in common is the Vietnamese contract workers’ nostalgia, admiration, and
affection for Germany, which stands in stark contrast to the West-German master narrative of the
GDR as a highly oppressive socialist country. One vivid illustration of the contract workers’
fondness for their host country was a 2008 Berlin exhibition called Bruderland ist abgebrannt
(“Fraternal Country has burned down”).440 Sponsored by the Amadeus Antonio Foundation (an
“initiative for civil rights and democratic culture”), this exhibition, for the first time, displayed
the lives of Vietnamese in the GDR as well as after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when their
fraternal country disappeared and they struggled to remain in (and part of) their new Heimat. The
purpose of this exhibition was to educate and inform the German people about the Vietnamese
presence in the GDR in the 1980s and why there was still a sizable Vietnamese population in
East Germany. The Amadeus Antonio Foundation introduced the content of the exhibition on
their website with the header: “An unknown chapter of the GDR is uncovered.”441
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Despite their desire to remain part of German culture, the Vietnamese contract workers
faced many difficulties following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. For instance, the struggles
of Vietnamese contract workers in maintaining employment and securing new positions
multiplied. According to data from the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (“Institute
for Labor Market and Employment Research”), two-and-a-half million East Germans lost their
jobs between 1989 and 1991, mainly due to the privatization and subsequent closing of
approximately 4,000 out of 14,000 East-German factories and businesses.442
What were formerly small crime activities, such as the selling of cigarettes, spiraled out
of control and a “cigarette mafia,” as newspapers called it, ignited and would terrorize parts of
Berlin by the mid-1990s. In 2017, Philipp Wurm published the article, Berlins Vietnamkrieg
(“Berlin’s Vietnam War”) in the Spiegel, recollecting the events of the day when six Vietnamese
were shot to death by an opposing Vietnamese gang in an effort to monopolize a certain area in
East Berlin.443
The negative news coverage and the depiction of the unemployed workers tarnished the
reputation of the northern/communist Vietnamese among their compatriots in Germany. In
“’There’s No Solidarity’; Nationalism and Belonging among Vietnamese Refugees and
Immigrants in Berlin,” Phi Hong Su described the tensions between the “Boat People” and
former contract workers.444 One of her Vietnamese interviewees claimed that “Germany has
reunified, but north and south [Vietnam] haven’t reunified.”445 Vietnamese in West Germany
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considered their behavior and culture to be more sophisticated and nuanced than the culture of
northern people, which strongly resembles the East and West conflicts about German identity,
specifically discussed in chapter two. According to Phi Hong Su, southern Vietnamese
complained about northern food and deemed it “boring,” whereas northern Vietnamese explained
that food scarcity and restricted resources in the north compared to the south were reasons for the
lack of variety in the dishes, which reflected the privilege of the south.446

THE NEW FACE OF EAST GERMANY
The lack of their compatriots’ support, as well as the collapse of their every-day infrastructure
because of the lack of political leadership, were not the only challenges the former contract
workers were facing in unified Germany. Hostility against foreigners increased in the Neue
Bundesländer of the former GDR. This was most likely due to the anger, frustration, and
disillusionment felt by East-German citizens as a result of social disruption and widespread
unemployment. It ultimately reached its peak because East Germans became ever more clearly
victims of the hasty unification progress, and perceiving foreigners as scapegoats was a
convenient, certainly predominantly unconscious, way of deviating aggression towards a system
that had exposed itself as dominant and uncompromising.
Nonetheless, hostilities against foreigners occurred in West Germany, as well. Only two
years after the extensive “Boat People” solidarity movement, xenophobic sentiments crept up in
Germany society and a “The boat is full” (“Das Boot ist voll”) rhetoric succeeded. Three specific
reasons fueled this anger: the economic crisis of the 1980s and the resulting increase of
unemployment, the realization that many Gastarbeiter had remained in Germany and had started
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to put down roots, and lastly, the politicians’ use of the new shibboleth “economic asylum
seeker” (“Wirtschaftsasylant”), ultimately depicting the refugees as asylum violators.447
After unification, attacks on immigrants and asylum seekers occurred on both sides and a
general debate on what makes a nation and democracy arose.448 However, the media particularly
focused on the Rostock-Lichtenhagen riots on August 24, 1992, as it represented one of the worst
post-Second World War attacks against foreigners in Germany. The 2014 German film Wir sind
jung. Wir sind stark (We are Young. We are Strong), directed by German filmmaker Burhan
Qurbani, gave an account of the the Rostock-Lichtenhagen riots and the specific events leading
to the escalation, when a large crowd of East Germans attacked the housing of Vietnamese
contract. Although the account is fictional, Qurbani aimed to recollect the riots as true to the
actual event as possible. While Qurbani was born and reared in Germany by Afghani parents, he
is nonetheless considered a “German with migration background” in Germany. This description
is specifically because of Qurbani’s parents’ migration status.449 This illustrates that the question
of what makes one “German” is complex.
When I interviewed Qurbani in 2017, he stated that he intended to visually illustrate the
“emotionale Überforderung” (“emotional feeling of exhaustion”) of East Germans.450 He
furthermore claimed that he and his co-author Martin Behnke determined that if they would have
been in East Germans’ shoes, they could have reacted the same way. This concept that East
Germans acted out of desperation is depicted throughout the film. In several instances, Qurbani
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alludes to the fact that East Germans, in general, are not xenophobic but use foreigners as
scapegoats for the German government’s failure to take care of their citizens and their resulting
misfortunes. The audience witnesses this in a straightforward manner, for instance, when Peter,
the only politician taking action against the riots, leaves a voice message to a colleague stating,
“We really are odd creatures. If things go well, they are the merry gypsies. If things go badly,
they are suddenly the filthy foreigners.”451 This is further reinstated during the climax of the
film, when the crowd of East Germans is assembling in front of the building and preparing to
attack. A group of protesters also gather, holding signs that say, “Foreigners are the scapegoats
of the East.”
Furthermore, Qurbani indicates in many ways that East-German adolescents contributed
to the riots out of sheer desperation and frustration and not from a firm ideological conviction.
This becomes evident when main actor Stefan, who will later take parts in the riots, gets agitated
when asked whether he is politically “left or right-wing?” to which he replies with a raised voice,
“I am normal… Can I just be normal?”452 Qurbani continually demonstrates how these
adolescents are confronted with challenges that are difficult to overcome not only because of
their immaturity but are even for adults impossible to solve. Qurbani referred to this as ”the
economic, political, and social crash after unification” (“ökonomischer, politischer, sozialer
Bruch nach der Wende”).453 In a scene when Stefan’s father first meets his son’s friend Robbie
and asks where they know each other from, Robbie replies that they met at the youth club that
has meanwhile closed its doors. “Now,” claims Robbie, “we are doing our own program,” which
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suggests that the youth is solely seeking entertainment as a distraction from an unfulfilling
life.454
The politicians who could have avoided the attacks are not depicted as being against the
Vietnamese but rather as pursuing their own agendas. The audience is introduced to three
different characters: Martin, who is sympathetic to the Vietnamese but ultimately lacks the
backbone to stand up for them, as he is afraid that it might hurt his career. Multiple times Martin
is seen training on an indoor rowing machine. He is rowing and rowing but not going anywhere,
which stands for his political efforts in real life. Peter is actively standing up for them, trying to
convince the media, people on the streets, and bystanders to stop their enterprise. And lastly
Jürgen, who lacks any sympathy, thinks that the protection of the Vietnamese should be the
police’s responsibility.
Qurbani suggests in numerous occasions that East Germans did not act out of sheer
hatred and xenophobia but out of desolation and despair. The audience witnesses various
instances when East Germans demonstrate kindness towards the contract workers and
disapproval of the radical East Germans’ behavior. This, however, does not change the fact that a
group of East Germans attacked the Sonnenblumenhaus, and, consequently, the Vietnamese
contract workers felt unwelcome in unified Germany.
The first fictional portion of the film leading up to the riots was shot in 16:9 ratio, black
and white, and mono sound, which makes the part more abstract. Qurbani then decided to change
into color, CinemaScope, and Dolby Surround once the riots start, in order for the viewer to
experience the film as “gelebte Realität” (“lived reality”).455 Qurbani claimed that this choice
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would make the audience feel as if they were participating in the event. He also made the actors
speak into the camera, therefore breaking the fourth wall. According to Qurbani, this choice was
made because he wanted to let the East Germans make a specific visual statement, “Look at us!,”
“Notice us!,” “We have something to say, too!,” or “We want to be heard!”456
Whereas the first part of the film was fiction, the second part that depicts the aggressions
on the lawn and the Sonnenblumenhaus were researched and a timetable of the real events was
meticulously followed, which made it seem like a documentary.457 Comparing Qurbani’s account
with live footage of the event filmed by Spiegel TV Media, it becomes evident that the filmmaker
committed to reflecting the actual event as accurately as possible. As a witness of the riots, Dr.
Richter explained that the atmosphere in the film depicted the actual events in a very authentic
way.
Parallel to the East-German struggle, the audience is confronted with the situation of the
Vietnamese contract workers, who, despite their shy and quiet nature and diligent work ethic, are
harassed and attacked by unemployed East Germans. Whereas most Vietnamese depicted in the
film are afraid of the dangerous behavior exhibited by East Germans and devastated about the
lack of support from local authorities, the main character Lien wants to stay. In one scene, she
even sides with East Germans and explains to her brother that they are only after the gypsies,
who deserve to be hated, as they do not work and exhibit poor hygiene. Lien claims that the
previous attacks against Vietnamese housing must have been a misunderstanding.
Whether she sincerely believes this or uses it as a tactic to appease her worrying brother
is unclear, but in numerous instances during the film, the audience sees Lien in close or friendly
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relationships with East Germans. In one scene, her boss fires an employee whose daughter calls
her “chink”; yet Lien shows compassion and does not want her to be fired. Furthermore, the boss
later states that he likes hiring Vietnamese contract workers, as they demonstrate praiseworthy
work ethics. Lien is also friends with a co-worker who is dating one of the active Neo-Nazis.
When Lien asks her friend why she is dating him, she gets upset and replies that Lien doesn't
even know him and that at least he is one who takes action and cleans the “pigsty” (referring to
the gypsies residing in the streets), which again implies that East Germans now have to take
matters in their own hands, as they are the forgotten or left behind.
In order for me to gain detailed knowledge about the riots, I interviewed Dr. Wolfgang
Richter, who was a witness of the event and also one of Qurbani’s adviser on set. In 1992, Dr.
Richter was Foreign Representative (Auslandsbeauftragter) in Rostock and inside of the
Sonnenblumenhaus with the Vietnamese when the riots and attacks occurred. During our
interview, he explained that the tense situation between East Germans and foreigners had been
increasing for weeks before the ultimate escalation.458 To understand the tension, he stated that it
is necessary to differentiate between the contract workers, such as the Vietnamese, and the Sinti
and Roma (or Gypsies) who were seeking asylum. In the past, the GDR had only invited contract
workers who legally worked and had therefore somewhat “earned” their place in society. The
Vietnamese, according to Dr. Richter, were seen as hard-working people and were appreciated.
However, the GDR had never accepted asylum seekers in the past, which changed after
unification, when the West-German asylum law came into force in the Neue Bundesländer as
well. In fact, in the GDR, only 0.51% of the population were foreigners; this number rose to 8%
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in 1992.459 Dr. Richter stated that, by 1992, so many Sinti and Roma had come to Rostock that
accommodation was not immediately possible, and the asylum seekers saw no other possibility
as to live on the lawn in front of the building where asylum applications were distributed. A lot
of time was wasted because the local politicians and the municipality refrained from taking
action and kept pushing the responsibility to someone else. Meanwhile, the condition on the lawn
became more and more unbearable to watch for the residents and feelings of anger increased and
later escalated. Dr. Richter explained that since this lawn happened to be next to the
Sonnenblumenhaus, the angry crowd – as in a pogrom - did not differentiate between Sinti and
Roma and Vietnamese anymore and let out all of their frustration with the politicians and
ultimately the government. What was most shocking to him was the fact that the police left for
approximately two hours, leaving the Vietnamese and him completely on their own and allowing
the situation to deescalate even further.
About a week after the riots, Der Spiegel published the lengthy article, “A Serious Sign
on the Wall,” at last providing a fair assessment of the situation and even criticizing the
government.460 The article started with the sentence, “The ones in Bonn [the federal
government], as it appears, have once again not figured it out.”461 The unnamed author first
criticized Chancellor Kohl for not having properly addressed the riots and not having offered his
empathy to the victims. Instead Kohl had distracted from the topic, and therefore, downplayed it
by asserting that such xenophobic attacks occurred in other countries, too. Kohl even blamed
former Stasi members, who “in all probability” had instigated and led the riots.462 The “victims

459

“Ernstes Zeichen an der Wand,” Der Spiegel, August 31, 1991, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d13689982.html.
460
Ibid.
461
Ibid.
462
Ibid.

197

of unity,” as the author called East Germans, had for the first time “unloaded their anger [..]
about the state, from which they felt betrayed and sold” and had turned the neighborhood into “a
battlefield in the fight against the republic.” 463 Several East Germans are quoted saying, “The
people are frustrated,” “We are the Turks in the country,” or more radical, “We are the shit on
the wall.”464 According to the article, errors were made during the unification negotiations: the
Währungsunion caused the inability of former customers from the East to pay in Deutsche Mark,
the resulting downfall of many business, and finally the high unemployment rate. What the
article also pointed out was that the “treasure of their [East-German] experiences” was not worth
anything anymore in unified Germany. Another crucial reason that resulted in these riots mainly
led by young people, previously discussed in Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark, was the
disappearance of federal youth organizations in East Germany, such as the Young Pioneers
(Junge Pioniere) that had offered youth and adolescents, “the feeling of togetherness and social
security.”465
In light of such violence and obstacles as depicted in the film, some 50,000 Vietnamese
returned to Vietnam after German unification. One of them was Mr. Kha, another one of the
Moritzburger Vietnamese previously mentioned in this chapter. Until today he participates in the
annual class reunion of all Moritzburger that is organized by the German ambassador in
Hanoi.466 During those meetings, attendees recall their experiences in the GDR. Martin Spiewak,
the journalist who had interviewed Mr. Kha and other contract workers in 1994, suggests that
although many had never been back to Germany after their experience as contract workers, their
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“nostalgic unbroken love for Germany” persisted for decades. Spiewak observed German traces
of the GDR during many curious encounters while in Hanoi. For instance, one cab driver with a
Saxonian accent asked him who the next German soccer champion would be. Countless
situations such as these demonstrate that many Vietnamese took a part of Germany back with
them to Vietnam. According to Spiewak, Vietnamese people were aware that they benefitted
from their time in Germany and embraced their “second identity,” as they were able to apply the
skills learned in Germany in the job market in Vietnam. Spiewak suggests that during their time
in Germany, Vietnamese workers were able to accumulate a “one-of-a-kind capital.” He was not
referring to money, but to language, contacts, and life experiences. French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu referred to this as cultural capital and social capital. Cultural capital can be
accumulated in form of, for instance, education (Bildung) or training, and social capital, though
social networks. According to Bourdieu, to some extent, both of them, are transformable into
economic capital (money).467
As this illustrates, the case of Vietnamese contract workers sheds important light on the
crisis of identity in the GDR. Spiewak’s interviewees lamented that Germans did not know about
Vietnamese contract workers in East Germany, or that they have simply forgotten about them.
Mr. Kha openly shared this sentiment. He claimed that German citizens did not do enough to
maintain friendships, despite the fact that East and West Germans were so admired in Vietnam.
To them, their Germany (meaning the GDR) had just expanded. It was the same place but with
larger borders.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter demonstrated that numerous former Vietnamese contract workers not only
identified as German but also held fond memories of their time in the GDR, memories they
cherish and passed onto the next generation until today. Although some East Germans sincerely
supported the official solidarity towards their socialist fraternal country and acted upon it, the
integration of Vietnamese contract workers was contested.
Pre-unification, it was the GDR administration’s ambiguous behavior towards the
contract workers that often led to social marginalization and multifaceted forms of
discrimination. On one hand, the contract-worker-agreement enterprise was disguised as a
service to the fraternal country. However, their integration into German every-day life was (by
both countries) discouraged. The GDR administration reinforced patriarchal ways to control the
contract workers at work and home. Furthermore, the East-German public was not informed or
educated about the contract workers’ different culture and habits, and, thus, East Germans never
learned how to interact with foreigners. The Vietnamese “Boat People” in West Germany also
did not offer much comfort or understanding to their fellow Vietnamese in the East, as they had
settled in West Germany with more political and legal certainty (even than the Gastarbeiter) and
had experienced cultural integration. Moreover, the ideological clash between North and South
Vietnam transferred to Germany and seemed difficult to overcome.
After unification, the Vietnamese in East Germany were left stranded in a unified country
that was struggling with, as it seems, far more pressing issues. The archival documents illustrate
the challenges the East-German companies were facing on deciding the future of their contract
workers all the while fighting bankruptcy and closure, which resulted in a back-and-forth shifting
of responsibilities and ultimately leaving many Vietnamese fend for themselves.
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The Rostock-Lichtenhagen riots were a direct result of the hopelessness, desperation, and
frustration the East German felt after unification, when they faced unemployment and real
existential threats for the first time in their lives in the new economy and social order. The
euphoria of unification experienced by the majority of Germans and their contract workers was
rapidly crushed. The hasty process of unification resulted in the desolation and frustration of East
Germans with their contract workers. The increase in unemployment and the cultural “take-over”
of the West were two reasons why the Vietnamese were seen as the scapegoat of East Germans’
unhappiness and racist behavior and remarks became more blatant and violent after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, when discontent reached its peak during the Rostock-Lichtenhagen riots. Using
foreigners as scapegoats offered a convenient escape from a sober reality and from the Western
perpetrator they could not contest. “Where social belonging becomes instable, there is a return of
categories, such as skin color, race, and nation … then only the certainty … to be German
remains” and then “violence becomes a tendency,” expert of right-wing extremism Wilhelm
Heitmeyer stated.468
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Figure 6: The Sonnenblumenhaus in Rostock-Lichtenhagen469
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CONCLUSION

Shortly before unification, on April 19, 1990, Lothar de Maizière delivered a State of the
Nation Address in front of the Volkskammer:

We are asked: Do we have nothing to bring to the German unification? And we
reply: Yes, we do! We bring our country and our people, we bring created values and our
diligence, our education and our ability to improvise […] We bring the experience of the
last decades that we share with East European countries. We bring our sensibility for
social justice, for solidarity and tolerance […] We bring our bitter and proud experiences
on the threshold of conformation and opposition. We bring our identity and our dignity.
Our identity is our history and culture, our failures and our accomplishments, our ideals
and our sufferings. Our dignity is our human right for self-determination.470

In 1990, East Germans agreed to join West Germany. Although they were aware of their
failed political system, they were proud of their cultural and other accomplishments outside of
politics. During the unification treaty negotiations, East-German politicians requested for both
cultures to be part of the unified Germany; a new country that would benefit from two different
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experiences and two different peoples. East Germans asked for specific symbols that would
reflect this, for instance, a new flag or a national anthem that would combine lyrics and melodies
of both countries. However, West-German politicians of the leading party did not grant these
symbolic wishes on the grounds that the West-German economy, legal system, and social norms
were superior and had passed the test of time. This attitude set the pattern of a consistent and
continual denying of East-German legitimacy and respect on a cultural, political, and social level
with ramifications lasting until the present day.
In chapter one, I discussed how on a political level, West Germany propagated this
narrative of West-German superiority during the negotiations about the unification treaty.
Symbols that could have united Germans and made East Germans feel like they belonged and
contributed in the new country were denied. Even East-German laws that were more progressive
than the ones observed in West Germany were initially dismissed by West Germans, only to be
implemented a few years after unification. I also discussed how several leading East-German
politicians were confronted with Stasi allegations without conclusive proof and how the media
turned this into a witch hunt against them, completely disregarding objective reporting. This
obsessive and harsh public scrutiny of East-German politicians devastated many East Germans
and even motivated a suicide. In the case of East-German politician Gregor Gysi, Stasi
allegations keep resurfacing until today as part of ad hominem attacks.
In chapter two, I turned to the arts and examined how West-German intellectuals used
cultural channels to undermine the identity and accomplishments of East-German artist. I
examined the Literature Dispute (Literaturstreit), in which acclaimed East-German author
Christa Wolf’s work was publicly shamed based on her former party affiliation in the GDR. I
present evidence that her work was not appropriately evaluated according to its merits, but
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merely on her former communist-party affiliation and her unwillingness to condemn an ideology
and country that she had once believed in. Wolf, too, was accused of having worked for the
Stasi. However, the fact that she admitted her involvement and proof was uncovered that she had
only written positive reports about the people she informed in her reports; she therefore did not
cause any harm, but this did not exonerate her, and the press continued to mock her.
In the second part of this chapter, I also illustrated how East Germans in everyday life
were navigating through a country that had become foreign to them. For this, I close read two
German Wende films, Good Bye, Lenin! and Berlin is in Germany, ideal examples of the ways in
which identity is negotiated by East-German citizens as a result of West-German cultural biases
and stereotyping.471 Although these films are fictional, they represent how Germans construct
and perceive the way they imagine their world and the ways others (East Germans) exist. Both
films feature an East-German hero and the struggles he faces, and therefore, help explain the
ramification of the West-German sense of superiority manifested in the everyday life of the East
German. Again, I demonstrated how East-German artists and citizens were consistently mocked
for their allegedly inferior culture and denied legitimacy.
In chapter three I examined spaces. I specifically elaborated on the problematic and
highly contested destruction of the Palast der Republik, as an example of how a cultural space
and cherished retreat of East Germans was demolished only to be replaced by an archaic symbol
of the Prussian monarchy. I wrote about the architects of the palace and how their modern
design, resembling the Bauhaus style, was ridiculed and a feasible and less expensive proposal
for repurposing the palace was denied. Lastly, again with the examples of Good Bye, Lenin! and
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Berlin is in Germany, I explained how such spatial transformations in East Germany further
alienated East Germans in their own country.
I dedicated a final chapter to the Vietnamese contract workers in East Germany, who
struggled to legally remain in unified Germany, while fighting for acceptance from Germans and
their own (South) Vietnamese compatriots. Similar to East Germans, Vietnamese who had come
to the GDR did not share the same ideology as South Vietnamese and were treated as unwanted
outsiders. I provided a close reading of the film Wir sind jung. Wir sind stark, based on the actual
xenophobic attack on contract-worker housing in East Germany after unification, that explains
the East-German anger leading to attack. The high unemployment, the abolition of cultural
institutions such as youth clubs, and the loss of hope for a better life after unification caused a
void that the adolescents depicted in the film attempted to fill. The contract workers and asylum
seekers “taking up space” in their country was a perfect scapegoat for the unfulfilled promises
and “blooming sceneries” that Chancellor Kohl had promised the East Germans.472
A lot has been written about German unification, the rushed unification process, the
Literaturstreit, the specific Wende films, the Palast der Republik, and the East-German contract
workers. However, the main goal of this dissertation was to group all these examples together
and illustrate the consistent and continuous denying of East-German legitimacy and respect after
unification in all areas of life. Though one of these examples might not be sufficient to make this
argument, this compilation of cases makes it impossible to deny a pattern.
The denying of East-German accomplishments and culture has lasting effects. In chapter
one, I discussed the different reactions of politicians, which ran from resignation all the way to
suicide. In chapter two, I wrote about Christa Wolf’s departure to the United States as a direct
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result of her defamation in the West. Chapter three examined the East-Germany's architects and
their public shaming in magazines and their withdrawal into oblivion. It seemed germane there to
refer to a poll conducted in 2007 showed that three-fourths of all East Germans still felt like
second-class citizens.473
Although this dissertation did not aim to prove that the current xenophobic sentiments
and the increasing support for right-wing parties and movements, such as the AfD and the
PEGIDA, are a direct result of this feeling of being left behind, this is definitely suggested by the
trajectory followed by the East Germans. These radical political philosophies are experienced as
providing “an outlet for frustration.”474 Since 2014, these movements have gained more
supporters and the AfD has now been voted into the Bundestag and has therefore become a threat
for German democracy.
As discussed in my introductions, East Germans such as Marieke Reimann and Thomas
Oberender have started to rewrite the narrative and have attempted to focus the West-German
attention to East-German concerns, away from the Stasi and unethical state narrative that prevail
until the present day. For future scholarship, I would welcome a new dialogue with East
Germans that could lead to more inclusive policies and decisions. Those include the adjusting of
wages, as continually proposed by Gregor Gysi, or the hiring of East Germans in leading
(academic) positions. But I am also suggesting small changes in everyday life. A start could be
the inclusion of the Gläserne Blume or other East-German art from the Palast der Republik in the
new Stadtschloß. Ultimately, such small symbolic changes were what the East Germans initially
longed for and were deprived of after the unification in 1990, which appears to have often
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resembled an annexation rather than a merger of two equal partners, the previously sovereign
polities of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.
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